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ABSTRACT
Salkovskis' cognitive model of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD, 1985) has led to a
wealth of research which has identified a number of cognitive vulnerabilities thought to be
characteristic of the disorder. Schemata related to responsibility, guilt, faulty meta-
cognitive beliefs, thought action fusion and the appropriateness of neutralisation have been
associated with OCD symptomatology. However, the majority of research has used non¬
clinical subjects, with varying criteria and methodology, leading to problems in
interpreting the results. More recent work (Sookman et al, 1994) has attempted to develop
a multidimensional model of OCD. The emphasis is on addressing early attachment
experience to examine the possible aetiology of core schemata. Subsequent research has
not reflected the need to develop this comprehensive approach to our understanding of
OCD: cognitive theorists have continued to examine cognitive schemata in isolation;
separate research has addressed personality factors such as perfectionism; a third vein has
examined OCD patients' reports of parenting. In the current paper, 20 subjects with a
diagnosis of OCD and an anxious control group of 20 subjects are compared on a number
ofmeasures, aimed at examining i) OCD related schemata (Inventory of Beliefs Related to
Obsessions, Freeston et al 1993), ii) experience of parenting (Parental Bonding Instrument,
Parker et al, 1979) and iii) the fundamental personality dimensions of sociotropy and
autonomy (Personal Style Inventory, Robins et al, 1994). The paper compares scores on
these measures between experimental and control groups to examine OCD specificity and
confirm the unique role of particular schemata in a clinical OCD group. The relationship
between early experience, cognitive vulnerability and OCD symptomatology is examined
in an attempt to incorporate these factors into a comprehensive account of OCD which
links early experience to OCD through the mediating influence of dysfunctional
assumptions and cognitive vulnerabilities.
INTRODUCTION
The development of cognitive theories and treatments of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder
(OCD) had been slow in comparison to advances in understanding and treatment of other
anxiety disorders. Various authors expressed surprise at this underdevelopment of ideas,
particularly in view of the recent rise of cognitive therapy for mood and anxiety disorders
(Salkovskis, 1985; Van Oppen & Arntz, 1994). The slow development of cognitive
accounts of OCD is even more remarkable given that cognitions play an obvious and
crucial role in the disorder in terms of the obsessional thought. Salkovskis (1985) argued
that "obsessional thinking is the archetypal example of a cognitive disorder in the
neuroses" (p 571). His proposed cognitive model led to a wealth of research into cognitive
theory and treatment ofOCD.
The current paper will begin by examining early cognitive accounts of OCD before
looking at Salkovskis' model in detail. Experimental studies aimed at validating and
developing this model will then be reviewed, which will include a critical examination of
the dominant methodology of employing non-clinical participants in OCD research. More
recent work on cognitive treatment for OCD will be examined to highlight the practical
application and efficacy of cognitive techniques in OCD. The final section of the
introduction will focus on the need to address early experience and its relevance to OCD in
terms of the development of cognitive vulnerabilities. The hypotheses and aims of the
current study will be developed from the literature review.
Early Cognitive Models of OCD
In his development of cognitive models of depression and anxiety disorders, Beck (1976)
did propose a cognitive account of OCD. His explanation pointed to the role of thoughts of
danger in terms of warning or doubt. As these thoughts are common in other anxiety
disorders, Beck differentiated OCD by stating that "the thoughts differ from those of the
anxiety neurotic in that they are concerned with an action the patient believes he should
have taken or an action he should not have taken" (Beck, 1976, p 88). Compulsions were
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regarded as an attempt through action, to allay the obsessional thoughts and doubts. Beck
did not develop the model further and thus provided only a very limited account ofOCD.
Carr (1974) had previously developed a fuller cognitive model of OCD. He drew on
Lazarus' (1966) work on threat appraisal, which postulated that an individual's evaluation
of a situation will be in terms of its harmful implications. Carr's main hypothesis therefore
was that "the compulsive neurotic always makes an abnormally high subjective estimate of
the probability of the undesired outcome" (Carr, 1974, p 316). This idea was seen to be
supported by findings that compared to other psychiatric groups, obsessive compulsive
patients were more cautious in terms of risk-taking activities (Steiner, 1972). The model
also identified the presence of high subjective cost of a feared event. This high subjective
cost was felt to be situation specific and not higher than in non-obsessive compulsives.
However, it had significance due to the interaction with the pre-existing high subjective
probability of outcome. It was further argued that because the "compulsive neurotic"
always made abnormally high subjective estimates of the probability of the undesired
outcome, all potentially harmful situations would generate a high level of threat with
subsequent anxiety. Compulsions were explained as threat reducing activities which
lowered the subjective probability of outcome and were reinforced by the reduction of
anxiety and their 'success' in averting the unfortunate outcome. While the model is
important in terms of addressing cognitive explanations of OCD for the first time, it failed
to provide sufficient evidence to support its proposals. It also failed to explain why
obsessive compulsive patients had the high subjective estimate of the cost and probability
of unfavourable events.
McFall & Wollersheim (1979) developed a subsequent model of OCD based on the work
of Lazarus (1966) and Carr's model (1974). Their model emphasised "deficits" in primary
and secondary appraisals as well as suggesting unrealistic beliefs which negatively
influenced these appraisals. The primary appraisal made in response to threat was said to
involve an estimation of danger of an event, relative to the person's perceived ability to
cope with it. The beliefs proposed as associated with this appraisal were i) one should be
perfect, ii) making mistakes results in punishment or condemnation, iii) one is powerful
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enough to initiate or prevent the occurrence of disastrous outcomes, and iv) certain
thoughts and feelings are unacceptable and could lead to a catastrophe. The primary
appraisals would result in an increase in anxiety and the obsessive compulsive behaviour
developed due to the secondary appraisal made of the likely consequences of efforts to
cope with the threat. These secondary appraisals would be influenced by the beliefs that i)
if something is or may be dangerous, one should be terribly upset by it, ii) magical rituals
in obsessive ruminating will circumvent feared outcomes, iii) it is easier and more
effective to carry out a magical ritual than it is to confront one's feelings/thoughts directly
and iv) feelings of uncertainty and loss of control are intolerable, should make one afraid
and something must be done about them. As a result of these beliefs, the obsessional
patients saw themselves as helpless to cope with the perceived threat and the compulsive
behaviour would be carried out to prevent the undesired event. It was hypothesised that
the distressing compulsions were viewed as more tolerable than the feelings of guilt which
were related to the initial intrusive thought.
Although the model expands on Carr's (1974) work, particularly in its attempt to identify
specific unreasonable or faulty beliefs associated with the primary and secondary
appraisals, it has been quite heavily criticised by Salkovskis (1985). He viewed the model
as attempting the perhaps too difficult task of "bridging the gap" between behavioural and
psychoanalytic theory. Salkovskis was clearly uncomfortable with the model's
dependence on pre-conscious and unconscious cognitions, despite them being said to be
'closer to the individual's awareness' than would be in psychoanalytic theory. He also
criticised the absence of differentiation between the negatively influenced threat appraisals
of the obsessionals and other anxious patients. Salkovskis questioned the benefits of
developing psychodynamic concepts when their use in the treatment ofOCD has been poor
(Cawley, 1974).
Salkovskis' Model of OCD.
Salkovskis (1985) proposed his own cognitive model of OCD based on Beck's cognitive
theories. His account drew together research carried out in OCD to that time, as well as
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using case examples to highlight and support aspects of the model. The model has now
become widely accepted and has generated a dramatic increase in the amount of research
published on the cognitive theory and treatment ofOCD.
Numerous studies had shown that negative intrusive thoughts are experienced by the
majority (84 - 99%) of non-clinical individuals (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Niler & Beck,
1989; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau & Gagnon, 1991). Salkovskis & Harrison's
(1984) replication of the first study of the incidence of intrusive thoughts in a normal
population (Rachman & de Silva, 1978) found that 88.2% of a sample (n = 178) reported
experiencing obsessional thoughts and impulses. This compared to 79.8% in Rachman &
de Silva's original study. While various methodologies have been used, the consistently
high percentages reported and the comparable results from close replication of studies
indicate the relative 'normality' of experiencing intrusive thoughts and images. A more
recent study has shown that compulsive behaviours are also common in the normal
population (Muris, Merckebach & Clavan, 1997). Because of the high incidence of
intrusive thoughts in the normal population, a significant factor needed to be found to
account for the development of obsessional and compulsive problems to clinically
significant levels in some individuals.
Salkovskis (1985) argued that cognitive intrusions in clinical obsessionals and non-clinical
populations are essentially similar in content, but are processed in a different way.
Thoughts that have no particular salience (in terms of personal implications) will not be
processed further, whereas salient intrusions will receive further processing, such as
evaluation of the thought and appraisals of harm. His account of OCD is based on the
fundamental distinction between obsessional or intrusive thoughts and negative automatic
thoughts. Rachman (1981) defines intrusive thoughts as "repetitive thoughts, images or
impulses that are unacceptable and /or unwanted" (p 89). He goes on to propose necessary
conditions for a thought to be intrusive: "the subjective report that it is interrupting an
ongoing activity; the thought, image or impulse is attributed to an internal origin and is
difficult to control." The negative automatic thoughts, in contrast are "elicited by stimuli
(actual external events or thoughts about events)" and are "plausible or reasonable,
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although they may have seemed far fetched to somebody else. The patients accepted their
validity without question and without testing out their reality or logic" (Beck, 1976, p 36.)
Salkovskis (1985) proposed that the properties of intrusive thoughts and negative
automatic thoughts differ in nine main characteristics. The most significant differences are
said to lie in perceived intrusiveness, accessibility of consciousness (intrusive thoughts
being more accessible) and the extent to which the thought is congruent with the
individual's belief system. Salkovskis employs the terms "ego syntonic" and "ego
dystonic" to differentiate between this congruence or incongruence with the belief system,
stating that "obsessions are incongruent with the individual's belief system [ego dystonic]
unlike negative automatic thoughts which are an expression of it" [ego syntonic] (p 573).
This distinction forms one of the major components of his cognitive theory.
Salkovskis argued that the obsessional thought acts as a stimulus which elicits negative
automatic thoughts through interaction between the intrusion and the individual's belief
system or schemata. The negative automatic thoughts were hypothesised to be related to
ideas of responsibility, both for causing harm to self or others as well as possible ideas of
responsibility for having had the thought itself. Thus responsibility is linked both to the
content and the occurrence of a distressing, ego dystonic thought. Neutralisation, either as
an overt compulsion or covert cognitive ritual is therefore understood as an attempt to
reduce personal responsibility, to avoid being blamed by self or others and to "put things
right". Reassurance seeking is understood in terms of the model as an attempt to share
responsibility with others.
Salkovskis later attempted to clarify the concepts of responsibility and neutralisation. The
importance of 'pivotal power' in responsibility was stressed. Responsibility is defined as
"the belief that one has power which is pivotal to bring about or prevent subjectively
crucial negative outcomes. The outcomes may be actual, that is, having consequences in
the real world, and/or at a moral level." (Salkovskis, Rachman, Ladouceur & Freeston,
1992, cited by Salkovskis, Richards & Forrester, 1995, p 285). Neutralising is defined as
"voluntarily initiated and conducted activity which is intended to have the effect of
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reducing the perceived level of responsibility" (Salkovskis et al, 1995, p 285). The
compulsive behaviour or neutralising activity is negatively reinforced by a reduction in
anxiety/distress, and therefore increases the probability of subsequent neutralising as an
'effective' coping strategy. Salkovskis also argued that as the neutralisation is consistently
followed by the absence of the expected punishment, which is a powerful reinforcer, the
perceived validity of the beliefs will increase. The example given is "I acted on my belief
and felt better, therefore the belief must have some basis in truth." More recently,
Salkovskis et al (1995) suggested that behaviours such as neutralising can also serve to
increase the sense of responsibility. If someone accepts that they can prevent harm, then
perceived responsibility may be increased, for if one can influence an event, some
responsibility for the possible outcomes must be assumed; "so by acting to reduce
responsibility, one implicitly accepts the implication of being responsible in the first
place" (Salkovskis et al, 1995, p 288).
Salkovskis, Westbrook, Davis, Jeavons & Gledhill (1997) recently examined the role of
neutralisation in the aetiology of OCD. The study used non-clinical participants who were
screened for intrusive thoughts, and only personally relevant intrusive thoughts were used
in the experiment. The study was based on evidence that attempts to suppress unwanted
thoughts in the normal population often produce a paradoxical increase in the frequency of
these thoughts (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994; Wegner,
Schneider, Carter & White, 1987; Lavy & van den Hout, 1990). They found that when
participants were asked to neutralise intrusive thoughts, more discomfort was associated
with subsequent presentation of the same thoughts compared to participants asked to use a
distraction strategy. This discomfort was also accompanied by a greater urge to neutralise
and distract and actually increased participants' reports of their rate of neutralising
(contrary to experimental instructions). It was noted that participants asked to neutralise
did experience a reduction in self-reported anxiety after the first presentation of the
intrusive thoughts. Clearly, the participants would not have been aware that this short term
'benefit' would then result in a dramatic increase in anxiety and discomfort after a delay.
The authors concluded that neutralising should be viewed as a self-perpetuating
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mechanism in obsessionals which serves to maintain the obsessional/compulsive
behaviours.
Finally, Salkovskis' model addressed the importance of dysfunctional schemata in the
development and maintenance of OCD. In his development of the cognitive model of
depression, Beck (1967) examined the role of self concepts or schemata. He proposed that
individuals form concepts from their experiences, and the attitudes and opinions
communicated to them by others. Some of these concepts or attitudes are said to "deviate
from reality and produce vulnerability to possible psychological disorders" (Beck, 1967, p
275). Beck argued that unless extinguished, these concepts became 'structuralised' as a
permanent formation in cognitive organisation. This cognitive structure or schema
remains permanently with the individual, even though it may be dormant. A schema is
defined by Beck as " a structure for screening, coding and evaluating the stimuli that
impinge on the organism" (Beck, 1967, p 283). Saffan, Seagal, Hill & Whiffen (1990)
described schemata as "pre-existing memory representations which are employed in a
constructive fashion during retrieval but also impose their own structure on new
information" (Safran et al, 1990, p 144). Salkovskis' model examined schemata in terms
of Beck's concept of dysfunctional assumptions (Beck, 1976). Salkovskis listed a number
of assumptions likely to be operating in OCD, including i) having a thought about an
action is like performing the action, ii) failing to prevent (or failing to try to prevent) harm
to self or others is the same as having caused the harm in the first place, and iii) one should
and can exercise control over one's thoughts. He stresses that the assumptions are likely to
vary considerably but that through interaction with the intrusive thoughts, the
dysfunctional assumptions will produce negative automatic thoughts related to blame,
threat and loss. Salkovskis did not expand on how these dysfunctional assumptions
relevant to OCD are developed.
Salkovskis went on to explain that if the negative automatic thoughts resulting from the
obsessional thought do not involve themes of responsibility or blame, then not only is
neutralisation very unlikely to occur, but the negative automatic thoughts would be likely
to lead to increases in anxiety or depression. Van Oppen & Arntz (1994) developed an
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interesting matrix which incorporates current understanding of anxiety, depression and
obsessive compulsive problems to delineate them clearly. The matrix has dimensions of
danger and responsibility. Danger is split into past or future event, and responsibility is
divided into either high or low responsibility for an act or event. The different matrix
dimensions allow comparison of conditions such as OCD, anxiety and depression, while at
the same time highlighting the important differences between them (see Figure 1). Thus,
both OCD and depression are similar in terms of the responsibility dimension but differ in
terms of past and future events. Similarly, anxiety and OCD both relate to future
'catastrophe' but differ in terms of level of perceived responsibility.
catastrophe in the past catastrophe in the future




low responsibility resentment anxiety
phobias
Figure 1: OCD compared with other anxiety disorders and depression, taken from Van
Oppen & Arntz (1994)
Salkovskis' model (1985) prompted a wealth of research, both attempting to find support
for the model as well as to develop it further. The following section reviews experimental
studies to explain current understanding of obsessive compulsive problems.
Experimental Studies on the Role ofResponsibility in OCD
The role of responsibility in OCD now appears to be widely accepted. In 1980, Rachman
& Hodgson noted that stimuli that would normally have caused distress and compulsions
in patients with OCD did not lead to checking rituals in the presence of an experimenter.
The explanation of this phenomenon was that the responsibility had been shared with the
experimenter, thus removing the sense of responsibility and subsequent discomfort from
the obsessive compulsive individual. This finding is similar to the behaviour Rachman
(1993) reported in relation to obsessional patients when admitted to psychiatric hospitals.
He observed that on admission, patients displayed little or none of their compulsive
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behaviours. It was only when they became accustomed to the ward that the behaviour
began to re-emerge. Rachman interpreted this as the patients gradually developing an
association or affiliation with the ward and its routine, which then led to the development
of a "sense of responsibility for its management and security" (Rachman, 1993, p 150). He
argued that people with OCD experience "little or no responsibility in the homes or
workplace of other people. They feel responsible within their own psychological
territory." (Rachman, 1993, p 150).
Although providing interesting interpretations of observations, these studies did not
empirically examine the role of responsibility in OCD. A series of studies with non¬
clinical and clinical groups have shown links between responsibility and OCD
symptomatology (Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon & Thibodeau, 1992; Freeston, Ladouceur,
Gagnon & Thibodeau, 1993; Salkovskis & Dent, 1989). Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran &
Woody (1995) attempted to examine the significance of responsibility in OCD using the
Responsibility Questionnaire (RAQ). Four factors emerged from the questionnaire:
responsibility for harm; responsibility in social contexts; a positive outlook towards
responsibility; and thought action fusion (TAF). Thought action fusion has been defined in
two ways: the belief that thinking about a harmful act is morally equivalent to carrying out
that act (TAF moral) and the belief that thinking about an event happening will increase
the chances that it will actually happen (TAF likelihood). Correlations with obsessionality
(measured by the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory, Hodgson & Rachman,
1977) were only strongly significant for TAF. The authors concluded that people with
OCD may not have a generally inflated sense or responsibility, but that the sense of
responsibility may be situation specific. However, their use of non-clinical participants is
problematic and this practice will be addressed in a later section. Furthermore, the
cognitive model proposed by Salkovskis stresses that the intrusion, through interaction
with the dysfunctional schemata causes negative automatic thoughts related to ideas of
responsibility for harm. Rachman et al's (1995) study appears to have misinterpreted the
concept of responsibility in OCD, as Salkovskis did not seem to have suggested that those
with OCD have a generally inflated sense of responsibility per se.
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Rheaume, Ladouceur, Freeston & Letarte, (1995) again using non-clinical participants,
attempted to validate the new definition of responsibility in terms of pivotal power.
Participants were asked to describe a possible negative outcome for 14 obsessive
compulsive relevant situations like contamination, somatic concerns, loss of control and
sexuality, which they rated in terms of probability, severity, influence and pivotal
influence, and then perceived relevance and perceived responsibility. Only situations
evaluated as very relevant were included in the analysis in an attempt to improve the
validity of the study. Regression analysis suggested that influence and pivotal influence
were the best predictors of responsibility ratings and better than probability or severity of
outcome. A second study where the order of situations was changed also showed pivotal
influence as the best predictor of responsibility. The authors concluded that the results
provided support for Salkovskis' model of OCD in which pivotal influence (i.e. control
over outcome) is the central responsibility schema in OCD patients. They further
concluded that the tendency in OCD to overestimate the probability and severity of
possible negative outcomes should be viewed as a separate schema: "general anxious
threat", which may be necessary but not sufficient for the development of OCD.
Experimental manipulations of responsibility in both clinical and non-clinical groups is a
method most recently employed. Ladouceur, Rheaume, Freeston, Aublet, Jean, Lachance,
Langlois & De Pokomandy-Morin (1995), using a non-clinical group manipulated feelings
of responsibility as either low or high by setting participants a task which the researcher
either explained was of no importance/significance or highly important. The experimental
description involved responsibility over changing the type of equipment at pedestrian
crossings, to reduce the number of accidents. A manipulation check showed that the bogus
information given to participants did result in the required level of perceived
responsibility. The first study showed no differences in checking, number of errors made
or the time taken to complete the task between the high and low responsibility groups.
Only perceived anxiety showed significant differences. The experiment was repeated
using a different manipulation which produced significantly stronger effects. On this
occasion, the high responsibility group did show more hesitations and checking, while
there was no difference in the time spent on the task or errors made. The authors
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concluded that responsibility and compulsive like behaviour are linked. The use of
behavioural measures to examine the effects of increased responsibility was a change from
previous studies that have used self-report, and should provide more reliable results.
However, the use of non-clinical participants again means that care should be taken in
drawing firm conclusions about the role of responsibility in clinical levels ofOCD.
Lopatka & Rachman (1995) improved on the previous study by employing clinical groups
in their analysis. The choice of measurement however was self-report rather than
behavioural. Participants (n = 30) all met DSM III-R criteria for OCD. The study used a
within-subject repeated measures design with responsibility manipulated by either
instructing the participant that they or the experimenter would accept full responsibility
for any outcome or imperfection. The manipulation of perceived responsibility was judged
to be effective from participant self-report. It was found that decreased perceived
responsibility did result in decreases in reported discomfort and urge to check. There were
further decreases in estimates of probability and severity of anticipated harm, perceived
panic, and the likelihood and severity of anticipated criticism. Increased responsibility
produced increases in discomfort and urge to check, but the results were not significant.
The authors explained this by suggesting that participants' level of perceived responsibility
may already have been high and therefore difficult to manipulate even higher. Two
cognitive biases were also encountered. Firstly, perceived responsibility was not affected
by the person's sense of control over the activity. Secondly, a decline in perceived
responsibility was followed by a decline in the perceived probability of the event
occurring. These biases seem to support the work on the role of pivotal influence in
responsibility, so that even if the person has relatively little control over an event, the
cognitive bias may maintain a high sense of responsibility. Pivotal influence therefore
seems to mean that while the individual may have relatively little overall power, the small
amount of power they have may be enough to 'tip the balance' in terms of feeling
responsible. The authors also suggested that the confusion of responsibility and
probability may be accentuated if the person feels pivotally responsible for preventing an
undesired outcome.
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The results of the studies discussed suggest that a heightened sense of responsibility and
particularly pivotal influence, have a significant role in the maintenance of OCD. The
following section will review studies which have examined other cognitive biases in OCD.
Evidence of Further Cognitive Biases in OCD
A series of studies conducted by Freeston and colleagues has uncovered a number of
strategies used in response to intrusive thoughts and incorporated these into the cognitive
account of OCD. Firstly, Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau & Gagnon (1991) identified 3
styles employed in response to unacceptable intrusive thoughts. 125 non-clinical
participants were asked to identify the types of intrusive thoughts/images they experienced
using the Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (developed for the study). Cognitions related
to: personal health; embarrassing or painful experiences; sexual behaviour; verbal
aggression; and friends or family with a fatal disease or having an accident. Thoughts
were then evaluated on 13 items such as frequency, disapproval and worry. Strategies
used after experiencing the thought/image were then indicated (e.g. reassuring oneself,
distraction, saying stop). The dominant response styles were identified as: no effortful
response (26% of sample), attentive thinking (34%) and escape/avoidance (40%). The
latter two strategies were associated with more anxiety and difficulty in removing the
thought and were viewed by the authors as corresponding to neutralising activities in that
they were intentional and effortful. Escape/avoidance strategies were also associated with
more sadness, worry, guilt and disapproval than the no effortful response group. Intrusions
eliciting escape/avoidance were evaluated as creating more disapproval than thoughts
eliciting attentive thinking.
Freeston, Ladouceur & Gagnon (1992) found evidence that supported the role of
responsibility in OCD but also linked responsibility to neutralising. The authors
highlighted the association made between mood disturbance and intrusive thoughts in the
cognitive model (Salkovskis, 1985). Mood was conceptualised as a predisposing factor
which could increase the personal significance of intrusions, thus increasing the likelihood
of further processing and the activation of dysfunctional assumptions. Non-clinical
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participants, (n = 125) completed the Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (described
earlier), as well as measures of depression, anxiety and compulsive behaviour. Five main
factors were extracted from the dimensions of the thoughts on which participants reported.
The factors were: "distress/severity " (worry, sadness, anticipatory fear, frequency and
anticipated difficulty of removal); "evaluation" (responsibility, disapproval and guilt);
"control" (ability to remove the thought and decrease discomfort); "diversity" and;
"attention" (triggers, frequency). They found that dysphoria and anxiety were related to the
'distress/severity' factor. 'Evaluation' was the only factor that was a significant predictor
of compulsive activity scores. 'Evaluation' was also associated with avoidance as a
response to the thoughts and depression. The authors concluded that the results showed
that depressed mood was associated with greater levels of negative evaluation of thoughts
(consistent with Salkovskis' model). The 'evaluation' factor's relationship to depression
scores was interpreted as an interplay between mood disturbance and the activation of
dysfunctional assumptions. Salkovskis' model also seemed to be supported by the finding
that effortful strategies such as escape, avoidance and attentive thinking were related to
anxiety and depression scores.
In an extension of these studies, Freeston & Ladouceur (1993) examined the differences in
response styles associated with appraisals of intrusive thoughts. Non-clinical participants
and a mixed psychiatric group (total n = 885) participated in the study, which again used
the Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire as the principle measure. The study looked
particularly at participants' appraisals of the probability that the unacceptable thought
would become reality and their level of disapproval for the thought. The results supported
their hypothesis that appraisals of probability and disapproval were related to different
strategies. Perceptions of high probability of the undesired outcome and participants' low
disapproval of the thought/image were associated with the use of attention strategies while
low probability and high disapproval were associated with greater use of escape/avoidance
strategies. They concluded that the results supported the distinction between ego dystonic
intrusive thoughts about remote events found in obsessionals and the ego syntonic
concerns found in worry. These results seem to follow the matrix proposed by Van Oppen
& Arntz (1995) described earlier which differentiated OCD from other disorders such as
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anxiety. The avoidance strategies were linked to compulsive/neutralising type behaviours
while attention was linked to challenging negative automatic thoughts. The study also
found that high disapproval and low probability were associated with more obsessive
compulsive symptomatology, extreme beliefs about intrusive thoughts and levels of
responsibility. The role of appraisals of probability and disapproval were concluded to be
significant in the understanding of obsessional problems.
The importance of guilt in OCD was addressed by Niler & Beck (1989). The role of guilt
in OCD, although not empirically examined previously, had been proposed. Rachman
(1971) suggested that high moral standards would be likely to be involved in the aetiology
of obsessional thoughts. Guilt is clearly related to appraisals of responsibility, in that it is
likely to arise when there is a perception of responsibility and the judgment that one has
behaved 'badly'. If one accepts responsibility for an event in which there has been a
negative outcome, guilt is likely to be associated with it. Guilt, moral standards and
responsibility are therefore likely to be related to each other in terms of cognitive biases in
OCD. In Niler & Beck's study (1989) as well as examining guilt in OCD, they also looked
at the relationship between anxiety and dysphoria in obsessional problems. The authors
used the Intrusive Thoughts and Impulses Survey, developed for the study to measure
obsessionality, and the Perceived Guilt Index (Otterbacher & Munz, 1973) as the main
measure with non-clinical participants. Using multiple regression analysis, they found that
dysphoria was a weak predictor of obsessionality, while anxiety was not predictive at all.
Guilt was found to be the strongest predictor of the frequency of intrusive thoughts,
difficulty in dismissibility, distress and the variety of thoughts. The link between guilt,
moral standards and responsibility will be examined in more detail later in terms of
personality traits in OCD.
Work into obsessional problems has begun to concentrate on the individual's interpretation
of their own mental processes. Salkovskis (1985) stressed that the negative interpretations
in OCD are not dissimilar to those made in other anxiety disorders like panic and
agoraphobia. The difference is that in panic, for example, negative automatic thoughts are
related to misinterpretations of bodily sensations, while in OCD, the misinterpretation is of
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the significance of mental functioning i.e. cognitive intrusions. Salkovskis, Richards &
Forrester (1995) stated that meta-cognitive beliefs (beliefs about one's own thoughts and
thought processes) are in the same broad class as "beliefs about the meaning of bodily
sensations" (as in panic). The role ofmeta-cognitive beliefs has already been touched on
earlier in relation to Salkovskis' proposed model of OCD, in that obsessionals are
proposed to misinterpret the significance not only of the content of the thought, but of its
occurrence as well. The dysfunctional assumptions Salkovskis proposed as relevant in
OCD include those related to faulty meta-cognitive beliefs, e.g. one should be able to
control one's own thoughts. Rachman (1993) also recognised the importance of the
individual's beliefs about the occurrence of intrusive thoughts. He examined the
phenomenon of thought action fusion (TAF) in OCD (described briefly earlier). Rachman
(1993) stated that the individual's misinterpretation of the significance of the thought
together with an exaggerated sense of responsibility can extend to a "psychological fusion
of the thought and the action itself'. This means that the experience of having the thought
is believed to be morally equivalent to or as morally 'bad' as actually committing the act
involved in the thought. This is often referred to as moral TAF. Likelihood TAF involves
the belief that thinking about an event increases the chances that it will actually happen.
Rachman (1993) added that the majority of people are able to distinguish between their
unwanted thoughts and their actions. It can be seen therefore, that where faulty meta-
cognitive beliefs and thought action fusion interact, the significance of obsessional
thinking is inflated, as is perceived responsibility.
In their study of responsibility in OCD discussed earlier, Rachman et al (1995) concluded
that as the strongest correlate with obsessionality, TAF seemed to be particularly
significant in OCD. Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman (1996) have recently developed the
Thought Action Fusion Scale to examine the significance of TAF moral and likelihood in
obsessional problems. They linked TAF to an inflated sense of responsibility. They argued
that "the psychological fusion of thoughts and actions is a fundamental part of the
catastrophic misinterpretation 'I am responsible for harm'" (p 380). Clearly, the belief that
having a thought about an event may increase the likelihood of that event would lead to the
perception of partial if not whole responsibility for the negative event. TAF would
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therefore also be related to the experience of guilt associated with responsibility.
Neutralising, as an attempt to remove the sense of responsibility would then follow,
according to Salkovskis' model.
Shafran et al (1996) noted that some forms of mental neutralising (e.g. repeating the
opposite of the thought or creating the opposite image) could be seen as a form of TAP, in
that the individual is deliberately attempting to influence reality through changing their
thoughts or images. They also referred to TAF as an internal rather than external source of
inflated responsibility. They argued that external sources (e.g. stoves, door locks) trigger
appraisals of responsibility and that these external cues have been long recognised.
Internal 'provocations' in the form of TAF have only recently been acknowledged.
However, TAF should not be viewed as a trigger in the same way as a cooker or door lock
is. TAF should be regarded as a cognitive bias or schema which can be activated by
external sources leading to misinterpretations and thus an inflated sense of responsibility.
For example, an external trigger such as a knife could lead to a thought about harming
someone. It is at this point that the TAF cognitive bias would begin to operate. Similarly,
individuals who do not have TAF may misinterpret a similar situation due to a different
but still OCD related cognitive bias, for example pivotal influence in responsibility or
misinterpretation of the occurrence of the thought.
Results of the Shafran et al (1996) validation of the TAF Scale indicated that TAF is a
reliable construct in both community and obsessional samples. The obsessional group
consisted of 147 individuals reaching a clinical cut off of 11 on the Maudsley Obsessional
Compulsive Inventory (MOCI, Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). Two thirds of the group also
received a formal diagnosis of OCD. Student and community groups were used as
controls. The scale consists of 19 items measuring TAF moral and TAF likelihood for
others and for self. Group differences were found between the OCD and control groups
for TAF moral and TAF likelihood, with obsessionals scoring significantly higher. TAF
likelihood was also associated with more compulsive checking (as measured by the MOCI)
for the obsessional and student groups, but not the community control. When depression
was partialled out, only the correlations between TAF likelihood and checking for the
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obsessional group remained significant. The authors concluded that both TAF likelihood
and moral do seem to be significant factors in OCD. They noted however, that the
obsessional group, although scoring significantly higher than controls on the measure, did
not endorse items strongly. Due to this weak endorsement of items, the authors suggested
that the scale should be used only as a starting point for identifying TAF in patients and
not to show degree of TAF beliefs. Identification of the presence of TAF will clearly have
implications for treatment, particularly as targeting compulsive behaviours may be less
fruitful if core TAF beliefs are not challenged. A more subtle method of investigation may
be needed to examine changes in TAF clinically. A number of other measures of
obsessionality now include TAF as a subscale, including the Inventory of Beliefs Related
to Obsessions (Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon & Thibodeau, 1993) and the Maudsley
Obsessional Compulsive Inventory - Revised (Rachman, Thordarson, Radomsky &
Shafran, 1996). Similarly, these subscales should be useful in identifying the presence of
TAF, thereby directing treatment approach.
The studies described above have been seen to support the cognitive model of OCD
proposed by Salkovskis (1985), in which the main dysfunctional assumptions he proposed
to be operating in OCD are related to themes of: inflated responsibility; neutralisation as
an attempt to 'put things right' and remove responsibility; the attachment of undue
significance to the content or occurrence of the obsessional thoughts; and thought action
fusion. However, the majority of studies in cognitive theories of OCD have used
participants drawn from non-clinical or mixed psychiatric groups, which may have
implications for the validity of findings. Before examining treatment studies and drawing
conclusions about the cognitive model, the following section will provide a critical review
of this methodology.
Use of Non-Clinical Participants in Research into OCD: Criticisms of Experimental
Studies
Norton, Cox, Asmundson & Maser (1995) conducted an analysis of publication trends in
Psychology and Psychiatry journals in the 1980s and reported a tenfold increase in the
17
proportion of articles reporting on anxiety disorders. This increase was found to be
particularly striking for OCD, among other disorders. The growth in studies in OCD has
been attributed at least in part, to an increasing tendency to use non-clinical participants as
analogue samples. It has been generally accepted that the use of non-clinical participants
could provide analogue information about obsessional symptomatology. However, Kazdin
(1978, cited by Gibbs, 1996, p 733) stated that "the relation between an analogue study and
generality to clinical situations for a given dimension itself is an area of research." This
view has been recently considered in a thorough review article of the use of non-clinical
participants in OCD research (Gibbs 1996).
The use of non-clinical participants can follow different methodologies which clearly has
implications for the validity of using the results to further understanding of clinical
disorders. The term non-clinical can mean either that the participants show some
psychological difficulties but that symptomatology falls below DSM diagnosis, or that the
participants do meet a diagnostic criteria but are not seeking treatment for the disorder. In
OCD research, the former seems to be the predominant operational definition. Gibbs
(1996) pointed out that in disorders where the form of psychopathology can be viewed on a
continuum rather than representing a distinct state, confidence in the use of analogue
studies can be heightened. Clearly, a diagnostic criteria itself is a classification which
decides on a 'cut-off point for 'caseness' or 'non caseness'. Non-clinical individuals may
therefore be of interest in increasing knowledge of psychopathology. Gibbs also argued
that clinical participants, i.e. those who are seeking treatment in psychiatric settings may in
themselves be a biased and non-representative sample. Studies have shown that most
individuals use primary care services rather than specialised psychiatric services, and
many do not seek any help at all (Kessler, McGonagle, Zhao, Nelson, Hughes, Eshleman,
Wittchen & Kendler, 1994; Robins & Regier, 1991; Shapiro, Skinner, Kessler, Vonkorff,
German, Tischler, Leaf, Benham, Cofflet & Regier, 1984). Furthermore, Kessler et al
(1994) found that specialist services were more likely to see individuals with co-morbid
disorders which can complicate research into specific disorders. It could be argued that
psychologists in fact do need to study this specific group of people who use mental health
services given that it is this group who will be receiving the psychological treatment which
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develops from the research. The complication of comorbid disorders, although admittedly
producing more difficulties in terms of research methodology, does reflect the clinical
reality of 'messy' or complicated cases which pure and controlled research does not
reflect.
Differences in symptom profile between clinical and non-clinical OCD groups are quite
notable. The majority of clinical patients (95%) experience both obsessions and
compulsions (Rasmussen & Tsuang 1986). The majority of non-clinicals experience either
only obsessions or only compulsions. Karno, Golding, Sorenson & Burnam (1988) found
that only 8.6 % of a non-clinical group experienced both obsessions and compulsions.
While the content of obsessions has been found to be similar in clinical and non-clinical
groups, compulsions differ, in that cleaning/washing is the most common compulsion in
clinical groups but was the least prevalent in a non-clinical sample (Henderson & Pollard,
1988). Furthermore, we know that the experience of intrusive thoughts is common in the
normal population (Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984), as are compulsions (Muris et al, 1997):
but there is likely to be a large qualitative and quantitative difference between the
experience of these symptoms in clinical and non-clinical groups. The amount of distress
is also likely to clearly differentiate the groups.
Burns, Formea, Keortge & Sternberger (1995) pointed out that even within non-clinical
groups, the methodology employed in examining obsessionality can differ. In some cases,
correlational data for all non-clinical participants is analysed between constructs relevant
to OCD. In other studies, a cut-off on self-report measures is used to select the 'clinical'
group. Studies vary enormously in the criteria for the non-clinical group. A lifetime
prevalence rate of 2 - 3% for OCD is now accepted as being relatively stable across
cultures and age cohorts and does not fluctuate significantly as a function of the
methodology employed in determining criteria (Gibbs, 1996). Degonda, Wyss & Angst
(1993) found a lifetime prevalence rate of 5.7% for obsessive compulsive syndromes - that
is obsessive compulsive symptoms accompanied by distress and a level of social
impairment, but symptomatology not severe enough to meet diagnostic criteria for OCD.
There has been wide discrepancy in prevalence rates reported which means that precise
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frequency is still unknown in subclinical OCD. There are also a number of reasons why
diagnostic criteria may not be met, e.g. duration, distress, ego syntonic symptoms etc.,
which further complicates the picture and the homogeneity of subclinical groups. Burns et
al (1995) recommended that given the lifetime prevalence rate in OCD, only the top 2% of
a sample score should be used in analogue studies of OCD for the results to have
relevance. However, Gibbs (1996) noted that in OCD research cut-offs have varied from
the top 2% - 25% of the score distribution of the sample. Thus both the criteria for
selecting participants as well as the cut-offs used differ considerably and mean that studies
of OCD are in reality very difficult to compare and interpret. Table 1 shows the use of
non-clinical participants, selection criteria and methodology employed for some of the
main studies relevant to OCD. The list is not comprehensive, but covers the main studies
described in the current review of research into the cognitive model of OCD and illustrates
the wide variety of methodologies used. Gibbs (1996) provides a similar table in her
review of the use ofnon-clinical participants in OCD research (pp 739 -741).
Clark (1992) pointed out some further methodological shortcomings in research which has
claimed to increase understanding of clinical OCD and provide support for Salkovskis'
model. He noted that studies have often used broadly based measures to assess intrusive
thoughts which are not specific to true obsessional phenomena. He stated that researchers
should ensure that measures are assessing the clearly ego dystonic and unacceptable
intrusive thoughts found in OCD. Other methodological flaws noted include the use of
personally irrelevant or emotionally neutral intrusive thoughts in experimental studies (e.g.
Clark 1992). Gibbs (1996) stressed the importance of using only personally meaningful
and the most distressing thoughts in future research employing non-clinical participants.
Gibbs also advised that studies examining the role of guilt and responsibility in OCD
(Freeston et al, 1992; Niler & Beck, 1989; Frost, Sher & Geen, 1986; and Frost, Steketee,
Cohn & Greiss, 1994) have failed to determine whether these factors were indeed specific
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Gibbs (1996) concluded her review by arguing that non-clinical obsessive compulsive
symptoms can be considered a milder variant of OCD. This conclusion is questionable
given the quantitative and qualitative differences already noted. She went on to suggest
that "analogue research appears to be a worthwhile method for examining hypotheses
about OCD, given the relatively limited number of OCD patients available for research
purposes and the large number of individuals who exhibit low level obsessive compulsive
symptoms." (p 765). While acknowledging that the use of non-clinical participants means
that recruitment is easier and ethical issues are avoided, this should not necessarily be
considered an important reason for continuing the use of analogue studies. However,
Gibbs did qualify her conclusions by stating that there must be methodological
improvements. She recommended i) recruitment with offers of treatment services rather
than the use of undergraduates in exchange for money or course credits, ii) only the top 2
% of the distribution on self-report measures of OCD on 2 separate administrations should
be used, iii) selection criteria must be uniform to allow comparison of results across
studies and iv) laboratory studies must increase external validity, for example by using
naturally occurring personally relevant thoughts. The review therefore accepted that future
use of non-clinical participants in OCD research is not counter-indicated but must be
uniform in methodology. Gibbs' review has however served to question the knowledge
that we currently have about obsessional problems in a clinical setting, due to the difficulty
in interpreting and comparing results across studies which have used such varying
methodologies.
Treatment Research
A more fruitful source of information about the validity of the cognitive model of OCD
may be found in studies of treatment effectiveness. Despite the increase in studies
examining aspects of the cognitive theory of OCD, there have been relatively few studies
examining cognitive treatment for OCD. Van Oppen & Arntz (1994) described controlled
studies using cognitive techniques such as self-instructional training (Emmelkamp, van de
Helm, van Zanten & Plochy, 1980) and rational emotive therapy (Emmelkamp, Visser &
Hoekstra, 1988; and Emmelkamp & Beens, 1991). The conclusions drawn were that self-
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instructional training did not increase the effectiveness of the traditional behavioural
approaches, while rational emotive therapy appears to be equally as effective as exposure
and response prevention. To my knowledge, only four published studies have tried to
examine the effectiveness of cognitive techniques along the lines of Beck and Salkovskis
and these will be examined in more detail below.
Freeston, Rheaume & Ladouceur (1996) described a treatment approach incorporating
cognitive techniques into the traditional behavioural treatment of exposure and response
prevention. The approach described is related in particular to the experience of clinical
obsessions without overt compulsions. Initial intervention focused on cognitive
behavioural education, giving information about the prevalence ofOCD, providing a list of
intrusive thoughts from community samples, giving data on the prevalence of these
thoughts and the similarities and differences between patients who consult and community
samples. The cognitive element of therapy involved tackling misinterpretations of
intrusive thoughts and using the downward arrow technique commonly used in cognitive
therapy for other anxiety and affective disorders. The authors went on to describe a
number of specific interventions which can be used to target the aspects of OCD proposed
by the cognitive theory: overestimation of the importance of thoughts; magical thinking;
responsibility; perfectionism; need for control; and over interpretation of threat. They
concluded that they had "preliminary evidence that the efficacy of purely cognitive
techniques can extend to obsessional ruminators" (p 444). However, their review did not
present this evidence satisfactorily as it only gave clinical examples of the use of cognitive
techniques, with no experimental control or outcome data.
Van Oppen & Arntz (1994) provided a similar review of cognitive techniques in the
treatment of OCD. Treatment concentrated on techniques aimed at reducing the
overestimation of the probability and consequences of catastrophe and the overestimation
of responsibility. Again, examples of the use of techniques with individual clinical
patients were given, with no attempt to provide controlled outcome data. The authors
noted that only one controlled study at that time had attempted to compare Salkovskis'
cognitive therapy with exposure and response prevention (Van Oppen, de Haan, van
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Balkom, van Dyck, Hoogduin & Spinhoven, 1992). They reported that preliminary data
showed no significant difference between these treatments, indicating that cognitive
techniques could be an effective treatment ofOCD.
More recently, Ladouceur, Leger, Rheaume & Dube (1996) provided more convincing
support for the cognitive treatment of OCD. Their study reported on the treatment of four
patients with OCD using cognitive correction of inflated responsibility. The study used a
multiple baseline across-subjects design. Participants all met DSM III-R (APA, 1987)
criteria for OCD, with mainly checking rituals as the compulsive behaviour. Dependent
variables were a diary of 'interference' caused by the rituals, the Yale Brown Obsessive
Compulsive Scale (Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, Mazure, Fleischman, Hill, Heniger &
Charney, 1989), and the Responsibility Questionnaire (Rheaume, Freeston, Dugas, Letarte
& Ladouceur, 1995). Treatment involved: explanation of obsessions and compulsions
according to Salkovskis' model; targeting of inflated responsibility; awareness of
automatic thoughts; correction of negative automatic thoughts; and development of
adequate perceptions of personal responsibility. There was no behavioural element
(exposure and response prevention) to treatment. Treatment was conducted twice a week
for a maximum of 32 sessions, with assessment during treatment and at 1, 2, 4, 6 and 12
months follow up. In summary, all participants were clinically improved immediately
after treatment and improvement was maintained at follow-up. The authors concluded that
their results were consistent with those obtained for exposure and response prevention
which indicated that cognitive intervention alone is an alternative to behavioural methods.
They noted that cognitive interventions may also be seen as a treatment of choice for
individuals who refuse or drop out of exposure based treatments due to anxieties about this
approach. The authors stressed the theoretical implications in that changing cognitions
about responsibility produced clinically significant changes in compulsions. This finding
supports both Salkovskis' notion that neutralising is unlikely to occur without a sense of
responsibility (Salkovskis, 1985) as well as the non-clinical studies described earlier
looking at the effects of experimental manipulation of responsibility (Ladouceur et al,
1995; Lopatka & Rachman, 1995). The study therefore provided evidence for the
effectiveness of targeting responsibility in the treatment ofOCD (with checking rituals).
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Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon, Thibodeau, Rheaume, Letarte and Bujold (1997) provided
another controlled study of cognitive treatment in OCD, but this was combined with
behavioural elements. 29 patients who fulfilled DSM III-R criteria for OCD with no overt
compulsions took part in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to an
experimental group (n = 15) and a waiting list control (n = 14). Treatment was structured
to include: a detailed cognitive account of obsessions; explanation of the rationale for
exposure and response prevention; exposure to the thoughts using a loop tape; cognitive
restructuring of dysfunctional beliefs; and relapse prevention. Cognitive restructuring
centred on beliefs related to magical thinking, overestimation of the consequences of
thoughts, exaggerated responsibility, perfectionistic expectations and inflated estimations
of the severity and probability of the outcome of thoughts. The need for restructuring was
determined on an individualised basis due to group heterogeneity. Patients received
treatment for an average of 40.5 hours.
Outcome measures included the Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS,
(French translation) Mollard, Cottraux & Bouvard, 1989), the Current Functioning
Assessment (Foa, Steketee, Grayson Turner, & Latimer, 1984), the Padua Inventory
(Sanavio, 1988). Results showed significant improvements on these measures for the
treatment group (even when drop outs were included) compared to the controls. Clinically
significant change was determined by statistical methods for all outcome measures. On
the Y-BOCS, 77% of those who completed treatment reached clinically significant
improvement, dropping to 59% at six month follow-up. These percentages were slightly
lower when the total sample (i.e. including those who dropped out of treatment) was
analysed. For all other outcome measures, the percentage of patients whose improvement
was clinically significant was lower (between 21% and 50%). The authors concluded that
the study demonstrated the effective use of cognitive behavioural treatment in pure
obsessionals, a group previously considered resistant to treatment. They did point out that
there was a high drop out from treatment, generally during the exposure phase (only 8
patients from the original 15 completed). While their study highlighted the use of a
combination of cognitive and behavioural techniques, it did not examine the effectiveness
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of only cognitive techniques in pure obsessionals. However, they did report on
preliminary evidence to suggest that cognitive techniques alone can be effective, based on
successful cognitive restructuring in four (out of six) patients with pure obsessions (Leger,
Freeston & Ladouceur, 1996).
A variety of methodologies has been used in the treatment research described above,
including single case studies, group comparisons, a combination of cognitive and
behavioural or only cognitive techniques and the use of specific subgroups in OCD.
Further studies are needed to target the range of proposed cognitive vulnerabilities in OCD
(e.g. TAF, perfectionism) and to examine the effectiveness of treatment in OCD with other
overt compulsions (e.g. washing) and covert compulsions (e.g. counting, mental rituals).
Research on the treatment of OCD can contribute to the validation of the cognitive theory,
particularly given that to date, validation has been presumed from studies using non¬
clinical samples. However, further studies should be controlled and endeavour to employ
robust methodology ifwe are to accept their findings.
Pure Obsessions
The literature described so far has concentrated almost exclusively on the theory and
treatment of OCD when both obsessions and compulsions exist. Very little work has
examined the experience of pure obsessions (i.e. obsessions without any overt compulsive
behaviours). Estimates of the prevalence of pure obsessionals within the OCD population
have varied but a median of 20 - 25% has been suggested (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997).
Salkovskis & Westbrook (1989) explored this issue in the context of behaviour therapy for
OCD. They seemed to be suggesting that pure obsessions or obsessional ruminations
without compulsions do not exist, arguing that therapists have simply failed to identify the
covert compulsions that follow obsessional thoughts. Covert compulsions are described as
'cognitive rituals' which the ruminator initiates to reduce the anxiety or discomfort caused
by the obsessional thought. They argued that cognitive rituals, e.g. counting, praying are
equivalent to the observable overt compulsions like handwashing in that they both serve to
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neutralise the obsessional thought. Salkovskis & Westbrook (1989) proposed that the
behavioural model can therefore be applied in obsessional ruminators by identifying the
covert behaviour so that exposure to the thought is followed by response prevention to the
covert behaviour normally carried out. More recently, it has been accepted that the
cognitive model of OCD as well as the behavioural model can be applied to obsessions
without overt compulsions. Freeston et al's (1996) study which was described earlier,
demonstrated the use of cognitive techniques in the treatment of obsessions with covert
compulsions (i.e. compulsions such as mental rituals). They demonstrated that obsessional
patients with covert compulsions had similar faulty beliefs about the occurrence or content
of their obsessional thoughts. These beliefs included: expectations about having had the
thought; ideas about control; interpretations about what the thought meant and; thought
action fusion. The cognitive techniques of negative automatic thought challenging and
correcting faulty beliefs could therefore be applied.
It has become generally accepted that obsessional ruminations are often followed by covert
behaviours which are equivalent to overt compulsions. It could be argued that this has
been accepted too readily, particularly as very few studies have examined pure obsessions.
Freeston & Ladouceur (1997) have attempted to rectify the near absence of research on
obsessional ruminations and covert behaviours in a descriptive study of the covert
behaviours of patients with obsessional thoughts. They discussed the definitions of
compulsions, neutralisation and covert behaviours that have been made in the literature to
clarify current understanding of pure obsessions. Rachman & de Silva (1978)
distinguished between neutralisation and coping mechanisms. They saw neutralisation as
attempts at 'putting right'. Neutralisation has also been described as "reparative,
corrective, preventive or restorative" (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980 p 273). Coping
strategies on the other hand, although not defined by Rachman & de Silva (1978) did not
seem to have the same restorative quality as a neutralisation. Some examples of coping
strategies given were distraction, praying, reassurance seeking and physical avoidance.
Freeston & Ladouceur (1997) concluded that "neutralising is connected by its subjective
meaning to the thought and is believed to be able to prevent the consequence foreseen by
the thought's content in some real, causal way. Coping mechanisms are less specific and
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address the thought's presence, meaning and associated discomfort." (p 336) Coping
mechanisms described by Rachman & de Silva (1978) would not meet the definition of a
cognitive ritual.
Freeston & Ladouceur (1997) noted that more recent writings on the subject of
neutralisation have provided both broad and narrow definitions. Salkovskis (1985 and
1989a) described neutralisation narrowly as attempts to put things right and avert blame
and responsibility. However, he also gave clinical examples of OCD patients' compulsions
in which he included behaviours such as avoidance and reassurance seeking, which do not
seem to meet the criteria of 'putting things right' (p 577). He later provided a broader
definition: "it is anything they try to do which is intentional or effortful" (Salkovskis &
Westbrook, 1989) which would include behaviours such as avoidance and reassurance
seeking as forms of neutralisation. Salkovskis et al (1995) then returned to the narrower
definition of neutralisation as having "the effect of reducing the perceived level of
responsibility". They also stated that behaviours such as avoidance or trying to suppress
the thought are different from neutralisation. The literature to date therefore continues to
reflect some confusion about how to define the range of behaviours that follow obsessional
thoughts; specifically what constitutes a neutralising behaviour and what could be
described as a coping mechanism.
In Freeston & Ladouceur's (1997) description of covert behaviours associated with
intrusive thoughts, 29 patients with dominant obsessional ruminations described how they
responded to the thoughts. Eighteen strategies were identified, with seven highlighted as
the most extensively used. These were: physical action; thought stopping; convincing
oneself that the thought is not important; thought replacement; talking about the thought;
doing nothing and; analysing the thought. However, the authors reported that 62.1 % of
participants described strategies that were 'not classifiable' and did not give examples of
these, which hampers a full investigation of the strategies used. They found that the
majority of strategies used could only be defined as coping mechanisms and not
neutralisations or cognitive rituals, even though they were effortful and intentionally
employed.
28
Freeston & Ladouceur (1997) concluded that although the coping mechanisms did not
fulfill the criteria of compulsions in DSM IV (APA, 1994), patients with dominant
obsessions can meet DSM IV criteria of OCD because coping mechanisms can been seen
as 'attempts to ignore or suppress' the thoughts. They take the view that patients with
dominant obsessions employing mostly coping strategies should not just get "through the
back door" in meeting criteria and that criteria regarding compulsions or neutralisations
should be broadened. I would argue that the issue of whether patients fulfill DSM IV
criteria of compulsions is not relevant because Freeston & Ladouceur (1997) have not
addressed what seems to be the main issue, which is how to explain the qualitative
difference between obsessionals who neutralise covertly and those who may carry out
covert behaviours which can only be defined as coping mechanisms. I would accept that
in many cases the compulsive behaviour does exist as a covert ritual which serves as a
neutralisation. However, there is now evidence to suggest that in some cases the
obsessional thoughts are not followed by any 'compulsive' behaviours which serve to
neutralise the obsession (Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997; Himle & Thyler, 1989). In terms of
cognitive strategies, trying to dismiss a thought by thinking about something else, or
distracting oneself is clearly qualitatively different from being compelled to repeat a
thought a specific number of times or carrying out some other form of cognitive ritual
which has a senseless quality. While this issue remains problematic, research has also
failed to explore the difference between individuals who have covert compulsions and
those who have overt compulsions. Again, there seems a qualitative difference between a
cognitive ritual like praying and an overt compulsion like handwashing. Given the
cognitive account of OCD, it could be that some subtle difference in the individual's belief
system could account for this difference in why some individuals show overt compulsions
while others rely on covert rituals and some use only coping mechanisms and no
compulsive neutralising behaviours.
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The Cognitive Model of OCD - Conclusions
The cognitive model of OCD proposed by Salkovskis (1985) prompted a wealth of
research. Studies have almost without exception involved non-clinical participants, which
has implications for how comparable and valid their conclusions can be. Bearing this in
mind, a number of conclusions have been made. The main elements and factors identified
in the research as involved in the development and maintenance of OCD are summarised
below.
1. A sense of responsibility for having had a thought or causing harm to self or others.
Pivotal influence is particularly important. Responsibility is situation specific and not
general.
2. Neutralisation as an attempt to put things right and a maintaining factor in OCD.
3. Overestimation of the probability, consequences and severity of an event.
4. Guilt (related to responsibility) as a significant factor in the maintenance ofOCD.
5. Misinterpretation of the significance of the content and/or the occurrence of a thought.
6. Thought action fusion - 'moral' and 'likelihood'
7. Preliminary evidence to suggest equal effectiveness of cognitive techniques compared
to behavioural techniques in the treatment of OCD.
Due to the varying methodologies and participant groups used, the influence of schemata
specific to OCD still needs to be validated. In recognition of this, an Obsessive
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group has recently been developed, involving 37 authors
who have contributed to OCD research. Their first publication (OC Cognitions Working
Group, 1997) has addressed some of the issues relevant to the advancement of cognitive
research in OCD. Due to the diversity and overlap of measures, the group's main focus
was to draw together research and measures related to OCD beliefs in order to coordinate
research and develop a single and standardised measure of beliefs to be used in future
research. The importance ofmeasures being able to discriminate OCD from other anxiety
and mood disorders was discussed, and it was concluded that although some published
measures have shown OCD discriminability, this is not universal. In its examination of
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published questionnaires, 17 different instruments were reported, assessing 19 different
belief domains thought to contribute to the development and maintenance of OCD. From
these domains, six main belief themes were concluded to be of central importance in OCD.
These are: i) inflated responsibility, ii) thought action fusion and beliefs about the over
importance of the consequences of thoughts, iii) excessive concerns about the importance
of controlling one's thoughts, iv) overestimation of the severity and probability of threat,
v) intolerance of uncertainty, and vi) perfectionism. The group has also addressed issues
related to the best method of assessing beliefs in OCD (e.g. experimental, self-report) as
well as how to standardise administration. This coordinated approach to improving
cognitive research into OCD is a welcome and necessary advancement, and further reports
from the group, particularly the development of a comprehensive measure of OCD beliefs
are eagerly awaited.
Despite the wealth of research conducted to date, and the promising developments of the
OC Cognitions Working Group, some areas in our understanding of obsessional problems
still remain to be developed. The following section introduces the literature which has
attempted to examine the basic dynamics of OCD in relation to developmental and familial
antecedents. The possibility of incorporating these factors into the cognitive account will
be addressed, particularly by reframing personality characteristics as core schemata in
OCD.
Early Experience and OCD
Researchers have been confident in suggesting the type of dysfunctional assumptions or
faulty beliefs that characterise OCD but very little attempt has been made to understand
their development in terms of early experience. One exception is the work of Sookman,
Pinard & Beanchemin (1994) who have developed what they describe as a
"multidimensional schematic restructuring" theory and treatment for OCD. The model
differs from previous approaches in a number ofways:-
- the notion of a constructivist-developmental identity structure as the basis for
understanding and treating symptoms.
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- attachment and developmental experiences are addressed.
- schemata are seen as multifaceted and therefore must be assessed on an
individualised basis.
- central affective schemata are addressed, with obsessions considered as representing
expressions of emotion which are not effectively coped with.
- aim of treatment is schematic restructuring of dysfunctional schemata, both cognitive
and affective.
(adapted from Sookman et al, 1994, p 176).
The authors pointed out that cognitive therapy for any disorder should aim to identify and
restructure the schemata to result in more enduring clinical improvement. They noted that
cognitive therapy for OCD based on Salkovskis' model focused only on treating the
specific automatic thoughts without exploring identity structure. Sookman et al (1994)
stated that "treating only specific automatic thoughts without adequate consideration of
underlying identity structure is insufficient for many patients" (p 179). Cognitive
treatment for OCD in its current form would therefore be likely to be less substantial and
long lasting.
Sookman et al (1994) began their explanation of the model by examining a model of
identity structure. This is based on Guidano & Liotti's (1985) model, where attachment
and early learning experiences contribute along with physiological factors in the
construction of the individual's core identity. The cognitive, affective, and motor
schemata can interact on a 'tacit' level and so may not be accessible to awareness even
though they may be central to the aetiology and maintenance ofOCD. The authors saw the
development of OCD as an "interplay of specific emotional experiences, dysfunctional
cognitive processes and content and inadequate coping skills these dimensions emanate
from identity structure schemas in interaction with environmental and physiological
factors" (p 179). They suggested that relevant schemata in OCD may be related to an
exaggerated sense of vulnerability, confusion of thought and action, inflexibility in view of
newness or change, rigid demands for performance, need for control, self doubt and
difficulty with strong emotions. The schemata develop in the context of attachment
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experiences. Treatment focuses on three "planes": the developmental, dimensional
(cognitive, affective and behavioural) and structural (explicit to tacit), with the aim of
restructuring the identity structure relevant to the development and maintenance of OCD.
The authors then described three cases in which the multischematic restructuring technique
was employed effectively, in patients with a long and previously intractable history of
OCD. The theory and treatment described provides a promising and illuminating advance
in our understanding and treatment of OCD. The emphasis on identifying core schemata
and particularly examining the aetiology of these beliefs through addressing early
attachment experiences is an attractive and fuller approach to treatment.
To my knowledge, very few studies have attempted to examine early experience to
determine if there is any pattern related to OCD. The following section will review work
which has attempted to link parental characteristics and parenting style with similar
characteristics in offspring and the development of specific psychopathologies.
Research on Parental Characteristics and Their Role in Relation to OCD
Perfectionism is a personality trait which has been related to OCD and will be discussed in
more detail in a later section. Several studies have found that the parents of OCD patients
tend to be perfectionistic (Honjo, Hirano, Murase, Kaneko, Sugiyama, Ohtaka, Aoyama,
Takel, Inoko & Wakabayashi, 1989; Allsopp & Verduyn, 1990; Rasmussen & Tsuang,
1986; Lo, 1967) and there is some evidence to suggest that perfectionism in parents is
related to the development of similar characteristics in offspring. Frost, Lahart &
Rosenblate (1991) suggested various mechanisms by which perfectionism in parents could
lead to the development of similar characteristics in their offspring (for example:
modeling, children urged to do better by their parents, parental approval given only with
improved performance in offspring, the child feeling the need to perform perfectly in order
to be accepted and loved). In examining perfectionism in parents, Frost et al (1991) used
a methodology in which rather than relying on participants' memories and perceptions of
their parents, characteristics of both parents and offspring were identified using the same
self-report measures. They found that daughters' perfectionism was significantly related
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to mothers' but not fathers' perfectionism in a female student sample. Daughters were
more perfectionistic and concerned over mistakes, set excessively high standards and
perceived their own parents as setting high standards. Frost et al (1991) also examined
characteristics thought to be related to perfectionism: perception of parental demands, guilt
induction, support, affection and permissiveness. Parents of daughters described as
perfectionistic were reported by them to be more strict, guilt-inducing, demanding and
critical and less permissive. In general, it was concluded that the parents employed a harsh
parenting style. In particular, fathers were seen as more overprotective, less affectionate
and less supportive. Although OCD symptomatology was not examined specifically,
correlations were found between maternal perfectionism and psychological symptoms in
their daughters.
Hoover & Insel (1984) studied a sample of 10 patients with severe OCD, their parents,
siblings and second and third degree relatives. Their paper provided a descriptive account
of each individual case, drawing together family characteristics, with no empirical
evaluation. Methodology consisted of interview with patients and relatives, with the
results described as 'features observed'. Despite the methodology employed, the paper
provided some insight into possible family characteristics relevant to OCD. In the 174
relatives studied, none had a history or diagnosis of OCD, but a minority of first degree
relatives (11.6%) had other psychiatric histories such as depression, alcohol related
problems and 'nervousness'. They found that the families tended to be perfectionistic,
with an emphasis on cleanliness and isolated from community/social life. The relationship
between the parents of the OCD patients was described as 'unfulfilled' with
'disappointing' or distant sexual relationships in many cases. One or both parents were
said to direct 'symbiotic' needs towards the patient: "parents and offspring became trapped
in an increasingly powerless struggle against symptoms that acted as a barrier to closeness,
but that also prevented the patient from developing an autonomous existence" (p 207).
The authors concluded that a number of factors, including family characteristics and by
implication parental style and developmental experiences contributed to the development
ofOCD.
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Steketee, Grayson & Foa (1985) examined parental style as one factor that could
distinguish between 'washers' and 'checkers' as subtypes of obsessive compulsive
ritualising. They questioned whether different forms of ritualistic behaviours have
aetiological implications. Rachman (1976) differentiated washing and checking in terms
of both function and aetiology. Checking rituals were noted as preventative: to ensure that
no future catastrophe would happen. The primary intent in terms of responsibility was
seen to be to forestall criticism from others or themselves. Washing on the other hand,
restored "a state of safety (e.g. cleanliness, hygiene) and they are preventative only in the
secondary sense that a failure to restore safety is threatening" (Rachman, 1976, p 270). In
terms of aetiology, Rachman proposed that there was a common but subtly different
history of excessive parental control in both washers and checkers. Parents of washers
were said to be more overprotective and obsessive, producing fearful children, whereas
parents of checkers were overcritical, demanding and meticulous, thereby producing
children fearful ofmaking mistakes. Steketee et al (1985) examined this hypothesis in 36
washers and 23 checkers, all meeting DSM III (APA, 1980) criteria for OCD. Perceptions
of parental characteristics were measured in a fairly simplistic and possibly insensitive
method by patients indicating which of 13 adjectives (very clean, meticulous,
disorganised, orderly, withdrawn, religious, strict, guilt-inducing, easy-going, affectionate,
permissive, overprotective and demanding) applied to their mother and father. There was
partial support for their hypotheses: checkers (and not washers) did perceive their mothers
as meticulous and demanding, which the authors concluded would be more likely to
produce overconcern with perfectionism. No significant result was found for washers'
parents being more overprotective or obsessive, and no pattern was found for paternal
traits in either washers or checkers. The authors pointed out that the data were collected
retrospectively and therefore tapped not only patients' perceptions but also their memories
of their parents. Nonetheless, their study did provide some evidence to suggest that
parental characteristics and early experience may be a significant factor in OCD. A more
robust method for examining parenting characteristics is examined in the following
section.
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Experimental Studies Using the Parental Bonding Instrument
The Parental Bonding Instrument (PBI, Parker, Tupling & Brown, 1979) was developed to
examine the contribution of parental style to the parent-child bond and to define and
measure constructs which appear significant in the development of psychopathologies.
The measure examines two dimensions: care and overprotection. Figure 2 below shows
how these dimensions translate into parental-child bonds. The instrument has been used in
clinical settings to characterise different disorders. Results from various studies have
suggested that 'affectionless control' (low care and high overprotection) is associated with
generalised anxiety disorder, social phobia, depression and avoidant personality disorder.
Panic disorder, increased dependency and increased hypochondriasis levels have been
associated with 'affectionate constraint' (high care and high overprotection) (Silove,
Parker, Hadzi, Pavlovic, Manicavasagar & Blaszcynski, 1991; Parker, 1981; Parker, 1979;
and Parker, 1983 (see Parker, 1990 for a review)).
Fewer studies have investigated parental bonding in OCD. Hafner (1988) used a sample
from an OCD self help group (81 out of 93 met DSM III-R criteria). Participants reported
low maternal and paternal care scores with raised maternal overprotection scores,
indicating 'affectionless control' as the most common parental characteristic. Kimidis,
Minas, Ata & Stuart (1992) used scores on obsessionality and compulsivity scales to
investigate parental bonding in a non-clinical adolescent sample. A brief eight item
version of the PBI was used. Obsessionality was again linked to 'affectionless control',
while high compulsion scores were related to high maternal and paternal over protection
scores (but not care scores). Cavedo & Parker (1994) stressed the need to control for
anxiety and depression scores when examining specific patterns in OCD. Using a non¬
clinical sample they confirmed the greater contribution of overprotection than care to













Figure 2: Dimensions measured in the Parental Bonding Instrument and how these
translate into parental-child bonds (taken from Parker et al 1979).
The authors pointed out that theoretical and clinical observations would predict the
importance of high overprotection scores in OCD. For example, Rachman (1976)
proposed the 'overcontrol' model in which hypersensitivity in the child is overlaid by
parental overconcern and overcontrol. Psychodynamic theories of OCD and obsessional
personality (Salzman & Thaler, 1981) emphasise unresolved separation of the child from
the mother, with parents described as overcontrolling or overinvolved. Similarly, more
recent work examined earlier has linked firstly parental harshness and secondly parental
strictness, criticism and lack of permissiveness, (Frost et al, 1991) to perfectionism, a trait
which has been associated with OCD. In terms of the dimensions measured by the PBI,
these two characteristics could be equivalent to low care and high overprotection
respectively, indicating that the development of perfectionism may be associated with
'affectionless control'.
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In the study described earlier, Frost et al (1994) also used the Parental Bonding Instrument
to measure perceptions of parenting (i.e. early experience/attachment style). Two samples
of participants were used for the study, both drawn from student populations. Separate
analyses were completed for each group due to differences in age and different cut-offs
used for inclusion. In the first sample, participants were included in the subclinical group
if they scored above cut- offs on two out of three of the obsessive compulsive inventories
employed. For the second sample, the same cut-offs were used but participants had to
score above these on all three of the measures. Mean scores for the obsessive compulsive
measures showed that sample 2 (n = 29) was significantly more 'obsessive compulsive'
than sample 1 (n = 41). In sample 1 no differences were found between the non-clinical
and subclinical groups for care scores, while significant differences were found for both
paternal and maternal overprotection, with higher scores in the subclinical group. In
sample 2, maternal and paternal overprotection scores were significantly higher in the
subclinical group, and maternal care significantly lower, again indicating the influence of
'affectionless control'. It should be noted however that anxiety and depression were not
controlled for and the group was not clinical, only 'subclinical'. The authors proposed that
"an overprotected child may develop the assumption that the world is a dangerous place
and that it is important to avoid unnecessary risks whenever possible" (p 54). Their
findings therefore pointed to a possible mechanism for the development of a schema based
on early experience. Further results reported were inconsistent across the two samples
which make them difficult to interpret. There was some evidence to suggest that
perfectionism in fathers (not mothers) was associated with obsessionality in their
offspring. Parents also tended to be more risk aversive in the subclinical group than the
non-clinical group (for one sample). Fathers were also more rigid and critical of their
daughter in the subclinical group (for one sample). While it is difficult to draw firm
conclusions from the data given the inconsistency across samples, the study did begin to
address the need to examine how early experiences can help understanding of the aetiology
and development of OCD.
In conclusion, studies which have examined parental bonding have shown some evidence
to suggest a pattern of parenting related to OCD (i.e. 'affectionless control'), but the
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differences in methodology, for example not controlling for anxiety and depression, short
versus normal form of the PBI, and the use of clinical, subclinical and non-clinical samples
means that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from the research conducted to date.
From the point of view of the cognitive model, it would be interesting to establish a link
between early experience and the development of cognitive vulnerabilities/dysfunctional
assumptions which are relevant to OCD. Some of the studies described above have also
suggested a link between parental characteristics and the development of personality styles
in their offspring (Frost et al, 1994; Frost et al, 1991). Specific personality styles have
been identified as relevant to obsessive compulsive symptomatology. These will be
reviewed in the following section.
Personality Style as a Form of Cognitive Vulnerability Related to OCD
Various studies have investigated personality style in relation to OCD. Perfectionism, risk
aversion and religiosity/moral strictness have all been proposed as personality traits linked
to obsessionality. While cognitive accounts have in the past suggested a role for traits
such as perfectionism in OCD (McFall & Wollersheim, 1979; Guidano & Liotti, 1983),
developments in Salkovskis' model have not incorporated personality style into a
comprehensive model of OCD. The possibility of developing an account of OCD in a
cognitive vein, while incorporating factors such as personality style will be examined after
a review of the main findings in the area of personality and OCD.
Perfectionism
Perfectionism has recently been described as the "tendency to set high standards and
employ over critical self evaluations" (Frost & Marten, 1990). It has been linked to a
variety of disorders (e.g. depression, eating disorders and other anxiety states) as well as
OCD. Frost & Steketee (1997) noted that perfectionism has historically played a
prominent role in theories of OCD, but that it has been given relatively little attention
recently. In studies using non-clinical or subclinical participants, perfectionism has
frequently been associated with obsessional traits and OCD symptomatology (Frost,
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Marten, Lahart & Rosenblate, 1990; Frost et al, 1994; Gershunny & Sher, 1995). In an
examination of perfectionism and obsessionality, Rheaume et al (1995b) used the
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al, 1990) with a student sample (n = 245).
The scale has six dimensions measuring: concern over mistakes, personal standards,
parental expectations, criticism, doubting of actions and organisation. Two responsibility
scales were also administered (the Responsibility Questionnaire, Rheaume et al, 1995b and
The R Scale, Salkovskis, 1992). The Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988) was used to
measure obsessive and compulsive symptoms. Results indicated that both perfectionism
and responsibility were moderately related to obsessive compulsive symptoms. Only
moderate and weak correlations were found between perfectionism and the two measures
of responsibility which indicated that perfectionism and responsibility are distinct,
although related constructs. Hierarchical regression analyses found that while
responsibility was a better predictor of obsessive compulsive symptoms, perfectionism
explained a significant part of the variance of symptoms after responsibility had been
controlled for, suggesting that perfectionism may in fact "play a significant and
underestimated role in the problems of some obsessive compulsive patients" (Rheaume et
al, 1995b, p 791). The authors concluded that while perfectionism may not be specific to
OCD, as it is common in other psychopathologies, it may be a necessary but insufficient
trait influencing the development of distorted appraisals related to OCD.
Frost & Steketee (1997) examined perfectionism in a clinical sample, to determine whether
levels were higher in obsessional patients compared to patients with panic/agoraphobia.
They stated that no previous study had in fact provided evidence of higher perfectionism in
clinical samples of OCD patients. 35 patients with a diagnosis of OCD, a community
control (n = 35) and a panic/agoraphobia group (n = 14) participated in the study. All
participants completed the revised Compulsive Activity Checklist (CAC-R, Steketee &
Freund, 1991) which examines compulsive activities. The Frost Multidimensional
Perfectionism Scale (FMPS) described earlier was used to measure perfectionism. Results
showed that OCD patients scored higher on the FMPS than community controls for total
perfectionism and on the concern over mistakes and doubts about actions dimensions.
However, the OCD and panic/agoraphobia groups did not differ in respect to overall
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perfectionism score. Only the doubts about actions subscale showed significantly higher
scores for the OCD group compared to the panic/agoraphobia group. The OCD group
scored no higher than controls on the parental criticism subscale, while the
panic/agoraphobia group scored significantly higher than controls on this subscale. The
findings therefore did not confirm higher perfectionism in OCD patients compared to other
anxiety disorders. However, the doubts about actions subscale did distinguish OCD from
other anxiety disorders, so the authors suggested that certain features of perfectionism may
exist which distinguish OCD from other anxiety disorder patients. They noted that as
Rheaume et al (1995a) suggested, a different definition of perfectionism, such as
'perfection is possible' as a core belief, may be warranted in OCD. Frost & Steketee
(1997) arrived at the same conclusion as Rheaume et al, in saying that perfectionism may
be a necessary condition for the development of many forms of psychopathology, but is
certainly not sufficient and does not determine the exact nature of the disorder. It may be
that refining the definition of perfectionism in relation to OCD, particularly in terms of
core beliefs may be a more fruitful subject of further investigation.
Risk Aversion
Risk aversion in relation to OCD has received some attention in the literature. Rasmussen
& Eisen (1989) found that risk aversion was a common childhood trait in adult OCD
patients. Other studies have looked at related traits such as harm avoidance (Pfohl, Black,
Noyes, Kelley & Blum, 1990) and sensation seeking (Babbitt, Rowland & Franken, 1990)
and found either higher levels compared to controls (for harm avoidance) or negative
correlations with obsessive compulsive behaviours (for sensation seeking). Steiner (1972)
looked at caution in a psychiatric sample and found that obsessional patients were
significantly more cautious than any other psychiatric group. Frost et al (1994) linked the
traits of caution and risk aversion to cognitive accounts of OCD (e.g. Carr, 1974) in which
obsessionals are thought to have abnormally high estimates of the probability of
unfavourable outcomes. They also suggested that aversion to risk may be related to




Religiosity and moral strictness have been investigated in relation to OCD. Clearly, guilt
may be directly related to moral strictness and as already stated, certain schemata found in
OCD, such as thought action fusion may have their origins in the influence of religious
teachings (Shafran et al, 1996). Guilt has already been examined in relation to OCD: Niler
& Beck's (1989) study, described earlier found that guilt was the best predictor of the
frequency, dismissibility and distress of intrusive thoughts and compulsions compared to
anxiety and depression in a non-clinical sample. It may be that guilt as a schema may be
particularly significant when examining religiosity and OCD.
Steketee, Quay & White (1991) examined the relationship between religion, guilt and
OCD in a clinical sample. They pointed out that in a similar way to culture, religion may
determine how but not necessarily whether OCD symptoms are expressed. 33 OCD
patients and 24 anxious controls provided information about their religion of origin,
current religion and self-reported religiosity (i.e. how religious they considered
themselves). The Problematic Situations Questionnaire (Klass, 1987) was used to assess
total guilt and three guilt subscales. The OCD group was not significantly more religious
or guilty than anxious controls, but severity of OCD symptoms was positively correlated
with religiosity and guilt. OCD participants who were more religious tended to report
more religious obsessions as opposed to aggressive or sexual ones. Greater religious
devotion was related to more guilt in the OCD group. The authors concluded that although
more complicated than predicted, there does seem to be a relationship between guilt,
religion and OCD. As they suggested, religion did not seem to determine whether
symptoms of OCD are expressed, but did seem to influence how they were expressed (e.g.
more devout patients experienced more religious obsessions).
Finally, in a fairly comprehensive study of personality traits, Frost et al (1994) examined
risk taking, guilt, moral rigidity, perfectionism and perceived criticism. Their study also
incorporated investigation of parenting style (results described earlier). Three measures of
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obsessive compulsive symptomatology were used to select a subclinical OCD group from
a student sample. This group was found to be significantly more risk aversive,
perfectionistic and guilty than controls. No differences were found in terms of moral
rigidity or perceived criticism. It should be noted that the study employed only a
subclinical group of OCD participants which makes it more difficult to draw firm
conclusions about personality style in OCD.
It has been shown therefore that a number of personality styles or traits have been
associated to a greater or lesser extent with either OCD or obsessive compulsive
symptomatology. As already stated, while cognitive accounts have in the past
incorporated personality into their models, recent theorising has almost ignored it. There
seems to be an unnecessary dichotomy in the research which separates personality
characteristics and cognitive theory. It could be argued that this dichotomy is false and is
based on choice of language rather than fundamental differences in the dimensions studied.
It may be that true cognitive theorists are loath to use terms such as 'personality' or
'traits', when in fact the dimensions they are studying are effectively equivalent. For
example, in terms of cognitive accounts of OCD, 'personality' could be seen as analogous
to cognitive vulnerabilities or similar to dysfunctional assumptions and schemata.
Perfectionism could translate, in the form of a cognitive schema, as "rigid demands for
performance" proposed by Sookman et al (1994) and include dysfunctional assumptions
about concern over mistakes or doubting actions. Risk aversion would similarly be related
to beliefs about making mistakes. Both perfectionism and risk aversion would also be
related to schemata concerning responsibility in that the possibility of being blamed for
mistakes implies responsibility. Moral strictness and religiosity as personality styles have
been associated with guilt (Frost et al, 1994) which has been identified as a schema related
to responsibility in OCD (Niler & Beck, 1989). Religious teachings have been linked to
thought action fusion as a cognitive vulnerability in OCD (Shafran et al, 1996), in which
'sinful' thoughts are seen as equivalent to 'sinful' acts. It can be seen that 'personality
style' could fit easily into a cognitive theory framework.
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If we accept the link between personality style and cognitive vulnerabilities it may be that
dysfunctional assumptions or schemata can reflect wider personality dimensions that have
been studied in relation to other psychopathologies. The personality dimensions of
sociotropy and autonomy were first referred to by Beck (1983) as important dimensions in
understanding depression. Similar constructs have been studied previously in relation to
depression and other psychopathologies: 'dependency' and 'self criticism' (Blatt, D'Affliti
& Quinlan, 1976), 'anxious attachment' and 'compulsive self reliance' (Bowlby, 1977).
Sociotropy has been defined as a concern about interpersonal relationships and the need
for positive interchange with others. Autonomy refers to concern about independence and
autonomous achievement. Although the constructs have been associated particularly with
vulnerability to depression, their influence on other psychopathologies has also been
postulated (Robins, Ladd, Welkowitz, Blaney, Diaz & Kutcher, 1994), and may be
relevant to anxiety disorders, including OCD. Closer examination of the nature of the
constructs would support the proposal that sociotropy and autonomy may be associated
with OCD. Robins (1990) stated that "highly sociotropic persons are very concerned about
the possibility of being disapproved of by others and often act in ways designed to please
those others in order to secure their attachments Highly autonomous persons are very
concerned about the possibility of personal failure and often act in order to maximise their
control over the environment and thereby to reduce the probability of failure" (Robins,
1990 p 393, emphasis added). From these descriptions it can be seen that cognitive
vulnerabilities in OCD such as an exaggerated sense of responsibility, overestimation of
threat, an inflated estimate of the probability and severity of the outcome of thoughts,
concern over mistakes and need for control could be understood in terms of sociotropic
and autonomous concerns.
The Personal Style Inventory (PSI, Robins et al, 1994) is a recently developed scale which
measures sociotropy and autonomy. The dimensions of the PSI (which has been developed
primarily to examine vulnerability to depression) includes separate subscales. Sociotropy
is made up of constructs of i) concern for what others think, ii) dependency and, iii)
pleasing others. The autonomy dimension consists of i) perfectionism/self criticism, ii)
need for control and, iii) defensive separation. Robins et al (1994) suggested that these
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constructs comprehensively cover the main domains of interpersonal and achievement
dimensions described in previous research on vulnerability to psychopathologies. The
constructs included in the PSI may be related to personality style or cognitive
vulnerabilities in OCD, as dimensions such as perfectionism/self- criticism, need for
control, concern for what others think, pleasing others are likely to be associated with
obsessional traits. Dysfunctional assumptions in OCD may therefore reflect either
sociotropic or autonomous concerns.
It has been hypothesised that personality styles develop from particular developmental
experiences. Research examined earlier in relation to the development of perfectionism
would support this hypothesis (e.g. Frost et al 1991). Broader dimensions such as
sociotropy and autonomy may also have their aetiology in particular early or parenting
experience. Attempts have been made to relate these personal styles to early/childhood
experience, but Robins et al (1994) commented that results have been mixed, with no clear
pattern emerging. Given Sookman et al's (1994) multidimensional model of OCD, the use
of the PSI may be of interest in examining personality dimensions or cognitive
vulnerability in OCD. The relationship between early experience and the development of
cognitive vulnerabilities relevant to OCD would also be of interest.
The current study will aim to address a number of areas which recent research into OCD
has failed to address sufficiently. This has been due to a number of methodological
shortcomings in terms of the type of participant recruited as well as the tendency for
researchers not to attempt to develop a comprehensive model of OCD which incorporates
dysfunctional beliefs, cognitive vulnerabilities and early experience. Before discussing
specific hypotheses in detail, the choice of experimental and control group will be briefly
described.
As already discussed, the majority of studies into OCD have used non-clinical or sub
clinical participants as the experimental group. The concerns about this choice of
participant group have already been discussed in detail. The problems with accepting the
conclusions of these analogue studies as well as negotiating the variety of methodologies
45
used in determining criteria and selecting the group have been addressed. It was surprising
to note that the OC Cognitions Working Group (1997) did not discuss the issue of non¬
clinical participants in OCD research as a methodological consideration in past and future
research. The group would be the forum for discussion, coordination and agreement
regarding this methodology, but its apparent disinterest in this area is a disappointing
oversight. The current study aimed to recruit only participants who met DSM IV criteria
(APA, 1994) for OCD and/or were receiving treatment at a Clinical Psychology or
Psychiatry Department. It was hoped to create two experimental groups: a clinical group
of patients with obsessions and compulsions and a clinical group of pure obsessionals (i.e.
with no overt or covert compulsions).
The hypotheses of the current study will be examined partly by comparing a clinical OCD
group with a clinical mixed anxiety group. OCD is categorised as a distinct anxiety
disorder but there has been some debate over the distinction between OCD and other
anxiety disorders. This is due to the number of features of OCD which are shared with
anxiety disorders and the co-occurrence of OCD and anxiety disorders. The frequent co¬
occurrence ofOCD and depression has also led to discussion as to whether OCD should be
considered an affective disorder. A number of studies have indicated that an anxiety group
(rather than depressed or normal) should be used as a control for an OCD experimental
group.
Crino and Andrews (1996) provided evidence to support the use of anxious (rather than
depressed or 'normal') participants as the most appropriate control for an OCD
experimental group. They investigated the relationship between OCD and other anxiety
disorders and depression in patients with OCD (n = 108), panic/agoraphobia (n = 219) and
social phobia (n = 127). Current diagnosis as well as criteria for meeting other diagnoses
over the patients' lifetime were assessed using a structured diagnostic interview. Their
main finding was that while OCD patients had high rates of co-occurring anxiety disorders
over their lifetime, patients with other anxiety disorders had low rates of diagnosable OCD
over their lifetime. Therefore, OCD patients seemed to have a vulnerability to other
anxiety disorders but other anxiety disorders (although having a vulnerability to each
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other) did not have a vulnerability to OCD. In relation to depression, the study found that
there were high rates of comorbid depression in OCD sufferers, but rates were no higher
than for other anxiety disorders. There did not seem to be any particular relationship
between OCD and depression compared to other anxiety disorders. OCD therefore seems
to be well placed among the anxiety disorders and the clear differences between these two
groups would indicate that an anxiety group would be an appropriate control to examine
differences between the two groups.
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HYPOTHESES
1. Recent cognitive accounts of OCD have concentrated on trying to identify
dysfunctional thinking in terms of cognitive biases or schemata which account for a
specific vulnerability to OCD. As has been discussed, research in this area has
predominantly used non-clinical participants and has suggested a number of dysfunctional
assumptions thought to be relevant to OCD. A recently developed measure, the Inventory
of Beliefs Related to Obsessions (IBRO, Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon & Thibodeau,
1993) provides a comprehensive examination of some of the main dysfunctional
assumptions thought to be central to OCD. While the scale has been developed mainly to
address meta-cognitions in obsessionals, it covers some of the other cognitive biases
thought to influence OCD: responsibility; blame; guilt; thought action fusion;
overestimation of negative consequences; over-estimation of negative outcomes;
intolerability of uncertainty and neutralisation as an appropriate response to thoughts. It is
hypothesised that the OCD group will score significantly higher on the IBRO compared to
the anxious controls, indicating the unique contribution of these specific cognitive biases
and schemata in OCD.
2. Research into pure obsessions is still in its infancy. It has been argued that there is a
qualitative difference between coping mechanisms (e.g. distraction and avoidance) and
compulsive or neutralising activities (defined as attempts at putting right and avoiding
blame and responsibility). The current study will attempt to examine whether there are
differences in terms of schemata/personality characteristics between groups of participants
who do and do not carry out compulsive behaviours. The cognitive model of OCD
explains the persistence of the disorder by stating that the occurrence or content of the
obsessions leads to negative automatic thoughts about the thought. These negative
automatic thoughts are related to dysfunctional schemata. It would be reasonable to accept
that some schemata will be the same in pure obsessionals and obsessionals who neutralise.
For example, themes measured in the IBRO such as blame, control over thoughts,
intolerability of uncertainty should be equal in these two groups. However, differences in
schemata could explain why some obsessionals neutralise and others do not. Themes such
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as neutralisation as more appropriate than confrontation (included in the IBRO) may not be
operating in pure obsessionals. Thought action fusion may also distinguish between pure
obsessionals and neutralising obsessionals: the belief that thinking about something may
result in it actually happening (TAF likelihood) may be more likely to provoke
neutralisation. TAF moral, (thinking about an act is morally equivalent to doing the act)
may not be able to distinguish between neutralisers and non-neutralisers in the same way.
To sum up, it is hypothesised that pure obsessionals will score significantly higher than the
anxious control group on the IBRO. However, differences between pure obsessionals and
neutralising obsessionals will be found on items of the IBRO. Specifically, pure
obsessionals will not report belief in thought action fusion or neutralisation rather than
confrontation of thoughts to the same extent as the neutralising obsessional group.
3. Cognitive accounts of depression and anxiety have developed from identifying types of
negative thoughts and information processing style associated with each disorder to
addressing more core fundamental beliefs and specific vulnerabilities in terms of
personality characteristics. Recent research into OCD has not developed in the same way.
While some specific characteristics such as perfectionism or guilt have been examined,
there has been no attempt to explore broader constructs such as 'autonomy' and
'sociotropy'; dimensions which have been extensively explored in depression. As already
argued, personality characteristics are similar and related to schemata in that they are
thought to be influenced by the environment and early experience, and mediate perception
of self and others, as well as directly influencing behaviour towards others and the choice
of personal goals. The Personal Style Inventory (PSI, Robins et al, 1994) assesses
personality characteristics said to "confer vulnerability to psychopathology". Scores on
the PSI will be compared between the OCD and anxiety groups. It is hypothesised that the
OCD group will score significantly higher on both dimensions than the anxious control
group. This hypothesis is based on closer examination of the subscales of the PSI which
relate to factors or constructs already suggested as relevant to OCD, for example,
perfectionism/self criticism. It is further hypothesised that sociotropy rather than
autonomy will be more strongly related to OCD as the subscales it measures (concern for
what others think, dependency and pleasing others) may be more related to OCD than the
49
autonomy subscales. Although autonomy subscales (perfectionism/self criticism, need for
control and defensive separation) may appear more relevant to OCD, closer examination of
individual items in each subscale would support the view that overall, sociotropy is likely
to be more closely linked to OCD. Examination of individual subscales of the PSI will
show higher scores in the OCD group for: concern for what others think; pleasing others;
perfectionism/self criticism and; need for control, as these themes should be particularly
relevant to OCD.
4. In cognitive theories, dysfunctional schemata are said to influence the development and
maintenance of OCD, therefore the number and strength of dysfunctional assumptions
should be related to the severity of symptoms. A positive relationship is therefore
expected to be found between current symptom scores for OCD and scores on the
cognitive vulnerability/schemata scales (IBRO and PSI). A similar pattern would be
expected for scores on the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI, Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer,
1988) and PSI, particularly in the anxious group, as an indication of the relationship
between symptoms of anxiety and cognitive vulnerability factors. Individual subscales of
the MOCI - R (Rachman et al, 1996) should also be positively related to IBRO scores. In
particular, a large correlation would be expected between the obsessions subscale of the
MOCI - R and the IBRO, given that the IBRO assesses dysfunctional assumptions related
to beliefs about obsessions.
5. Research which has examined early experience and OCD has again used mostly non¬
clinical participants and methodology has varied (particularly in relation to controlling for
anxiety and depression). It has therefore been difficult to draw firm conclusions about
patterns of parenting related to OCD. The current study will use the Parental Bonding
Instrument (PBI, Parker, Tupling & Brown, 1979) to examine experience of parenting in a
clinical OCD group, controlling for anxiety and depression scores. Given the pattern that
previous research has found, it is hypothesised that a large proportion of both the anxiety
and OCD group will fall into the 'affectionless control' category, indicating high
overprotection and low care. In particular, it is hypothesised that overprotection will be
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more relevant to OCD than care, given the psychodynamic (Salzman & Thaler, 1981) and
overcontrol models ofOCD (Rachman, 1976).
6. The hypotheses proposed so far have addressed whether there are differences in
cognitive vulnerability in terms of schemata and personality characteristics (as far as these
can be assessed in a questionnaire format) between an OCD and anxiety group. The
significance of early experience and specifically parenting style has also been discussed.
Could there be a relationship between early experience and particular schemata or
personality characteristics? The work of Sookman et al (1994) has stressed the need to
examine early experience and attachment as a way of understanding current thinking style
and schemata in the OCD patient. Furthermore, the dimensions of sociotropy and
autonomy in the PSI have been hypothesised to derive from particular developmental
experiences (Robins et al, 1994). The current study will therefore address whether parental
style reported by participants is related to dysfunctional schemata and personality style as
measured by the IBRO and PSI. Firstly, 'affectionless control' (high overprotection and
low care) has been associated with OCD symptomatology. OCD has been related to
specific cognitive vulnerability which is thought to develop through early experience. If
parenting is related to the development of dysfunctional assumptions in OCD, then high
scores on the IBRO should be associated with 'affectionless control'. In terms of
personality dimensions, some non-linearity may be found in relation to parenting and
cognitive vulnerability. For example, high scores on sociotropy may arise as a
consequence either of extreme 'overprotection' or extreme 'underprotection'.
7. The previous hypothesis begins to examine the relationship between early experience
and cognitive vulnerability. The final hypothesis looks at the relationship between OCD
symptomatology, early experience and cognitive vulnerability. In cognitive theorising,
schemata are seen as mediating factors which underlie and can account for the
development and maintenance of psychopathology. A model of OCD could be developed
which linked 'adverse' or specific early experience to psychopathology in adult life though
the mediating influence of dysfunctional assumptions and cognitive vulnerability (see
figure 3). It is hypothesised that there will be a positive relationship between pathological
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scores ('affectionless control') on the PBI and patients' symptoms ofOCD and anxiety. If
cognitive vulnerability is the mediating factor which can account for the development and
maintenance of OCD, the relationship between PBI scores and OCD symptomatology will











FIGURE 3: Cognitive vulnerability as the mediating factor in the development of anxious




1. The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM III-R Patient Edition (SCID - P, Spitzer,
Williams, Gibbon and Frost, 1990) is a structured interview schedule for assessing criteria
required for a diagnosis of OCD. Although the schedule has been developed in relation to
DSM III-R (APA, 1987) criteria for OCD, comparison with DSM IV (APA, 1994) criteria
shows that there are no significant differences between previous and current criteria. The
interview generates information about the experience of obsessions and/or compulsions.
In the case of obsessions, the qualitative experience of the obsessional thought is examined
to distinguish it from other forms of anxious ruminations (e.g. worrying about having a
panic attack). Distinctions are made to exclude a possible psychotic element to thoughts or
the thoughts being related to another co-existing disorder (e.g. thoughts of food associated
with an eating disorder). Information is also sought on the amount of distress or
interference with social functioning experienced due to symptoms. Each section of the
format (either symptoms or qualitative distinctions) is rated as absent/false, subthreshold
or threshold/true to inform diagnosis.
2. The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI, Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988) is a measure of
anxiety symptoms. It is used frequently in research to provide an anxiety rating. The scale
consists of 21 items describing mostly physical symptoms of anxiety which correspond
closely to DSM III-R generalised anxiety and panic disorder symptoms. Items are rated on
a 0 - 4 scale (not at all to severe). The authors reported good internal consistency (a =
0.92) and stability (r = 0.75 at 1 week interval) and evidence of good convergent, divergent
and factorial validity (Beck et al, 1988a).
3. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) consists of 21
items to measure the intensity and severity of depressive symptoms. Each item has four
alternatives describing different types of depressive symptoms increasing in severity. It is
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used extensively in research and numerous studies have supported its convergent and
discriminant validity (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988)
4. The Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory - Revised (MOCI-R, Rachman,
Thordarson, Radomsky & Shafran, 1996). The original MOCI (Hodgson & Rachman,
1977) has been used widely in OCD research and has been considered one of the best
measures of specific OCD related behaviour (Taylor, 1995). However, it has several
limitations, particularly the categorical format of true/false responses and the absence of a
number of themes now thought to be related to OCD. Rachman and colleagues have
therefore developed a revision of the original scale. The version used in the current study
is a 62 item inventory which consists of 9 subscales: contamination, checking, obsessions,
hoarding, indecisiveness/ perfectionism, concern over mistake, routine/counting/slow,
TAF moral and TAF likelihood. The TAF subscales measure beliefs rather than symptoms
and are not included in the main scale total. Items are rated on a 0 - 4 scale (not at all true
of me to very much true of me). Preliminary studies showed good reliability in both
student and obsessive compulsive samples (a = 0.95) for the 7 main subscale totals
(Thordarson, 1997, personal communication).
4. The Inventory ofBeliefs Related to Obsessions (IBRO, Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon &
Thibodeau, 1993) was developed to assess some of the main schemata thought to be
related to OCD, with the main emphasis on meta-cognitive beliefs. The scale consists of
20 items which are rated on a scale of 1 - 6 (1 = I believe strongly that this statement is
false to 6 = I believe strongly that this statement is true). Individual items are grouped into
9 subscales: i) direct or indirect responsibility for harming, possibly harming or failing to
prevent harm to self or others; ii) blame or blame avoidance; iii) control of thoughts and
actions and possible consequences ofnot controlling such thoughts; iv) thoughts as causing
or provoking harm; v) guilt as an appropriate response to thoughts; vi) overestimation of
negative outcomes; vii) reaction to danger; viii) the neutralisation rather than confrontation
of thoughts; and ix) the intolerability of uncertainty. The scale therefore assesses the main
belief domains identified by the OC Cognitions Working Group (1997). Component
analysis of the 20 items of the scale revealed three main dimensions: dysfunctional
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responsibility schemata (11 items), overestimation of threat (5 items) and intolerance of
uncertainty (4 items).
Freeston et al (1993) reported on the statistical properties of the scale. The total scale has
adequate internal consistency (a = 0.76), reliability (a = 0.82) and test-retest reliability (r
= 0.70). The scale also showed evidence of criterion, convergent, discriminant and
factorial validity. Clark and Purdon (1995) in a review of measures which have been
developed to examine OCD concluded that the IBRO was a promising instrument for
assessing dysfunctional beliefs related to obsessions.
The Personal Style Inventory (PSI, Robins, Ladd, Welkowitz, Blaney, Diaz & Kutcher,
1994) is a measure aimed at identifying sociotropic or autonomous personality traits. The
inventory consists of 48 statements about personal characteristics, which are rated on a 1 -
6 scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree). Each of the two personality
dimensions consists of three subscales. Sociotropy is made up of: concern for what others
think; dependency; and pleasing others. Autonomy consists of: perfectionism/self
criticism; need for control; and defensive separation. The inventory showed good factor
structure, internal consistencies (a = 0.88 for sociotropy and 0.86 for autonomy) and test-
retest reliability (a =0.80 for sociotropy and 0.70 for autonomy) with low correlation
between dimensions (r = 0.18). Convergent and discriminant validity were acceptable.
The Parental Bonding Instrument (PBI, Parker, Tupling & Brown, 1979) assesses the
individual's attitudes towards each parent separately on two identical scales. The
participant is asked to rate attitudes and behaviours (very like to very unlike) as they
remember each parent in the first 16 years of life. The instrument has two subscales: care
and overprotection, which total 25 items. The instrument has good factor structure, with
adequate validity and good test-retest reliability (r = 0.76). Sex, age and social class of
respondents were found to be uninfluential. It has also been shown that PBI scores are not
influenced by mood (Parker, 1990; Gerlsma, Kramer, Scholing & Emmelkamp, 1994).
The PBI was designed to measure perceived parental characteristics and therefore requires
retrospective and subjective accounts. Various strategies (e.g. corroborative reports from
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siblings and parents, comparing scores of twins) have supported the PBI as a relatively
accurate measure of actual parenting (Parker, 1990), although results of longitudinal
studies are still awaited.
Participants
Participants for the experimental group were recruited by a number of methods. Clinical
Psychology and Psychiatry Departments were asked to identify patients that were currently
being seen or recently had been seen for obsessive compulsive difficulties. A local OCD
self-help group was also contacted.
Patients currently receiving treatment for a range of anxiety disorders were recruited from
Clinical Psychology Departments to form the control group. The majority were
participating in a psycho-educational anxiety management group.
Procedure
Participants in the experimental group were informed of the study through various
methods. The majority (13) were introduced to the study by their psychologist who
explained the nature of the research and provided written information. Participants who
expressed an interest were contacted by the researcher to arrange an appointment. Patients
who were in contact with Psychiatry services or who had terminated/completed treatment
were sent an introductory letter and information sheet directly from the researcher. If
patients expressed an interest in the study (by returning a slip to the researcher) an
appointment was arranged. Current in-patients were approached by the researcher who
gave written and verbal information about the study. They were given time to decide if
they wanted to take part in the study, and if willing a time was arranged for the researcher
to return.
At the appointment further information was given to participants about the nature of the
research and they were given the opportunity to ask questions. Information given was
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limited so as not to produce bias in responding. All participants who attended the
appointment agreed to take part in the research and signed a consent form. Data collection
was carried out at that meeting. Participants were advised that they could withdraw from
the study at any time. A clinical interview was conducted to gather demographic
information and determine the nature and duration of obsessive compulsive problems as
well as treatment history. Formal diagnosis of OCD was made based on the SCID-P
structured interview format (Spitzer et al, 1990). If participants met criteria they were then
asked to complete the questionnaires detailed above. After completing the questionnaires,
the full aims of the study were discussed with the participant. They were offered a booklet
on obsessional compulsive problems and the option of receiving a summary of the research
findings when completed. The procedure lasted between one to two hours in most cases.
The three participants who were in-patients completed the questionnaires over a number of
sessions.
The procedure for the control group varied. All participants were given written
information about the study and their inclusion as a control was explained by their
Psychologist. A minority (three) followed the same procedure as above, meeting with the
researcher to obtain demographic information and details of the anxiety disorder before
completing the questionnaires. The remainder who expressed an interest in participating in
the study to their Psychologist, were given or sent the questionnaire battery which included
a top sheet to obtain the demographic details and information related to the type of anxiety
disorder and type and length of treatment. The Psychologist involved in their treatment
was contacted to clarify information if it was not provided adequately by the participant.
Participants were not asked directly about obsessive compulsive symptoms, although this
information was provided in the MOCI-R. No participants in the control group had
received a diagnosis of OCD. The battery consisted of the same questionnaires detailed
above. Participants either returned the battery to their Psychologist or by post to the




A total of 54 patients was contacted in relation to the research. 26 agreed to take part in
the study. Three participants were excluded as they did not fulfill the criteria for OCD.
Only one participant experienced pure obsessions (i.e. the experience of intrusive thoughts
which met criteria for obsessions (DSM IV, APA, 1994) with no overt or covert
compulsions) It was therefore impossible to create a separate experimental group of
participants with pure obsessions. This participant was included in the main experimental
group. The main group therefore consisted of 23 participants. The mean age of
participants was 36.4 years (range 20 - 61 years, 9.4 standard deviation in years). 14 were
male and 9 female.
12 participants were currently being seen as Clinical Psychology outpatients. Six reported
receiving predominantly behavioural treatment, with five participants indicating a
cognitive as well as behavioural element to treatment. One patient was in the process of
cognitive behavioural assessment. Three participants were currently inpatients, one of
whom was receiving behavioural treatment. Five participants had been in contact with
Psychology services in the past year (two had received predominantly behavioural
treatment and three cognitive behavioural treatment). Participants were not asked about the
amount of psychological intervention received. Three participants were attending a
Psychiatry service. Within the group, five participants were recruited through a local
obsessive compulsive disorder self-help group. Of these, two were currently receiving
psychological treatment and three had had contact with Psychology services in the past.
18 participants were taking medication, mostly prescribed for obsessive compulsive
symptoms. Two participants had a previous diagnosis of a psychotic disorder
(schizophrenia and manic depression). Both were receiving medication for these
disorders, but on clinical interview obsessive compulsive symptoms were considered
separate and distinct and warranted a diagnosis ofOCD.
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Average duration of the disorder ranged from 1-24 years, with a mean of 9.8 years. This
was based on participants' estimations. A number of participants reported several contacts
with mental health services over the course of the disorder's duration. A variety of
obsessions and compulsions were reported. The most common obsessional symptoms
were the experience of repeated doubts, followed by thoughts of harm coming to self or
others, need for order and contamination. The most common compulsions were checking
and cleaning. Most participants had a number of obsessions and compulsions. Table 2
gives a summary of the main OCD characteristics of the group.
Control Group
34 patients receiving treatment for anxiety disorders were contacted about the study. 25
patients agreed to participate. One participant was excluded on the basis of a high score
on the MOCI-R (102), and two participants were excluded as they did not complete all of
the questionnaires in the battery. This left a total of 22 participants. Of these, eight
experienced symptoms of Generalised Anxiety Disorder and 14 suffered from panic
attacks. 14 were female and eight male. Mean age was 36.4 years (range 16 to 57 years).
Participants had been in treatment with a Psychologist for between one week and two
years, with a mean of 13 weeks. The majority (n = 15) had been in contact with
Psychology services for less than six weeks. The figures reported were an estimate made
by participants and as they were not asked to report on the number of appointments with a
Psychologist it is difficult to determine a precise level of psychological involvement. In
all cases, treatment was predominantly cognitive behavioural. 12 participants were taking
medication for anxiety and depression (lofepramine, propranalol, imipramine, venlafaxine,
thioridazine, paroxetine). Participants in this group were not asked about the duration of
their anxiety disorder or treatment history.
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Comparison of Groups
The experimental and control groups did not differ significantly in terms of age (t == .01, p
= .91, df 43, SE of diff 3.20), sex (t = 1.66, p = .11, df 43, SE of diff = .15) or years in
education (t = 1.98, p = .06, df 42, SE of diff = .76). As expected, the groups differed
significantly on obsessive compulsive symptoms as measured by the MOCI - R, with a
mean score of 81.09 for the experimental group and 32.32 for the control group (t = 5.73, p
< .01 (one tailed), df 43, SE of diff 8.51). There was no significant difference between
groups on depressive symptoms, as measured by the BDI. Mean scores were 19.70 for the
experimental group and 16.45 for the control group (t = 1.1, p = 0.28, df 43, SE of diff,
2.95). Groups did not differ significantly on the BAI. The mean score for the OCD group
was 20.39 and 23.68 for the anxious group, (t = .84, p = .41, df 43, SE of diff, 3.93). Table
3 below shows the means, standard deviations and range of scores on these measures for
both groups.
MEASURE MEAN STANDARD DEV. RANGE
OCD GROUP
14 female 9 male
AGE 36.39 + 9.48 20-61
EDUC 13.22 + 2.92 10-20
MOCI - R 81.09 * 32.71 35 - 134
BDI 19.70 + 10.74 3-48
BAI 20.39 + 13.73 4-48
ANXIOUS GROUP
13 female 9 male
AGE 36.41 11.88 16-57
EDUC 11.71 1.98 10- 17
MOCI - R 32.32 23.37 2-77
BDI 16.45 8.89 6-39
BAI 23.69 12.62 7-60
Table 3: Sex, age, years in education, and scores on the Maudsley Obsessional
Compulsive Inventory - Revised, Beck Depression Inventory and Beck Anxiety Inventory
for the experimental and control group. + = no significant difference between groups (p >
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MAIN HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1. Comparison ofscores between the experimental and control group on the
Inventory of Beliefs Related to Obsessions: the unique contribution of specific cognitive
biases to OCD.
It was hypothesised that the OCD group would score significantly higher than controls on
the IBRO to demonstrate the unique contribution of specific dysfunctional beliefs about
obsessional thoughts to the maintenance of OCD. An independent t test was carried out
between groups to compare scores on the IBRO. The mean score on the inventory for the
OCD group was 68.96 and 71.64 for the anxious group. No significant difference was
found between groups (t = .69, p = .25 (one tailed), df 43, SE of diff 3.89), disconfirming
the hypothesis (see table 4).
Hypothesis 2. Pure obsessionals and differences in dysfunctional assumptions which
distinguish them from neutralising obsessionals.
It was hypothesised that pure obsessionals would score higher than controls on the IBRO
and that differences would be found between the pure and neutralising obsessionals on
particular subscales/items of the IBRO. As it had not been possible to recruit a separate
group of pure obsessionals, no analysis was completed for this hypothesis. As only one
participant experiencing pure obsessions was recruited, it was not possible to provide
statistical comparison. Appendix 1 provides a qualitative description and individual scores
of this participant as a brief exploration of the experience of pure obsessions in the light of
the hypothesis.
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OCD ANXIOUS t TEST (one tailed)
IBRO
mean 68.96 71.64 t= .69 p = .25 (NS)
43 df
st. dev. 13.13 12.95
range 40-93 00 1 Oo
PSI SOCIOTROPY
mean 108.0 106.05 t = .37 p = .36 (NS)
43 df
std dev 19.01 16.68
range 50- 138 76 - 143
PSI AUTONOMY
mean 91.35 88.55 t= .59 p = .28 (NS)
36.39 df
std dev 12.53 18.78
range 61 - 117 60 - 122
Table 4: Means, standard deviations and range of scores for the Inventory of Beliefs
related to Obsessions and sociotropy and autonomy scales of the Personal Style Inventory
for the experimental and control group, t values and significance for between group
comparisons. (NS = not significant)
Hypothesis 3. Comparison ofscores between the experimental and control group on the
Personal Style Inventory. It was predicted that the construct ofsociotropy would be more
relevant to OCD than autonomy. Examination of individual subscales of the PSI was
planned to highlight themes ofparticular relevance to OCD.
a. It was hypothesised that the OCD group would score significantly higher than controls
on both constructs of the PSI. 1 tailed independent t tests were conducted to compare
sociotropy and autonomy scores between groups, as measured by the PSI. Mean scores
showed that for both sociotropy and autonomy, scores were higher in the experimental
group (see table 4) but the difference was not significant for sociotropy (t = .37, p = .36, df
43, SE of diff 5.34). For autonomy, a Levene's test for equality of variance showed a
significant difference in group variances (F = 6.34 p = < .05) showing that variance was
greater in the anxious group and indicating the need to adjust the t test in accordance. The
adjusted t test indicated no significant difference in autonomy scores between groups (t =
.59, p = .28, df 36.39, SE of diff, 4.78). As groups did not differ significantly on the BDI
depression would not be a confounding variable in comparison of the sociotropy and
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autonomy constructs between the OCD and anxiety groups. Figure 4 shows the
distribution of autonomy and sociotropy scores for the two groups.
Figure 4: Distribution of sociotropy and autonomy scores for the OCD and anxious
groups.
b. It was hypothesised that sociotropy would be more strongly related to OCD than
autonomy. Pearson product-moment correlations (1 tailed) showed that neither construct
was significantly correlated with scores on the MOCI - R in the OCD group (for
sociotropy, r = .28, p = .10 and for autonomy, r = .24, p = .14). As correlations were not
significant, comparison of the size of correlations was not appropriate.
The same procedure was conducted within the anxious group. 1 tailed Pearson product-
moment correlations were conducted between MOCI - R scores and sociotropy and
autonomy. Significant correlations were found for both sociotropy and autonomy
(sociotropy r = .71 p < .001; autonomy r = .51 p < .01). Using the formula devised by
Williams (1959) and endorsed by Steiger (1980) to test the difference between strength of
non-independent correlations, the difference in correlations did not reach statistical
significance at the .05 level (t = 1.40, p < .10, 19 df). Scatterplots to illustrate the
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relationship between MOCI - R scores and sociotropy and autonomy in the OCD and
anxious group are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Correlation matrix for scores on the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive
Inventory - Revised and sociotrpy and autonomy in the OCD and anxious groups.
c. Scores on the individual subscales of the PSI were compared between groups. It was
predicted that higher scores on the subscales 'concern for what others think', 'pleasing
others', 'perfectionism/self criticism' and 'need for control' would be found in the OCD
group. The results are shown in table 5 below. 1 tailed t tests were conducted for
subscales where higher scores for the OCD group were predicted. The remaining
subscales were compared using 2 tailed t tests. No significance difference was found
between the OCD group and anxious groups on any of the subscales. Figure 6 illustrates
the similar subscale scores obtained on the PSI for the OCD and anxious group.
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Subscale of Personal Style Inventory t value p value df / SEofdiff
concern for what others think .39 .35* 43 / 1.90
Dependency .02 .98+ 43 / 1.74
pleasing others .53 .30* 43 / 2.37
perfectionism/self criticism 1.44 .08* 43 / 1.16
need for control .76 .23* 43 / 1.92
defensive separation .12 .90+ 43 / 2.70
Table 5: Series of t tests for subscales of the Personal Style Inventory between the OCD
and anxious group. (* = 1 tailed + = 2 tailed)
Figure 6: Distribution of scores on subscales of the Personal Style Inventory, to illustrate
the similar scores between the OCD and anxious group. Note that total obtainable scores
for each subscale varies, so that comparison within groups is not possible.
d. A further series of Pearson product-moment correlations was conducted for PSI
subscale scores and MOCI - R scores for both groups to test whether specific subscales
were more related to OCD than others. 1 tailed correlations were conducted for the four
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subscales hypothesised to be most relevant to OCD. Correlations for the remaining two
subscales were 2 tailed. Within the anxious group, significant correlations were found for
most of the subscales (excluding 'need for control'), while only one significant
relationship (for 'perfectionism/self criticism') was found within the OCD group (table 6).
subseale of Personal Style Inventory r P
OCD GROUP
concern for what others think* .26 .12
dependency+ .22 .31
pleasing others* .29 .09
perfectionism/self criticism* .42 <.05
need for control* -.01 .49
defensive separation+ .21 .34
ANXIOUS GROUP
concern for what others think* .57 <.001
dependency+ .60 <.005
pleasing others* .63 <.001
perfectionism/self criticism* .47 <.05
need for control* .33 .07
defensive separation+ .47 <.05
Table 6: Pearson product-moment correlations between scores on the Maudsley
Obsessional Compulsive Inventory - Revised and sociotropy and autonomy in the OCD
and anxious group. (* = 1 tailed correlation + = 2 tailed correlation.)
Hypothesis 4. Examination of the relationship between symptomatology and strength of
dysfunctional beliefs in OCD and anxiety.
a. It was hypothesised that the number/severity of symptoms of OCD and anxiety would be
positively related to scores on cognitive vulnerability measures (IBRO and PSI). The
relationship between obsessive compulsive symptomatology and sociotropy and autonomy
has been examined in the previous hypothesis (3b) where no relationship was found in the
OCD group, while positive correlations were found between MOCI - R scores and
sociotropy and autonomy within the anxious group. A 1 tailed Pearson product-moment
correlation was conducted for scores on the IBRO and MOCI - R in the OCD group to test
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the hypothesis that there would be a positive correlation between dysfunctional beliefs
related to obsessions and obsessive compulsive symptoms. A significant relationship was
found (r = .43, p < .05). Within the anxious group a significant but smaller correlation was
found between IBRO and MOCI - R scores (r = .38, p < .05 (1 tailed)). Figure 7 shows
scatterplots of the relationship between the IBRO and obsessive compulsive symptoms for
both the OCD and anxious group.
Figure 7: Scatterplot for scores on the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory and
the Inventory of Beliefs Related to Obsessions for the OCD and anxious group.
b. Individual subscales of the MOCI - R were examined to test the hypothesis that
particular individual subscales would also be related to scores on the IBRO. A large
correlation was expected between the obsessions subscale and the IBRO. Within the OCD
group a significant relationship was found between only the hoarding subscale of the
MOCI - R and the IBRO within the OCD group. No other subscales were correlated with
IBRO scores (table 7). For the anxious group, 1 tailed Pearson product-moment
correlations between the IBRO and the subscales of the MOCI - R revealed only one
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significant correlation for the 'indecisiveness/perfectionism/concern over mistakes'
subscale (see table 7).
IBRO correlations with OCD ANXIOUS
Subscales of MOCI - R r P r P
checking .30 .08 .28 .11
contamination -.06 .39 .26 .12
hoarding .41 <.05 .04 .43
indecisiveness/perfectionism/concer
n
.31 .07 .48 <.05
obsessions .33 .06 .18 .21
routine/counting/slow .32 .06 .32 .07
Table 7: 1 tailed Pearson product-moment correlations between the Inventory of Beliefs
Related to Obsessions and subscales of the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory -
Revised within the OCD and anxious group.
c. The relationship between cognitive vulnerability and symptoms of anxiety was also
examined. 1 tailed Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted for scores on the
BAI and sociotropy and autonomy. Within the anxious group a significant correlation was
found for sociotropy (r = .57, p < .005) but not autonomy (r = .33, p = .07). For the OCD
group, 2 tailed correlations found no significant correlations for sociotropy or autonomy
and BAI scores (r = .30, p = .16; r = .17, p = .43).
Hypothesis 5. Exploration ofparental bonding in anxiety and OCD - the contribution of
'affectionless control' and the greater contribution ofoverprotection in OCD.
Data for the PBI was incomplete. Maternal bonding was not completed for two
participants (one OCD, one anxious) and three participants did not complete the inventory
for paternal bonding (one OCD, two anxious). These participants reported that they had
had no contact with that parent during childhood, for varying reasons. These cases were
included in the analysis as missing data rather than attributing zero scores.
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a. It was hypothesised that a proportion of participants from both groups would fall into
the 'affectionless control' category, indicating high overprotection and low care. Figures
8a and 8b below show the distribution of scores for maternal and paternal care and
overprotection as measured by the PBI for the OCD and anxious groups. Parker et al
(1979) provided means for maternal and paternal care and overprotection scores based on a
sample of 410 normal participants. In figures 8a and 8b these means have been used to
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Figure 8a: Distribution of scores for maternal bonding in the OCD and anxious groups.
Crossing axes represent normal population means.
divide the distribution of scores into the 4 categories of affectionless control, affectionate
constraint, absent/weak bonding and optimal bonding. For maternal bonding (Fig 8a) it
can be seen that participants do not fall into any particular category, although more
participants fall into the low care categories. Similarly for paternal scores (Fig 8b), no one
clear category emerges, but participants more clearly tend to fall into the low care
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categories compared to the maternal scores. Paternal overprotection tends to be generally
lower than maternal overprotection. Table 8 shows the mean scores in each group for













Figure 8b: Distribution of scores for paternal bonding in the OCD and anxious groups.
Crossing axes represent normal population means.
Parental Bonding Instrument Mean Standard Dev. Range
OCD group
maternal care 23.41 8.94 1-36
maternal overprotection 13.18 8.37 0-35
paternal care 20.32 8.16 6-34
paternal overprotection 11.14 8.09 0-31
ANXIOUS group
maternal care 24.24 7.62 10-36
maternal overprotection 12.76 6.15 0-25
paternal care 18.79 6.01 9-29
paternal overprotection 12.21 5.47 2-32
Table 8: Means, standard deviations and range for scores on the Parental Bonding
Instrument for the OCD and anxious group.
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Parker et al (1979) referred to a fifth category of 'average bonding' (statistically defined).
Average bonding would refer to scores which fall close to the mid-points of the crossing
axes. Of particular interest then are the participants who most clearly fall into the
'affectionless control' quadrant. For maternal bonding, one participant from the OCD
group reported scores which clearly demonstrate 'affectionless control'. For paternal
scores, two participants from the OCD group also stand out as clearly falling into the
'affectionless control' category, although in this case, their scores are not as easily
distinguished from the remaining participant's scores as is the case in maternal bonding.
Appendix 2 provides a qualitative description and individual scores for these three
participants.
b. It was further hypothesised that high overprotection as measured by the PBI would be
more relevant to OCD than low care. It was not necessary to control for each variable in
the analyses as overprotection and care scores were not significantly correlated within the
OCD group or anxious group (for OCD group r = -.29, p = .20 for maternal and r = -.18, p
= .41 for paternal; for anxious group r = -.16, p = .49 for maternal and r = -.35, p = .14 for
paternal). Within the OCD group, one tailed Pearson product-moment correlations showed
no association between scores on the MOCI - R and either maternal or paternal care scores
(see table 10). Similarly, no relationship was found between maternal or paternal
overprotection and MOCI - R scores (table 10). As no relationships were found, it was not
possible to compare size of correlations as planned. Within the anxious group, the same
series of correlations was conducted. No relationship was found between obsessionality
(as measured by the MOCI - R) and maternal or paternal care or overprotection (see table
10)
Hypothesis 6. The relationship between early experience and personality style/cognitive
vulnerability to OCD.
a. It was predicted that a positive relationship would be found between scores on the IBRO
and overprotection and a negative correlation between care and IBRO scores. Within the
OCD group, the relationship between scores on the IBRO and scores on the PBI were
examined. 1 tailed Pearson product-moment correlations showed that only maternal care
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was significantly but weakly correlated with IBRO scores (r = .33, p < .05) but the
correlation was positive and not negative. 1 tailed correlations were not significant for
paternal care or maternal and paternal overprotection (see table 9) (r = .13, p = .28; r = .32,
p = .08; r = .18, p = .21). Within the anxious group, no relationships were found between
IBRO and PBI scores (see table 9).
Correlations r P predicted
OCD GROUP * = signif direction
IBRO with (1 tailed)
Maternal care .37 <.05* no
paternal care .13 .28 no
maternal overprotection .32 .08 yes
paternal overprotection .18 .22 yes
SOCIOTROPY with (2 tailed)
maternal care -.29 .19 yes
paternal care -.17 .46 yes
maternal overprotection .19 .40 yes
paternal overprotection -.14 .53 no
AUTONOMY with (2 tailed)
maternal care -.16 .48 yes
paternal care -.23 .31 yes
maternal overprotection .49 <.05* yes
paternal overprotection .21 .36 yes
Correlations r P predicted
ANXIOUS GROUP direction
IBRO with (1 tailed)
maternal care .26 .12 no
paternal care .28 .12 no
maternal overprotection .02 .47 yes
paternal overprotection -.03 .46 no
SOCIOTROPY with (2 tailed)
maternal care -.18 .73 yes
paternal care .27 .27 no
maternal overprotection -.19 .40 no
paternal overprotection -.25 .30 no
AUTONOMY with (2 tailed)
maternal care -.06 .79 yes
paternal care .16 .52 no
maternal overprotection -.07 .76 no
paternal overprotection -.30 .22 no
Table 9: Pearson's correlations within the OCD and anxious group between scores on the
Parental Bonding Instrument and the Inventory of Beliefs Related to Obsessions and the
sociotropy and autonomy constructs of the Personal Style Inventory.
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b. It was further hypothesised that relationships would be found between scores on the PSI
and the PBI, although some non-linearity was expected. A further series of Pearson
product-moment correlations (two tailed) was calculated for sociotropy, autonomy and
parental bonding. Within the OCD group, no significant correlations were found between
autonomy or sociotropy and maternal care, paternal care or paternal overprotection (see
table 9). A significant positive correlation was found between autonomy and maternal
overprotection (r = .49, p < .05). No correlations were found within the anxious group. It
was hypothesised that some non-linearity may have been found in relation to parenting and
cognitive vulnerability. Figures 9a and 9b show the scatterplot of scores on the PBI and
sociotropy and autonomy. It can be seen that no pattern of non-linearity is emerging.
Figure 9a: Scatterplot matrix for sociotropy and autonomy with maternal care and
overprotection in the OCD and anxious group.
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Figure 9b: Scatterplot matrix for sociotropy and autonomy with paternal care and
overprotection in the OCD and anxious group.
Hypothesis 7. The relationship between parenting experiences and adult symptoms of
OCD and anxiety and the mediating role ofpersonality style and dysfunctional beliefs.
It was hypothesised that early experience should be linked to symptomatology in adult life
through the mediating influence of personality style and cognitive vulnerabilities, as
measured by the IBRO and PSI. Pearson product-moment correlations (1 tailed) have
already been conducted within the OCD and anxious groups between scores on the PBI
and the MOCI - R (see results for hypothesis 5b). No significant correlations were found
(table 10). This result did not warrant the planned regression analysis to investigate the
mediating role of dysfunctional assumptions/belief measures. The hypothesis also
proposed to look at the relationship between anxiety scores (BAI) and adverse early
experience and dysfunctional beliefs. 1 tailed Pearson product-moment correlations were
conducted for scores on the PBI and the BAI in both the OCD and anxious group. No
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correlations were found (table 10), which again prevented the planned regression analysis




MOCI - R -.04 .42
BAI .06 .40
maternal overprotection with:
MOCI - R .13 .29
BAI .16 .24
paternal care with:
MOCI - R -.08 .36
BAI .03 .44
paternal overprotection with:
MOCI - R -.14 .26
BAI .09 .35
ANXIOUS GROUP r P
maternal care with:
MOCI - R .03 .46
BAI .19 .19
maternal overprotection with:
MOCI - R -.11 .33
BAI -.06 .41
paternal care with:
MOCI - R -.05 .42
BAI .19 .22
paternal overprotection with:
MOCI - R -.02 .48
BAI .27 .13
Table 10: 1 tailed Pearson product-moment correlations between scores on the Maudsley
Obsessional Compulsive Inventory - Revised and the Parental Bonding Instrument and
scores on the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the Parental Bonding Instrument for the OCD
and anxious group. No significant correlations found.
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DISCUSSION
The following section will critically discuss the results found in the current study.
Methodological shortcomings will then be highlighted before a summary of the main
findings is given and conclusions are made. Recommendations for further research are
discussed.
Critical Examination of Findings
The first hypothesis predicted that the OCD group would score significantly higher on the
IBRO than the anxious control group. No significant difference was found between
groups. This is a surprising finding, given that the measure was designed to highlight
dysfunctional beliefs specific to OCD and in particular, the main belief domains concluded
from the OC Cognitions Working Group review of measures (1997). In the development
of the scale, Freeston et al (1993) conducted a number of studies to examine the properties
of the scale. The majority of these involved non-clinical samples, with a mean score on
the scale reported as 65.8 (range 35 - 90). A comparison of an OCD group (n = 14) and a
matched non-clinical group (n = 14) did find a significant difference between scores, with
the OCD group scoring higher than controls (mean of 75.56 compared to 59.20). It was
concluded that the scale was measuring extreme beliefs specific to OCD. However, as the
control group was non-clinical, perhaps the only conclusion that could be made was that
compared to a normal population the dysfunctional assumptions measured by the scale
were specific to an OCD group. The present study has demonstrated that when comparing
beliefs between an OCD and clinical matched anxiety group, the dysfunctional
assumptions measured by the scale did not appear to be specific to OCD. It may be that
the assumptions are present in a range of anxiety disorders. The results indicate that care
must be taken in concluding about specific OCD cognitive vulnerabilities that may in fact
be found in a wide range of disorders. Freeston (1997, personal communication) has used
scores on the IBRO as an indication of change in thinking style for 22 ruminators receiving
cognitive treatment for obsessions. He reported a reduction in IBRO means from 70.6 pre-
treatment to 56.6 post-treatment and 53.1 at 56 month follow-up, concluding that the
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measure is sensitive to treatment change. It may be that this is the case, but that changes in
scores on the measure as a result of treatment reflect changes in more general cognitive
biases in psychopathology and not necessarily biases specific to OCD. Further research is
needed to examine whether the IBRO can highlight the unique contribution of specific
cognitive vulnerabilities in OCD, or is simply measuring generic beliefs in psychiatric
patients.
The development of the IBRO included a component analysis which revealed three main
dimensions: dysfunctional responsibility: overestimation of threat: and intolerance of
uncertainty. It was decided that as there was no difference between total scores on the
IBRO between groups, separate analysis on the individual subscales was not warranted.
Furthermore, the inventory's author has not recommended separate analysis of the
subscales (Freeston, 1997, personal communication).
It should be acknowledged that some methodological problems may have influenced the
above finding. A recent review of assessment of cognitive vulnerability in OCD
(Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997) discussed the advantages and
disadvantages of priming participants before assessing cognitive biases when using a self-
report format. Priming refers to including a definition and examples of intrusive and
obsessional thoughts before participants complete the questionnaire, to distinguish
obsessions from worry, cognitions associated with anxiety or even pleasurable ideas. The
authors did not reach any conclusion about whether priming should be used. In the current
study, it was felt that priming for the IBRO could have been advantageous and may have
resulted in more distinction between groups. This is due to the fact that the majority of
items on the scale are general, for example "uncertainty should not disturb", "loss is
always a terrible thing" or refer to assumptions related to responsibility, blame,
neutralising and thought action fusion, where priming may not have affected responses.
However, for the items which refer to "thoughts", it is probable that participants in the
anxious group were responding in relation to their worrying thoughts and negative
automatic thoughts related to anxiety. The possibility of this is increased given that all
participants in the anxious group were receiving cognitive behavioural treatment for
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anxiety disorders. While some had not been in treatment for long, the majority would have
been introduced to the idea of the role of cognitions in anxiety. Items on the scale such as
"thoughts are in themselves harmless", "not being able to control thoughts will harm no
one" and "enduring unpleasant thoughts without doing anything is dangerous for the
person who has them" may have been responded to in the light of understanding of the
effects of thoughts in anxiety and therefore constituted a bias in responding. A further
observation is that participants in both groups tended to report some confusion about items
of the scale and difficulty in responding. This seemed to be related to both the generality
of some items as well as complicated item wording, often involving the use of double
negatives. Priming may have reduced this confusion by providing a clear focus for
responding.
For the second hypothesis, related to dysfunctional thinking in pure obsessionals, it was
not possible to apply statistical tests. The brief case description provided in Appendix 1
illustrated one example of cognitive bias in pure obsessions, but it is not possible to draw
any firm conclusions from the case. This case served to highlight the issue of
heterogeneity within the OCD population, which will be discussed more fully later.
The third hypothesis examined the constructs of sociotropy and autonomy (as measured by
the PSI). It was found that the OCD and anxious groups did not differ significantly for
scores on either sociotropy or autonomy. Although the mean score was slightly higher in
the OCD group on both measures, the range and standard deviation of scores meant that
differences between the constructs failed to reach significance. The further examination of
the individual subscales of the PSI between groups confirmed that the anxious and OCD
groups did not differ in their reports of sociotropic or autonomous concerns (Figure 6 ,
Table 5).
Reported norms for the PSI (Robins et al, 1994) show that the means within the OCD and
anxious group were higher than in the normal population. For a sample of non-clinical
students (n = 411) mean sociotropy score was 95.8. In the current study, this compares to
means of 108 and 106 in the OCD and anxious group respectively. For autonomy, normal
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population mean was 82.6 compared to 91.35 for the OCD group and 88.55 in the anxious
group. The PSI is a recently developed scale, and to my knowledge no studies have used
the scale to examine the constructs in depression. The development of the scale included
mean scores for a group of depressed patients, but scores related to the original 60 item
version of the scale (Robins et al, 1994). In order to allow some comparison, the mean
scores of 127.7 for sociotropy and 117.3 for autonomy (n = 50) on this original scale
would be equivalent to approximate scores of 101 for sociotropy and 94 for autonomy on
the revised 48 item scale. Unpublished mean scores for a small group of depressed
patients on the revised inventory (n = 10) were 110.7 for sociotropy and 106 for autonomy
(Charlton, 1997, personal communication). These means in a depressed population are
very similar to the mean scores found in both the OCD and anxious groups in the current
study, suggesting that sociotropy and autonomy may be specific vulnerabilities in anxiety
as well as depressive disorders.
The results would suggest that the broad personality characteristics of sociotropy and
autonomy may be relevant and clinically important in anxiety disorders and OCD, but may
not be able to distinguish between anxiety disorders. Further examination of personality
constructs may be a fruitful area of further investigation in OCD research, to examine
vulnerability to the disorder. In research into depression, various authors have investigated
the personality-event congruence hypothesis: that specific events increase vulnerability to
depression dependent on the underlying personality construct. For example, in sociotropic
individuals, vulnerability to the onset of depression has been related to life events
involving social loss or rejection, while events involving failure or loss of control have
been related to vulnerability to depression in autonomous individuals (Segal, Shaw, Vella
& Katz, 1992). While results in this area have been mixed, it may be that a similar pattern
is operating in anxiety and OCD, whereby vulnerability to the disorders is related to these
underlying personality constructs. Different types of significant life event could similarly
distinguish between the onset of OCD or anxiety in sociotropic and autonomous
individuals. For example, becoming independent in a new home has been related to the
development of OCD symptoms in individuals due to the link with responsibility schemata
(Rachman, 1993). It may be that this life event involving increase in responsibility may
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increase vulnerability to the onset of symptoms due to more general underlying constructs
such as autonomy. While this investigation is beyond the scope of the present study it is
an area worthy of further study.
In relation to the PSI it had also been predicted that there would be a stronger association
between sociotropy and OCD than autonomy. This hypothesis was based on closer
examination of the individual subscales of the PSI. It was found that within the OCD
group, OCD symptomatology was not related to either construct and therefore it was not
possible to examine which construct had the stronger relationship. However, in the
anxious group a strong and significant correlation was found between OCD
symptomatology and sociotropy and autonomy. A trend towards a stronger relationship
between sociotropy and OCD symptomatology than autonomy was found in the anxious
group. A statistical explanation of these findings was possible: if there was little variance
on MOCI - R scores within the OCD group, this would produce a ceiling effect. However
closer analysis of the data showed that the range of scores and standard deviation on the
MOCI - R in the OCD group were greater than or equal to the anxious group, indicating
that the finding seems to reflect a real effect. It could be concluded that the constructs of
sociotropy and autonomy are relevant to OCD, due to the clear relationship found between
PSI scores and MOCI - R scores. However, the data for the OCD group found no
relationship between these measures. This contradictory finding is an important one in
relation to the use of non-clinical participants and correlational analyses based on
symptom scores in OCD research. In the current study, the separate analyses which
allowed a comparison between a clinical OCD group and anxious group as well as
correlations enables us to conclude that obsessionality as a trait may be related to the
broader constructs of sociotropy and autonomy, but that these constructs do not appear to
be specific to the disorder of OCD. The issue of drawing conclusions from correlational
analyses in which results may be related to obsessionality as opposed to OCD will be
referred to and discussed more fully later.
Hypothesis 4 aimed to examine the relationship between symptomatology in OCD and
anxiety and cognitive vulnerability. This involved correlations between the MOCI - R,
82
BAI, IBRO and PSI in both groups. Correlations for obsessionality and sociotropy and
autonomy have already been discussed above. For anxiety symptoms and the constructs of
sociotropy and autonomy, no relationship was found in the OCD group which was not a
surprising finding given that we would not necessarily expect to find particular
relationships related to anxiety symptoms in an OCD population. For the anxious group, a
significant correlation was found between BAI scores and sociotropy but not autonomy.
There is some evidence to suggest that level of symptomatology is related to cognitive
vulnerability, but the current results do not indicate this universally or conclusively.
In looking at OCD symptomatology and cognitive vulnerability in the form of
dysfunctional beliefs about obsessions, scores on the MOCI - R and the IBRO were
analysed to determine if the greater number or strength of OCD symptoms were related to
greater dysfunctional beliefs. Although a previous hypothesis had found that there was no
significant difference between scores on the IBRO between the OCD and anxious group,
the correlational analysis showed that in both groups there was a significant relationship
between symptomatology and cognitive vulnerability. This finding would seem to support
the view that the IBRO may be sensitive to obsessionality as a trait, but that firm
conclusions about the unique contribution of dysfunctional thinking about obsessions to
OCD cannot be made. In support of this view, the correlational analysis between the
subscales of the MOCI - R and the IBRO did not produce the predicted results. In the
OCD group, the 'obsessions' subscale was predicted to be most strongly related to the
IBRO, but no correlation was found and only the hoarding subscale correlated with IBRO
scores. Within the anxious group, a significant correlation was found for IBRO score and
the indecisiveness/perfection/concern over mistakes subscale. This finding again
highlights the need for caution in interpreting findings about OCD from a non-OCD group.
It is interesting that within the anxious group, the subscale of the MOCI - R which is
arguably the most general and least symptom related, correlated with scores on an
inventory which has already been criticised as being too general, with items which could
produce strong belief in an anxious population.
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The influence of early experience was examined in hypothesis 5. The distribution of
scores on the PBI did not illustrate many clear patterns emerging in terms of identifying
specific categories of parenting style associated with OCD or anxiety, although it was
noted that more participants fell into the low care categories (as defined with reference to
the normal population). High overprotection was not evident from the distribution of
scores. Correlational analyses between scores on the MOCI - R and the PBI did not reveal
any relationships between OCD symptomatology and care or overprotection in either the
OCD or anxious group. These findings are not particularly surprising, as it had been
hypothesised that only a proportion of participants would fall into the 'affectionless
control' category. Early experience has been linked to a number of psychopathologies, but
that link is not proposed to be absolute. In OCD while we might expect to find certain
dysfunctional developmental experiences in some patients which do seem to suggest a
particular pattern related to adult pathology, it is not proposed that this pattern is necessary
or indeed sufficient for their development in all patients. Similarly, dysfunctional patterns
of parenting in childhood will not necessarily result in psychopathology in later life.
Particularly given the small sample size in the current study, it was unlikely that a clear
pattern on parenting styles would emerge. Furthermore, parenting style is only one of
many influences that could account for cognitive vulnerability to psychopathology. The
possibility of biases in responding should also be considered in discussing the results of
the PBI analysis. Although studies have shown that participants' recall of parenting
received does appear to be a valid measure of actual parenting (Parker, 1990) and not
affected by mood (Gerlsma et al, 1994), it may be that in OCD, thinking style and
schemata could influence participants' responding. Specifically, schemata related to
responsibility and thought action fusion may prevent participants from portraying their
parents in a negative, or at least less than positive light.
Other studies which have examined parenting style and anxiety and OCD using the PBI
which were discussed in the introduction have concluded that 'affectionless control' at
least to some extent appears to be relevant to OCD and anxiety disorders. Silove et al
(1991) in examining parenting in patients with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) and
panic disorder (PD) found that 'affectionless control' seemed to be associated with GAD
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while 'affectionate constraint' was associated with PD. This result has some implications
for results of the current study, where the anxious control group was a mixed group of
panic and generalised anxiety patients, so it may be that the group was more likely to show
a broader pattern of responding on the PBI. However, the authors took a liberal approach
to analysing their data, by using the mean scores provided by Parker et al (1979) as cut¬
offs to determine categorisation of parental bonding to allow statistical comparison. In this
respect, they were ignoring the 5th category of average bonding described by Parker et al
(1979). In the current study, the more conservative method of providing a qualitative
description of categorisation and using correlational analysis was used, which should yield
more valid results.
Research specific to OCD and the PBI has been limited and similarly problematic and was
examined in detail in the introduction. Cavedo & Parker (1994) found using non-clinical
participants, that high overprotection scores were related to higher scores on the OCD
measures (MOCI, Hodgson & Rachman, 1977; the Leyton Obsessional Inventory, Murray,
Cooper & Smith, 1979), but that results were less consistent for care scores. However,
they noted that "high levels of such [obsessive compulsive] symptoms should not of
necessity be regarded as equating with OCD, a more categorical disorder and not
necessarily with the same pathogenesis." (p 81) Given that in the current study,
correlational analysis within the anxious group has produced significant results when no
relationships were found within the OCD group (see results for hypothesis 3), their caution
in drawing firm conclusions from their findings should be heeded. In the more
comprehensive study using the PBI, reported by Frost et al, (1994), differences between
non-clinical and subclinical groups were found for maternal care and overprotection and
paternal overprotection. The authors did not attempt to categorise scores into parental-
child bonding dimensions. It was again difficult to make firm conclusions about the
influence of parenting given that the study used a 'subclinical' OCD group selected by cut¬
offs on three measures of OCD symptomatology. Separate analyses were conducted for
two samples, which again made interpretation difficult because results differed between
the two groups.
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In conclusion, the current study did not find evidence to support the contribution of low
care or high overprotection to OCD. It may be that the small sample sizes can in part
account for this finding or that responding in the OCD group was influenced by OCD
related schemata as discussed. However, given that previous research has suffered from
the methodological problems noted and did not produce robust findings, it may be that
OCD is not linked to any specific parenting style. 'Affectionless control' may yet be
associated with OCD but may not be necessary or sufficient for its development. The
heterogeneity of an OCD population, which will be discussed in detail later could also
make it difficult to identify patterns of parenting style related to OCD.
The sixth hypothesis continued to examine early experience by investigating the
relationship between scores on the PBI and the IBRO as a measure of OCD related
dysfunctional thinking. In the current study, it has already been concluded that beliefs
about obsessions and the other cognitive vulnerabilities measured by the IBRO were not
specific to OCD, but that a positive relationship was found between OCD symptomatology
and the IBRO in the OCD and anxious group. As no relationship was found between OCD
symptomatology and dimensions of the PBI, it would have been unlikely to have found
significant correlations between the PBI and the IBRO, although the correlation between
OCD symptoms and the IBRO would allow the possibility of such a relationship. Only
one significant correlation was found, between maternal care and the IBRO in the OCD
group. The correlation was in the opposite direction to that predicted, suggesting that high
care was associated with greater dysfunctional beliefs about obsessions. It is difficult to
interpret this finding, but it may be that if reflects the possible bias in responding referred
to earlier: that is that OCD participants with more extreme cognitive biases (as measured
by the IBRO) were consequently more influenced into responding on the PBI in a positive
way, so that care scores were artificially heightened.
The relationship between the broader constructs of sociotropy and autonomy and the PBI
was also examined. Only one significant correlation was found for autonomy and maternal
overprotection in the OCD group. Interpretation of this result must be cautious given that
a similar relationship was not found in the anxious group, and indeed no correlations were
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found for sociotropy or for other dimensions of the PBI with autonomy. However, the
significant correlation between autonomy and maternal overprotection could be understood
in terms of overprotection, rather than resulting in dependency, producing the opposite
effect of the individual developing a personality style more synonymous with 'autonomous
achievement'.
The final hypothesis proposed to link parenting experience to symptomatology through the
mediating influence of dysfunctional beliefs and cognitive vulnerability as measured by
the IBRO and PSI. As already discussed no relationship was found between OCD
symptomatology and early experience in either the OCD or anxious group. Similarly, no
correlations were found between anxiety symptoms (BAI) and early experience. In both
cases it was therefore impossible to conduct the planned regression analysis. The lack of
a relationship between scores on the MOCI - R and the PBI has already been discussed in
relation to the previous hypothesis. It was similarly surprising on one level that no
relationship was found between early experience and symptoms of anxiety. Research
which has examined the relationship between anxiety and the PBI has found identifiable
patterns of parenting associated with the disorder. It may be that the distinction noted by
Silove et al (1991) between parenting in GAD and PD could account for the lack of a clear
relationship emerging in the mixed anxiety control group used in the current study. The
other explanations discussed earlier in relation to the OCD would also apply in the current
case: the small sample size and the acknowledgment that adverse early experience is not a
necessary or sufficient factor in determining the presence or absence of psychopathology
in adult life.
Overall, it was disappointing that the full analysis planned for the final hypothesis was not
warranted given the lack of relationships found. The research had hoped to examine and
introduce a more holistic model of OCD which incorporated early experience, personality
style and cognitive vulnerability. The results have not supported this notion, although it
should be noted that sample sizes are small and a more comprehensive replication with
increased numbers may yet produce evidence to support such a model. Despite the lack of
significant results in relation to this final hypothesis, the study did highlight some
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interesting findings, which will be discussed more fully after an examination of the
methodological shortcomings of the study.
Consideration ofMethodological Shortcomings
Some methodological problems have already been discussed in relation to the results of
specific hypotheses, for example the use of priming when administering the IBRO. More
general methodological consideration are discussed in this section.
An important item for discussion is the use of a scale such as the MOCI - R as an
indication of the number and/or severity of OCD symptoms. The original MOCI was
developed specifically to identify symptoms of OCD rather than measure obsessionality,
and although the revised version has maintained this to some extent, some questions are
general and not symptom focused. The generality of some items could have implications
for the possibility that within the anxious group, scores on the MOCI - R were reflecting
obsessionality rather than symptoms. This would be important in correlational analysis, as
the hypotheses of the current study aimed to study characteristics of OCD and not just of
obsessionality.
A further consideration in relation to the MOCI - R is whether the scale truly reflects the
intensity of OCD. It was observed during the administration of the scale that the total
score obtained did not always seem to reflect the severity or intensity of the problems for
certain patients: that is that a high score on the MOCI - R did not necessarily tally with a
patient who was more incapacitated by the disorder and vice versa. For example, the
patient described in Appendix 1 scored 40 out of 208 on the MOCI - R. The range within
the OCD group in the current study was 35 to 134, suggesting that compared to the other
participants within the experimental group, he was not particularly symptomatic. As is
described in Appendix 1, this participant was an in-patient whose obsessional thoughts
were overwhelming and caused extreme distress and significantly interfered with normal
functioning. He described the thoughts as being present all the time and was visibly
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anxious and agitated throughout our meetings. Several sessions were required to complete
the questionnaires due to the distress and anxiety he was experiencing. And yet he scored
only 40 on the MOCI - R. This is explained in that the scale includes subscales to measure
the main obsessional and compulsive symptoms. In the case of this participant, he had a
limited number of symptoms, for example he did not have any compulsive behaviours. In
fact, his symptoms amounted only to the repetitive thoughts about having harmed
someone. As a result, he was not particularly symptomatic in terms of number of
symptoms but the severity and intensity of the disorder had required in-patient treatment.
While one could argue that this is an extreme case, it was observed with other participants
that their MOCI - R score did not always reflect the severity or intensity of the disorder
described during clinical interview. A large number of symptoms causing little distress
and little interference may not be as severe a case of OCD as few symptoms that
nevertheless result in immense distress and interruption to daily functioning.
If we accept that the measure of obsessionality used in the current study is worthy of the
criticism described above, this has implications for the interpretation of results using
correlational analysis. If the MOCI - R is not truly reflecting the extent of OCD in
participants, then caution must be used in accepting both the disconfirmed as well as
confirmed hypotheses. The use of scales such as the MOCI - R to measure obsessionality
in non-clinical participants has even greater implications for the validity of results when
using either correlational analysis or selecting 'subclinical' groups based on obsessionality
scores. While it is accepted that correlational analyses are examining obsessionality as a
trait rather that OCD, it may also be that the artificial classification of participants using
self report symptom measures is not a reliable method. The concerns raised above about
OCD measures is only one aspect of a general concern about the use of non-clinical
participants in OCD research. A robust clinical distinction should be employed in further
research to overcome these difficulties. A more detailed criticism of the use of non¬
clinical participants, particularly in the light of some of the findings of the current study
will be made later.
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Another consideration in the current study is the nature of the participant groups.
Participants in the OCD group were recruited from Psychology and Psychiatry services, as
being currently in treatment or having received treatment in the past. The majority had
received some form of psychological intervention, with some subjects describing a
cognitive element to treatment. Participants were not asked to expand on what this
intervention had involved and their therapist was not asked about treatment content. It was
possible therefore that participants had already been exposed to cognitive theories of OCD
and had engaged in work related to this approach. This may have affected responses to
particularly the IBRO, and may also have produced some shift in cognitive style, so that
their belief systems had changed or become less extreme during the course of treatment.
Indeed, one participant stated after completing the questionnaires that her responses would
probably have been very different if the battery had been administered a year previously,
before she had begun treatment. She recognised that her thinking style and beliefs had
changed significantly over the course of treatment. In some cases therefore, results on the
cognitive vulnerability measures in the OCD group may have been dampened by
treatment. It should be noted that this may have been relevant for only a minority of
participants. This issue also reflects some of the difficulties in recruiting clinical
participants for research when the disorder to be studied is relatively rare, at least
compared to disorders such as panic disorder or depression. In the current study it was
noted that a total of 54 current or ex-patients from Psychology and Psychiatry services
within a large population base were contacted, yielding only 26 participants, 3 or which
were excluded from the analysis. It may have been beneficial to the study to recruit
participants who had not received psychological intervention or were only undergoing
assessment for psychological intervention, but one would have to question the
practicalities of this method. In the current study, it is accepted that knowledge of
cognitive theories or treatment could have been a confounding variable for a minority of
participants.
Similar difficulties were evident in the anxious control group. Firstly, participants were
again already receiving treatment for their anxiety disorder and the amount of intervention
received varied. The possible influence of knowledge of cognitive theories of anxiety
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disorders has already been discussed in relation to the possibility of biased responding on
the IBRO within the anxious group. The mixed anxious group (patients with
panic/agoraphobia and GAD) may also have confounded results, in that the OCD group
was being compared with a heterogeneous control in terms of type of disorder. It has
already been discussed that the PBI has distinguished between patients with GAD and
those with PD (Silove et al, 1991). It may be that some of the measures used in the current
study would distinguish between the individual anxiety disorders which made up the
control group, making clear comparisons between the OCD and anxious group more
difficult. A further consideration is that while no participant in the anxious group had
received a diagnosis of OCD, a diagnostic interview was not conducted to determine the
absence ofOCD. In the majority of cases, it was clear from the MOCI - R score that there
was no evidence of OCD, or indeed obsessive compulsive symptomatology. For a small
minority of participants, their scores on the MOCI - R certainly indicated a level of
obsessive compulsive symptomatology. Whether the symptoms would have merited a
diagnosis ofOCD was unclear, as this was not examined specifically, although as criteria
for OCD involves more than just symptomatology, the possibility of a diagnosis of OCD in
the anxious group is further reduced.
Heterogeneity within groups was not only specific to the anxious group. OCD is a
disorder in which a range of obsessions and/or compulsions can be experienced. In the
OCD group in the current study, table 2 illustrated that participants differed greatly in
terms of the number and type of obsessions and compulsions reported. Previous research
into OCD which has used clinical rather than subclinical groups has varied in terms of the
specificity of the OCD participant. While some research has recruited an OCD group in a
similar way to the current study, thereby forming a group of patients with a range of
symptoms, other studies have selected patients with only one type of obsession or
compulsion. This method has been employed where there was recognition that traits, early
experience, or cognitive vulnerability may be different even within the OCD population.
For example, Steketee et al's study (1995) which was detailed in the introduction, recruited
separate experimental groups of 'washers' and 'checkers', based on a proposed theoretical
distinction between parenting style associated with each symptom. In a treatment outcome
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study, Ladouceur et al (1996) reported on cognitive treatment ofOCD in patients with only
checking rituals. Indeed the current study had aimed to recruit a pure obsessional group,
(based on the narrow definition of a compulsive behaviour), in an attempt to investigate
whether differences in cognitive vulnerability could account for the absence of compulsive
behaviours. Because of the heterogeneity of the OCD population, it may be that clear
patterns or specific underlying cognitive schemata will be difficult to find. This would
suggest the need to investigate specific subgroups within OCD. From a practical point of
view, this may be difficult as not only is clinical recruitment often difficult, but as we have
seen, patients can also experience a range of symptoms, making it difficult to categorise
them into subgroups. From a clinical point of view, subgrouping may be unsatisfactory,
given the range of symptoms that some patients present with and difficulties in accepting
whether results from one subgroup e.g. washers can be generalised to other subgroups of
OCD.
The heterogeneity of the OCD population does not only limit itself to the type of
symptoms experienced, but also extends to co-morbidity with other anxiety disorders and
depression. Overlap and unclear distinctions between OCD and other diagnoses,
particularly psychosis is a related problem. In the current study, the OCD group showed
high levels of symptoms for both anxiety and depression. Mean BAI score was 20.39 with
a range of 4 to 48. For the BDI scores ranged from 3 to 48 with a mean of 19.70. As these
scores did not differ significantly from the anxious group, it had not been necessary to
control for anxiety or depression in correlational analyses, and in comparative statistics,
anxiety and depression should not have been a confounding variable. Although OCD has
been confirmed as a distinct anxiety disorder (Crino & Andrews, 1996), the BAI and BDI
scores in the current study illustrate that in cognitive research into OCD we may be
measuring schemata and other cognitive vulnerabilities which are related to anxious and
depressive vulnerability, and not purely to OCD. The inclusion of OCD as an anxiety
disorder in itself is an indication that there are fundamental similarities between an OCD
population and individuals with other forms of anxiety disorder. This means that an
anxious control group is the best comparison group ifwe are to highlight factors specific to
OCD and not to anxiety disorders in general. However, it also means that studies which
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expect to find differences between groups, may not do so, as the variables measured may
be anxiety but not OCD specific. In the current study, results for the OCD and anxious
group comparison on the IBRO may be a reflection of this (bearing in mind the
methodological problems discussed in relation to this finding). Previous research has
similarly found that certain constructs were not distinguishable between an OCD and
anxious population. For example, Frost & Steketee (1997) in their examination of
perfectionism in OCD found that a clinical OCD and panic/agoraphobia group did not
differ significantly for total perfectionism scores. This study is particularly interesting in
that the authors noted that theirs was the first research which had attempted to examine
perfectionism in clinical subjects. Previous research had used correlational analysis in
non-clinical participants, using measures of obsessionality to correlate with perfectionism
scores. As well as the concerns about this method which have already been discussed, the
finding further highlights that certain traits, personality styles or schemata may be related
to psychopathology or anxiety disorders in general but not necessarily be specific to OCD.
The distinction between OCD and delusional disorders is a further complication in OCD
research which was relevant in the current study. Kozak & Foa (1994) examined the
concepts of obsessions, overvalued ideas and delusions to determine how these concepts
can be distinguished. Patient insight has been used as one form of distinction, in that a
diagnosis of OCD requires that the individual can think rationally about their obsessions
and recognise them as senseless or irrational. DSM IV criteria also states that the
individual must recognise that the obsessional thoughts are a product of their own mind
and are not imposed from without, as in psychotic disorders. It has been noted however
that some patients with OCD do not recognise that their obsessions are senseless, and these
have been described as overvalued ideas or delusions. This leads to the question of
whether these patients can be considered psychotic. After a full examination of research
which has investigated these concepts, Kozak & Foa (1993) concluded that "obsessive
compulsive ideas cannot satisfactorily be dichotomised according to patients' insight, and
that the notion of a continuum of strength of obsessive compulsive beliefs is more
appropriate" (Kozak & Foa, 1994 p 343). Strength of obsessive compulsive belief has
been viewed as ranging from full recognition of the senselessness of the thoughts to the
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complete absence of recognition, and many studies have found a broad range of insight in
diagnosed OCD patients (Foa & Kozak, 1993).
In the current study, this issue of a continuum of strength of belief in the obsessional
thought was noted during the clinical interviews with patients in the OCD group. In
particular, the patient who experienced pure obsessions was one case where the distinction
between an obsessional thought and a delusion was not clear cut. As described in
Appendix 1, he was able to recognise to some extent that the nature of his belief was
unreasonable, and indeed that the incident which had clearly triggered the thoughts was
unlikely to have caused the harm he feared it to have done. However, he was not certain of
the senselessness of either of these factors. A diagnosis ofOCD was appropriate, but again
the heterogeneity of an OCD population was evident.
The overlap between OCD and psychosis was apparent in other individuals who
participated in the study. While care was taken in ensuring that the criteria for OCD was
fulfilled in all cases, (and indeed one participant was excluded on the grounds that his
hoarding symptoms were in relation to a diagnosis of schizophrenia rather than OCD) the
complication of a psychotic illness was relevant for two patients who participated in the
study. Interestingly, one of these participants (participant 1 in Table 2), who had a
previous diagnosis ofmanic depression, had an almost identical obsessional thought to that
of the participant described above. In this case, the participant did engage in compulsive
behaviours, but these were fairly limited, and it was the obsessions rather than the
compulsions that disrupted functioning. Another patient (participant 9 in Table 2) had a
previous diagnosis of schizophrenia. Research into the co-morbidity of OCD and
schizophrenia has shown that rates of schizophrenia in OCD do not differ significantly
from the general population (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) and there does not seem to be a
particular association of these disorders. Research has also found that OCD does not
appear to be a precursor of schizophrenia, although a relatively high incidence of other
psychoses have been found among obsessive compulsives (Goodwin, Guze & Robins,
1969). In the case of this participant, the diagnosis of schizophrenia had been made when
the patient was 22, but obsessive compulsive symptoms appeared to have developed
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unrelated to the schizophrenia at the age of approximately 29. It can be seen in table 2 that
his symptoms, particularly the compulsions were classic symptomatology ofOCD and care
was taken to ensure that the obsessions were not psychotic in nature.
The examination of the heterogeneity of an OCD population given above, is an area which
can only be touched on in the current research and is one that is of particular interest in
OCD research. Its inclusion in the current paper is intended simply to point to the
complications of participant recruitment in OCD research and to highlight that both in this
and other studies which use clinical OCD patients, results may reflect the complexity of
varying symptomatology, co-morbidity and overlap with delusional and psychotic
disorders. The final section will provide a summary of the main findings of the study and
the conclusions that can be drawn from them, particularly in relation to previous research
conducted into OCD before discussing how research in this area can develop.
Summary ofMain Findings
The current study did not support the unique contribution of specific dysfunctional
thinking styles related to responsibility, overestimation of threat and intolerance of
uncertainty (as measured by the IBRO) to OCD. The absence of a difference between the
OCD and anxious group on this measure could have reflected methodological
shortcomings in the study's design, or may indicate that dysfunctional thinking thought to
be specific to OCD may be found in a range of anxiety disorders. The heterogeneity of
both the anxious and OCD groups may also have contributed to the absence of a clear
distinction between groups for the IBRO.
Influence of the constructs of sociotropy and autonomy were not different between the
OCD and anxious group. The mean scores for both constructs suggest that they may be
relevant in anxiety disorders, and support the view that sociotropic and autonomous
concerns confer vulnerability to a range of psychopathologies. Correlational analysis
examining OCD symptomatology and the PSI found no relationship in the OCD group.
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However, significant correlations were found between OCD symptomatology and
sociotropy and autonomy scores within the anxious group. Problems with the use of
symptomatology measures in OCD research were discussed. It is suggested that
correlational analyses using these measures may not be a reliable method of investigation.
In particular, the conflicting finding in this case between the correlations in the OCD and
anxious groups would indicate that correlational analyses may be measuring obsessionality
as a trait rather than OCD. This finding has implications for the widespread use of non¬
clinical or subclinical participants in OCD research.
Evidence that studies may be identifying relationships in obsessionality rather than OCD
was further supported by correlations conducted between obsessive compulsive symptoms
scores and OCD related dysfunctional thinking. While no differences between scores on
the IBRO were found between experimental and control groups, significant correlations
were found between MOCI - R scores and the IBRO for both groups. There does seem to
be a relationship between these measures, but its reliability is questioned due to concerns
over the use of the MOCI - R as an adequate measure of OCD severity. The finding that
the beliefs measured by the IBRO do not appear to be specific to OCD also reduces the
impact of this finding.
The influence of early experience in terms of parenting produced mixed results. No clear
pattern of parenting style emerged in the OCD or anxious group. No correlations were
found for MOCI-R with care or overprotection in either group. These results were
discussed in terms of the small sample size and a recognition that adverse early experience
is not a necessary or sufficient factor in the development of adult psychopathology.
Correlations for the PBI and dysfunctional thinking related to obsessions found only one
significant correlation, between maternal care and IBRO scores in the OCD group. The
direction of the correlation was the opposite to that predicted, making the finding difficult
to interpret. On the PSI a significant correlation was found between autonomy and
maternal overprotection in the OCD group.
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The final series of hypotheses had intended to examine the mediating role of dysfunctional
thinking in terms of the relationship between early experience and symptomatology. The
absence of any relationships between dimensions of the PBI and either OCD or anxiety
symptoms prevented the planned regression analysis and did not support the concept of an
integrated model ofOCD incorporating early experience and cognitive vulnerability.
Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research
Some of the main conclusions that can be drawn from the current research relate to
methodology in OCD research and point to the type of research that may prove to be most
fruitful in future studies. One of the first conclusions to be made involves the use of non¬
clinical participants in OCD research. The critical review of this methodology given in the
introduction highlighted the possible downfalls of such an approach. Results of the current
study in part support the criticisms of this method. Some of the conflicting results found
(particularly those related to hypothesis 3) indicated that correlations may be found
between scores on symptom measures ofOCD and other variables, but that comparison on
those variables between a clinical OCD group and an appropriate control group may not
reveal a significant difference. The study also found that correlations between OCD
symptomatology and other variables were found within the anxious group but not in the
OCD group. Research which used only non-clinical participants and correlational analyses
might have concluded that there was a clear relationship between OCD and other variables
based on this finding. The current study has shown that to accept such a conclusion is
problematic, as similar correlations may not be found in an OCD group, which is the
population of interest. This should lead us to question the validity of the research
conducted to date which has used correlational analyses in non-clinical populations to
make conclusions about OCD.
The distinction between obsessionality as a trait and OCD as a disorder has been
highlighted in the current study. Findings have supported the idea that patterns and
features found in obsessionality may not be found in OCD. Previous research has not
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addressed this issue sufficiently, as very few studies have been able to demonstrate the
dichotomy between obsessionality and OCD because they have not employed clinical
OCD participants. Where clinical participants have been used, the control group is often
not appropriate (e.g. Freeston et al, 1994). Future research needs to use clinical groups of
OCD patients to ensure that constructs relevant to OCD and not just to obsessionality as a
trait are being measured. An appropriate clinical control group should also be used to
determine specificity to OCD and not to anxiety disorders in general. The use of symptom
measures of OCD in both clinical and non-clinical correlational analyses has been
discussed in detail previously, so will not be repeated here. However, this potential
problem in reflecting severity or intensity of OCD is relevant to the discussion of
correlational analyses in OCD research and would support the proposal that future research
should aim to investigate OCD by comparing clinical OCD and anxious groups rather than
relying solely on correlational analyses.
The heterogeneity of the OCD population is a problem which can complicate research in
this field. Various suggestions were made previously including the subcategorisation of
OCD groups, but the difficulties with this method were highlighted. Research which
attempts to distinguish between groups of participants may need to accept the limitations
of this approach. In the current study, it was felt that particularly analyses involving the
PBI may have suffered from the heterogeneity of the groups studied, particularly the OCD
group. The final hypothesis relating to the possibility of developing a more integrated
model of OCD which incorporated early experience, personality style and cognitive
vulnerability was not supported in the current study, possibly due to the small sample size
and therefore more significant contribution of group heterogeneity. Despite the absence of
significant results, the aim of trying to integrate theories ofOCD would still appear a valid
and necessary one. However, attempting to do this using a similar methodology to the one
employed in the current paper would require a study on a much larger scale. An
alternative methodology would be to examine an integrated model of OCD using
individual case studies. The multifaceted model of OCD proposed by Sookman et al
(1994) which was discussed in the introduction could be considered the first real attempt to
develop a comprehensive model of OCD, which specifically examined early experience
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and schemata. The authors pointed out that research which examines such a model must
acknowledge the need to look at schemata on an individualised basis. They therefore
chose to illustrate the model by using single case studies rather than attempting to identify
specific patterns of early experience or thinking style. What seems to be emerging is that
while a model can provide a framework to help direct treatment of OCD on an
individualised basis, it may not be that specific patterns of adverse early experience or
types of dysfunctional thinking style can be reliably detected in a heterogeneous OCD
groups.
In conclusion, while many of the hypotheses in the current study were discontinued, some
interesting and important findings were made, which could be viewed as a starting point
for further research aiming to broaden current cognitive accounts of OCD. The
development of a more comprehensive model of OCD which aims to incorporate
schemata, personality style and early experience is an exciting possibility which should be
pursued. However, the current paper has identified the need for further investigations in
OCD to consider many of the methodological problems that are inherent in OCD research




Allsopp, M. & Verduyn, C. (1990). Adolescents with obsessive compulsive disorder: a
case note review of consecutive patients referred to a provincial regional adolescent
psychiatry unit. Journal ofAdolescence,Vol. 13, pp 157-169.
American Psychiatric Association (APA) (1980). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental disoders (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association (APA) (1987). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental disoders (3rd ed.rev.). Washington, DC: Author.
American Psychiatric Association (APA) (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental disoders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
Babbitt, T., Rowland, G. & Franken, R. (1990). Sensation seeking: preoccupation with
diet and exercise regimes. Personality and Individual Differences, Vol. 11, pp 759-761.
Beck, A.T. (1967). Depression; clinical, experimental and theoretical aspects.
(Republished as Depression; causes and treatment. University of Pennsylvania Press,
Philadephia, Penn.
Beck, A.T. (1976). Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders. International
university Press, New York.
Beck, A.T. (1983). Cognitive Therapy of Depression: New Perspectives. In P.J. Clayton
and J.E. Barrett (Eds.) Treatment ofDepression: Old Controversies and New Approaches
(pp 265-290) New York: Raven Press.
Beck, A.T., Rush, A.J., Shaw, B.E. & Emery, G. (1979) . Cognitive Therapy of
Depression. New York, Guilford Press.
Beck, A.T., Epstein, N. & Harrison, R. (1983). Cognitions, attitudes and personality
dimensions in depression. British Journal ofCognitive Psychotherapy, Vol. 1, pp 1-16.
Beck, A.T., Epstein, N., Brown, G. & Steer, R.A. (1988a). An inventory for measuring
anxiety: psychometric properties. Journal ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol 56,
pp 893-897.
Beck, A.T., Steer, R.A. & Garbin, M.G. (1988b). Psychometric properties of the Beck
Depression Inventory: twenty five years of evaluation. Clinical Psychology Review, Vol.
8, pp 77-100.
Blatt, S.J., D'Affliti, J.P. & Quinlan, D.M. (1976). Experiences of depression in normal
young adults. Journal ofAbnormal Psychology, Vol 85, pp 383-389.
Bowlby, J. (1977). The making and breaking of affectional bonds: I. etiology and
psychopathology in the light of attachment theory. British Journal ofPsychiatry, Vol 130,
pp 201-210. British Journal ofMedical Psychology, Vol. 52, pp 1-10.
101
Burns, L.G., Formea, G.M., Keortge, S. & Sternberger, L.G. (1995). The utilization of
nonpatient samples in the study of obsessive compulsive disorder. Behaviour, Research
and Therapy, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp 133-144.
Carr, A.T. (1974). Compulsive neurosis: a review of the literature. Psychological
Bulletin, Vol. 81, No. 5 pp 311-318.
Cavedo, L.C. & Parker, G. (1994). Parental bonding instrument. Exploring for links
between scores and obsessionality. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, Vol.
29, pp 78-82.
Cawley, R. (1974). Psychotherapy and obsessional disorders. In Obsessional States Ed.
Beech, H.R. pp 259 - 290. Methuen, London.
Clark, D.A. (1992) "Depressive, anxious and intrusive thoughts in psychiatric inpatients
and otupatients." Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol 30, pp 93-102.
Clark, D.A. & Purdon, C.L. (1995). The assessment of unwanted intrusive thoughts: a
review and critique of the literature. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 33, No. 8, pp
967-976.
Craske, M.G., Rapee, R.M., Jackel, L. & Barlow, D.H. (1989). Qualitative dimensions of
worry in DSM III-R generalized anxiety disorder subjects and non anxious controls.
Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 27, pp 189-198.
Crino, R.D. & andrews, G. (1996). Obsessive-compulsive disorder and Axis 1
comorbidity. Journal ofAnxiety Disorders,Vo\. 10, No. l,pp 37-46.
Degonda, M., Wyss, M. & Angst, J. (1993). The Zurich Study XVIII. Obsessive
compulsive disorders and syndromes in the general population. European Archives of
Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, Vol 243, pp 16-22.
Emmelkamp P.M.G., van de Helm, M. van Zanten, B. & Plochy, I. (1980). Contribution
of self instructional training to the effectiveness of exposure in vivo: a comparison with
obsessive compulsive patients. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol 18, pp 61-66.
Emmelkamp, P.M.G., Visser, S. & Hoekstra, R. (1988). Cognitive therapy versus
exposure in vivo in the treatment of obsessive-compulsives. Cognitive Therapy and
Research Vol 12, pp 103-114.
Emmelkamp, P.M.G. & Beens, H. (1991). Cognitive therapy with obsessive compulsives:
a comarative evaluation. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol 29, pp 293-300.
Foa, E.B., Steketee, G., Grayson, J.B., Turner, R.M. and Latimer, P.R. (1984). Deliberate
exposure and blocking of obsessive-compulsive ritual: Immediate and long-term effects.
Behaviour Therapy, Vol. 15, pp 450 - 472.
102
Foa, E. B., & Kozak, M. J. (1993). DSM IV field trial in obsessive compulsive disorder.
Unpublished manuscript.
Freeston, M., Ladouceur, R, Thibodeau, N. & Gagnon, F. (1991). Cognitive intrusions in a
non clinical population. I. Respnse style, subjective experience and appraisal. Behaviour,
Research and Therapy, Vol 29, pp 585-597.
Freeston, M.H., Ladouceur, N, & Gagnon, F (1992). Cognitive intrusions in a non clinical
population II. Associations with depressive, anxious and compulsive symptoms.
Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol 30, pp 273-281.
Freeston, M.H., Ladouceur, R., Gagnon, F & Thidobeau, N. (1992). Intrusive thoughts,
worry and obsessions: empirical and theoretical distinctions. In Salkovskis, P. Clinical
and Non Clinical Intrusive Thoughts. Symposium conducted at the world congress of
Cognitive Therapy, Toronto, Canada.
Freeston, M.H. and Ladouceur, R. (1993). Appraisal of cognitive intrusions and response
style: replication and extension. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp
185-191.
Freeston, M.H., Ladouceur, R., Gagnon, F. & Thibodeau, N. (1993). Beliefs about
obsessional thoughts. Journal ofPsychopathology and Behavioural Assessment, Vol. 15,
No. l,ppl-21.
Freeston, M.H., Rheaume, J. & Ladouceur, R.. (1996). Correcting faulty appraisals of
obsessional thoughts. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 34, No. 5/6, pp 433-446.
Freeston, M.H. & Ladouceur, R. (1997). What do patients do with their obsessive
thoughts? Behaviour, Reserach and Therapy, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp 335-348.
Freeston, M. H., Ladouceur, R., Gagnon, F., Thibodeau, N, Rheaume, J, Letarte, H. &
Bujold, A. (1997). Cognitive-Behavioural Treatment of Obsessive Thoughts: A Controlled
Study. Journal ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp 405 - 413.
Frost, R., Sher, K. & Geen, T. (1986). Psychopathology and personality characteristics of
nonclinical compulsive checkers. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol 24, pp 133-143.
Frost, R. & Marten, P.A. (1990). Perfectionism and evaluative threat. Cognitive Therapy
and Research, Vol. 14, pp 559-572.
Frost, R., Marten, P., Lahart, C. & Rosenblate, R. (1990). The dimensions of
perfectionism. Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 14, pp 449-468.
Frost, R.O., Lahart, C.M. & Rosenblate, R. (1991). The development of Perfectionsim: A
Study of Daughters and Their Parents. Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 15, No. 6,
pp 469-489.
103
Frost, R.O., Steketee, G. Cohn, L. & Griess, K. (1994). Personality traits in subclinical and
non-obsessive-compulsive volunteers and their parents. Behaviour, Research and
Therapy, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp 47-56.
Frost, R.O. & Steketee, G. (1997). Perfectionism in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
patients. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp 291-296.
Gerlsma, C., Kramer, J.J.A.M., Scholing, A. & Emmelkamp, P.M.G. (1994). The
influence of mood on memories of parental rearing practices. British Journal of Clinical
Pscyhology, Vol. 33, pp 159 - 172.
Gershunny, B. & Sher, K. (1995). Compulsive checking and anxiety in a non clinical
sample: differences in cognition, behaviour, personality and affect. Journal of
Psychopathology and Behavioural Assessment, Vol. 17, pp 19-38.
Gibbs, N.A. (1996). Non clinical populations in research on obsessive-compulsive
disorder: a critical review. Clinical Psychology Review, Vol. 16, No. 8, pp 729-773.
Goodman, W.K., Price, L.H., Rasmussen, S.A., Mazure, C., Fleischman, R.C., Hill, C.L.,
Heniger, G.R. & Charney, D.S. (1989). The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale. I.
Development, use and reliability. Archives ofGeneral Psychiatry, Vol 46, pp 1006-1011.
Goodwin, D.W., Guze, S.B. & Robins, E. (1969). Follow up studies in obsessional
neurosis. Archives ofGeneral Psychiatry, Vol. 20, pp 182 - 187.
Guidano, V.F. & Liotti, G. (1983). Cognitive Processes and the Emotional Disorders.
New York: Guilford.
Guidano, V.F. & Liotti, G (1985). Methods for measuring adjustment and social
behaviour in the community: I. Rationale, descriptions, discriminative validity and scale
development. PsycologicalReports, Vol 13, pp 503-535.
Hafner, R.J. (1988). Obsessive compulsive disorder: A questionnnaires survey of a self-
help group. International Journal ofPsychiatry, Vol 34, pp 310-315.
Henderson, J.G. & Pollard, C.E. (1988). Three types of OCD in a community sample.
Journal ofClinical Psychology, Vol 44, pp 747-752.
Himle, J. & Thyer, B.A. (1989). Clinical social work and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder:
a single subject investigation. BehaviourModification, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp 459-470.
Hodgson, R.J. & Rachman, S. (1977). Obsessional-compulsive complaints. Behaviour,
Research and Therapy, Vol. 15, pp 389-395.
Honjo, S., Hirano, C., Murase, S. Kaneko, T., Sugiyama, T., Ohtaka, K., Aoyama, T.,
Takel, Y, Inoko, K. & Wakabayashi, S. (1989). Obsessive compulsive symptoms in
childhood and adolescence. Acta Psychiatrica Scandanavica, Vol. 80, pp 83-91.
104
Hoover, C.F. & Insel, T.R. (1984). Families of origin in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder.
The Journal ofNervous andMental Disease, Vol. 172, No. 4 pp 207-215.
Karno, M., Golding, J.M., Sorenson, S.B. & Burnam, M.A. (1988). The epidemiology of
obsessive compulsive disorder in five US communities. Archives of General Psychiatry,
Vol 45 pp 1094-1099.
Kazdin, A.E. (1978). Evaluating the generality of findings in analogue therapy research.
Journal ofConsulting and Clincial Psychology, Vol 46, pp 673-686.
Kessler, R.C., McGonagle, K.A., Zhao, S, Nelson, C.B., Hughes, M., Eshleman, S.,
Wittchen, H. & Kendler, K.S. (1994). Lifetime and 12 month prevalence of DSM-III-R
psyciatric disorders in the United States. Archives ofGeneral Psychiatry, Vol 51, pp 8-19.
Kimidis, S., Minas, I.H., Ata, A.W. & Stuart, G.W. (1992). Construct validation in
adolescents of the brief current form of the Parental Bonding Instrument. Comprehensive
Psychiatry, Vol 33, pp 378-383.
Klass, E.T. (1987). Situational approach to the assessment of guilt: Development and
validation of a self-report measure. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioural
Assessment, Vol. 9, pp 35-48.
Kozak, M.J. & Foa, E.B. (1994). Obsessions, overvalued ideas and delusions in
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp
343-353.
Ladouceur, R., Rheaume, J., Freeston, M.H., Aublet, R, Jean, K., Lachance, S., Langlois,
F. & De Pokomandy-Morin, K. (1995). Experimental manipulations of responsibility: an
analogue test for models of obsessive compulsive disorder. Behaviour, Research and
Therapy, Vol. 33, No. 8, pp 937-946.
Ladouceur, R, Leger, E, Rheaume, J. & Dube, D. (1996). Correction of inflated
responsibility in the treatment of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Behaviour, Research and
Therapy, Vol. 34, No. 10, pp 767-774.
Lavy, E. & van den Hout, M. (1990). Thought suppression induces intrusion. Behavioural
Psychotherapy, Vol 18, pp 251-258.
Lazarus, R.S. (1966) Psychological Stress and the Coping Process. New York. McGraw -
Hill.
Leger, E., Freeston, M.H. & Ladouceur, R. (1996, August). Cognitive Therapy of
obsessional thoughts. Communication presented at the International Congress of
Psychology, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Lo, W. (1967). A follow up study of obsessional neurotics in Hong Kong Chinese. British
Journal ofPsychiatry, Vol. 113, pp 823-832.
105
Lopatka, C. & Rachman, S. (1995). Perceivied responsibility and compulsive checking:
an experimental analysis. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 33, No. 6, pp 673-684.
McFall, M.E. & Wollersheim, J.P. (1979). Obsessive compulsive neurosis: a cognitive
behavioural formulation and approach to treatment. Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol.
3, pp 333-348.
Mollard, E., Cottraux, J., & Bouvard, M. (1989). Version ffancaise de l'Echelle
d'Obsession-Compulsion de Yale-Brown [French translation of the Yale-Brown Obsessive
Compulsive Scale]. L'Encephale, Vol. 15, pp 335 - 341.
Muris, P, Merckelbach, H. & Clavan, M. (1997). Abnormal and normal compulsions.
Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp 249-252.
Murray, R.M., Cooper, J.E. & Smith, A. (1979). The Leyton Obsessional Inventory: an
analysis of the responses of 73 obsessional patients. Psychological Medicine, Vol. 9, pp
305 - 311.
Niler, E.R. & Beck, S.J. (1989). The relationship among guilt, dysphoria, anxiety and
obsessions in a normal population. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp
213-220.
Norton, G.R., Cox, B.J., Asmundson, G.J.G. & Maser, J.D. (1995). The growth of research
in anxiety disorders during the 1980s. Journal ofAnxiety Disorders, Vol 9, pp 75-5.
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (variety of contributors) (1997).
Cognitive assessment of obsessive compulsive disorder. Behaviour, Research and
Therapy, Vol. 35, No. 7, pp 667 - 681.
Otterbacher, J.R. & Munz, D.C. (1973). State trait meausre of experiential guilt. Journal
ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol 40, pp 115-121.
Parker, G. (1979). Reported parental characteristics of agoraphobics and social phobics.
British Journal ofPsychiatry, Vol 135, pp 155-160.
Parker, G. (1981). Parental representations of patients with anxiety neurosis. Acta
Psychiatrica Scandinavia, Vol 63, pp 33-36.
Parker, G. (1983). Parental overprotection: a risk factor in psychosocial development.
Grune and Stratton, New York.
Parker, G. (1990). The parental bonding instrument. A decade of research. Social
Psychiatry and Psychiatric Edpidemiology, Vol. 25, pp 281-282.
Parker, G., Tupling, H. & Brown, L.B. (1979). A parental bonding instrument. British
Journal ofMedical Psychology, Vol. 52, pp 1-10.
106
Pfohl, A.B., Black, D.W., Noyes, E., Kelley, M. & Blum, N. (1990). A test of the
tridimensional personality theory: association with diagnosis and platelet imipramine
binding in obsessive compulsive disorder." American Journal ofPsychiatry, Vol. 44, pp
226-232.
Purdon, C. & Clark, D.A. (1994). Perceived control and appraisal of obsessional intrusive
thoughts: a replication and extension. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, Vol. 22,
pp 269-285.
Rachman, S. (1971). Obsessional ruminations. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol 9
pp 229-235.
Rachman, S. (1976). Obsessional-compulsive checking. Behaviour, Research and
Therapy, Vol 14, pp 269-277.
Rachman, S.J. (1981). Special issue on unwanted intrusive cognitions. Advances in
Behaviour Research and Therapy, Vol. 3, pp 87-123.
Rachman, S. (1993). Obsessions, responsibility and guilt. Behaviour, Research and
Therapy, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp 149-154.
Rachman, S. & de Silva, P. (1978). Abnormal and normal obsessions. Behaviour,
Research and Therapy, Vol. 16, pp 233-248.
Rachman, S.L. & Hodgson, R.J. (1980). Obsessions and Compulsions. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J: Prentice Hall.
Rachman, S., Thordarson, D.S., Shafran, R. & Woody, S.R. (1995). Perceived
responsibility: structure and significance. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 33, No.
7, pp 779-784.
Rachman, S., Shafran, R. Mitchell, D, Trant, J. & Treachman, B. (1996). How to remain
neutral: an experimental analysis of neutralization. Behaviour, Research and Therapy,
Vol. 34, No. 11/12, pp 889-898.
Rachman, S., Thordarson, D.S. and Radomsky, S. (1996). A revision of the Maudsley
Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (MOCI-R) Unpublished manuscript.
Rasmussen, S. & Tsuang, M. (1986.) Clinical characteristics and family history in DSM III
obsessive compulsive disorder. American Journal ofPsychiatry, Vol. 143, pp 317-322.
Rasmussen, S. & Eisen, J. (1989). Clinical features and phenomenology of obsessive
compulsive disorder. Psychiatric Annals, Vol.19, pp 61-12.
Rheaume, J., Ladouceur, R., Freeston, M.H. & Letarte, H. (1994). Inflated responsibility
in obsessive compulsive disorder: psychometric studies of a semiidiographic measure.
Journal ofPsycopathology and Behavioural Assessment, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp 265-276.
107
Rheaume, J., Ladouceur, R., Freeston, M. & Letarte, H. (1995a) Inflated responsibility in
obsessive compulsive disorder: validation of an operational definition. Behaviour,
Research and Therapy, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp 159-169.
Rheaume, J., Freeston, M.H., Dugas, M.J., Letarte, H. & Ladouceur, R. (1995b).
Perfectionism, responsibility and obsessive-compulsive symptoms." Behaviour, Research
and Therapy, Vol. 33, No. 7, pp 785-794.
Robins, C.J. (1990). Congruence of Personality and Life Events in Depression. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp 393-397.
Robins, L.N. & Reiger, D.A. (Eds) (1991). Psychiatric disorders in America: The
Epidemiological Catchment Area Study. New York: the free press.
Robins,C.J., Ladd, J., Welkowitz, J, Blaney, P.H., Diaz, R. & Kutcher, G. (1994). The
Personal Style Inventory: preliminary validation studies of new measures of sociotropy
and autonomy. Journal ofPsychopathology and Behavioural Assessment, Vol. 16, No. 4,
pp 277.
Safran, J.D., Seagal, Z.V., Hill, C. & Whiffen, V. (1990). Refining strategies on self-
representations in emotional disorders. Cognitive Therapy and Research, Vol. 14, No. 2,
pp 143-160.
Salkovskis, P.M. (1985). Obsessional compulsive problems: a cognitive-behavioural
analysis. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp 571-583.
Salkovskis, P.M. (1989). Cognitive-behavioural factors and the persistence of intrusive
thoughts in obsessional problems. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 27, pp 677-682.
Salkovskis, P.M. (1992). Cognitive models and theory of obsessive compulsive disorder.
Paper presented as the World Congress ofCognitive therapy, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Salkovskis, P. & Harrison, J. (1984). Abnormal and normal obsessions - a replication.
Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp 549-552.
Salkovskis, P.M. & Dent (1989). Intrusive thoughts and negative beliefs, (unpublished
manuscript).
Salkovskis, P.M. & Westbrook, D. (1989). Behaviour therapy and obsessional
ruminations:can failure be turned into success? Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol.
27, No. 2, pp 149-160.
Salkovskis, P.M., Rachman, S.J., Ladouceur, R. & Freeston, M. (1992). Proceedings of
the Toronto Cafeteria. Unpublished.
Salkovskis, P.M. & Campbell, P. (1994). Thought suppression in naturally occurring
negative intrusive thoughts. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol 32, pp 1-8.
108
Salkovskis, P.M., Richards, H.C. & Forrester, E. (1995). The relationship between
obsessional problems and intrusive thoughts. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy,
Vol. 23, pp 281-299.
Salkovskis, P.M., Westbrook, D., Davis, J., Jeavons, A. & Gledhill, A. (1997). Effects of
neutralization on intrusive thoughts: an experiment investigating the etiology of obsessive
compulsive disorder. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp 211-219.
Salzman, L. & Thaler, F.H. (1981). Obsessive -compulsive disorders: a review of the
literature. American Journal ofPsychiatry, Vol 138, pp 286-296.
Sanavio (1988). Obsessiona and compulsions: the Padua Inventory. Behaviour, Research
and Therapy, Vol. 26, pp 169-177.
Segal, Z.V., Shaw, B.F., Vella, D.D. & Katz, R. (1992). Cognitive and life stress
predictors of relapse in remitted unipolar depressed patients: a test of the congruency
hypothesis. Journal ofAbnormal Pscyhology, Vol. 101, pp 26 - 36.
Shafran, R., Thordarson, D.S. & Rachman, S. (1996). Thought-Action Fusion in
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. Journal ofAnxiety Disorders, Vol. 10, pp 379 - 391.
Shapiro, S., Skinner, F.A., Kessler, R.G., Vonkorff, M., German, P.S., Tischler, G.L., Leaf,
P.J., Benham, B., Cofflet, D & Regier, D.A. (1984). Utilization of health and mental
health services. Archives ofGeneral Psychiatry, Vol 44 pp 971-978.
Silove, D., Parker, G., Hadzi, Pavlovic, D., Manicavasagar, V. & Blaszcynski, A (1991).
Parental representations of patients with panic disorder and generalised anxiety disorder.
British Journal ofPsychiatry, Vol 159, pp 835-841.
Sookman, D. Pinard, G. & Beauchemin, N. (1994). Multidimensional schematic
restructuring treatment of obsessions: theory and practice. Journal of Cognitive
Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp 175-194.
Spitzer, R.L., Williams, J.B.W., Miriam Gibbon, D.S.W., & Frost, M.B. (1990).
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM III R Patient Edition. American Psychiatric Press
Inc.
Steiger, J.H. (1980). Tests for comparing elements of a correlation matrix. Psychological
Bulletin, Vol. 87, pp 245 - 251.
Steiner, J.A. (1972). A questionnaire study of risk taking in psychiatric patients. British
Journal ofMedical Psychology, Vol. 45, pp 365-374.
Steketee, G.S., Grayson, J.B. & Foa, E.B. (1985). Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder:
differences between wahsers and checkers. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 23, No.
2, pp 197-201.
109
Steketee, G. & Freund, B. (1991). Compulsive Activity Checklist (CAQ): Further
psychometric analysis and revision. Behavioural Psychotherapy, Vol. 21, pp 13-25.
Steketee, G., Quay, S. & White, K (1991). Religion and Guilt in OCD Patients. Journal of
Anxiety Disorders, Vol. 5, pp 359-367.
Taylor, S. (1995,in press). Assessment of obsessions and compulsions:self report
inventories and observer-rated scales. Clinical Psychology Review.
Trinder, H. & Salkovskis, P.M. (1994). Personally relevant intrusions outside the
laboratory: long term suppression increases intrusion. Behaviour, Research and Therapy,
Vol 32, pp 833-842.
Van Oppen, P. & Arntz, A. (1994). Cognitive therapy for obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Behaviour, Research and Therapy, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp 79-87.
Van Oppen, P. de Haan, E., van Balkom, A.J.L.M., van Dyck, R., Hoogduin, C.A.L. &
Spinhoven, P. (1992). Behaviour therapy versus cognitive therapy for obsessive
compulsives. Paper presented at the second World Congress of Cognitive Therapy,
Toronto, 17-21 June, 1992.
Wegner, D.M., Schneider, D.J., Carter, S.R. & White, T.L. (1987). Paradoxical effects of
thought suppression. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychiatry, Vol 53, pp 5-13.
Williams, E.J. (1959). The comparison of regression variables. Journal of the Royal




APPENDIX 1 PURE OBSESSIONS
Case History of Participant with Pure Obsessions
(participant 11 in Table 2, Results section)
The patient 'RB' was the only participant recruited who experienced pure obsessions, i.e.
with no overt or covert compulsive behaviours. He was a 30 year old man, with an 18 year
history of obsessive compulsive difficulties.
RB was an in patient at the time of assessment. He had had a number of previous
admissions in the preceding 7 years. He reported having had contact with mental health
services since the age of 12, and had received Clinical Psychology input intermittently for
a number of years. His last contact with a Psychologist had been 3 years previously. The
treatment approach he described was cognitive behavioural. Current medication was
fluoxetine.
RB described having some obsessional thoughts related to contamination. However, his
predominant obsessions involved ideas of harming others. His most distressing thought
was that he had killed someone. He said the thoughts were present for "100% of the day".
Although he did not engage in any compulsive behaviours, RB did seek reassurance from
other people and would try to distract himself from the thoughts. He prayed in relation to
the thoughts, but the praying was not in a compulsive or ritualized manner. He would also
avoid situations which made the thoughts more salient.
This case was particularly interesting because of the recent development of his symptoms.
RB said that in the past, he had carried out a number of compulsive behaviours, such as
checking, counting and repeating words silently. However, he described a significant
change in his symptoms which he was able to date accurately to 3 months before our
meeting. Previous to that time, he said that his obsessional thoughts had involved thoughts
of him harming others. The thoughts had now changed to the repeated doubt that he had
killed someone. He was able to pinpoint the development of the obsession to a specific
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incident in which he had got into a friend's car and, he said "I put my foot under the ledge
of the car and thought, I've killed someone". It was after this point that the obsessional
thought had changed from fears that he would harm someone to thinking that he had
already killed someone. What was particularly interesting was that after this time, he no
longer carried out the compulsive behaviours. He explained that previously he had
checked to "guard against" the possibility of him harming anyone. Since the content of the
thought had changed to him already having killed someone, the purpose and therefore
completion of the compulsions became redundant.
Problems with the distinction between obsessions and delusions was apparent in this case.
This issue was discussed in general and in relation to this participant in the Discussion
section of the current paper, and so will not be repeated in full here. The particular aspects
of this case of note are firstly RB's level of recognition that the thoughts were 'senseless'
(OCD criteria). He was able to accept that there may have been a possibility that the
thoughts were not true and he did not believe the thoughts completely, but this was not
absolute. Secondly, he was not able to fully appreciate the impossibility of having killed
someone in the manner he had described. In terms of a continuum of strength of belief in
the thought, RB was close to an absence of recognition of the senselessness of the thought,
and the distinction between an obsessional and a psychotic thought was slight. His scores
on the research questionnaire battery are shown below, together with the mean scores for
the OCD group for comparison.
MOCI
R




















It can be seen that compared to the mean, RB scored significantly lower on the MOCI - R.
This was discussed more fully in the Discussion section. BDI and BAI scores show a high
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level of clinical depression and anxiety. The sociotropy score was equal to the group mean
and the autonomy score higher than the mean. His sociotropy score was higher than
autonomy, which was the prediction for whole group analyses. IBRO score was higher
than the mean, which for this individual would have been expected. Paternal care and
overprotection scores were not dissimilar from mean scores. Maternal care and
overprotection were higher than mean scores for the group. In this case therefore, high
overprotection was found, even though low care was not a significant factor.
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APPENDIX 2
This appendix provides brief case descriptions of the 3 participants whose scores on the
Parental Bonding Instrument most clearly fell into the 'affectionless control' (high
overprotection, low care) category. Participants were not asked directly about their
experience of parenting during the clinical interview, so the outlines below do not discuss
parenting in detail, but provide qualitative information about the clinical presentation of
each participant.
Participant DB: maternal 4affectionless control'
(participant 7 in Table 2, Results section)
'DB' was a 31 year old woman who said she had always been 'perfectionistic' but dated
the onset of obsessive compulsive symptoms to the age of 11. She experienced thoughts
about contamination linked to ideas of harm coming to other people. She also described
the need to keep things in a particular order around the home and followed a number of
routines, for example when dressing. Overt compulsions were checking and cleaning. She
engaged in one covert compulsion, of counting.
DB felt that the nature of the obsessions and compulsions had changed over the course of
the disorder. For example, the purchase of her own flat had led to increased cleaning. At
the time of the assessment, she was living away from her own home, which had reduced
many of her symptoms. This was consistent with Rachman's (1993) description of
increased symptoms in the person's own "psychological territory". When working as a
secretary, the symptoms were increased and checking behaviour was predominant. Since
she had stopped work, the behaviours had reduced and she would spend approximately
half an hour a day either aware of the obsessions or acting on the compulsions. She felt
generally that symptoms were present for 60 - 65% of the time.
DB had been on antidepressant medication (paroxetine) for 7 months and had been
receiving cognitive therapy for just less than that time. Her scores on the measures are


























It can be seen from the table that she scored highly in terms of obsessive compulsive
symptoms, and symptoms of anxiety and depression were mild. In this case, the IBRO
score was relatively low. Autonomy was high and this is interesting in the light of the high
maternal overprotection score, possibly indicating a 'rebound' to autonomous achievement
(as described in the Discussion section).
Participant KF: Paternal 'Affectionless Control'
(participant 4 in Table 2, Results section)
'KF' was a 33 year old woman with a 5 year history of OCD. She was able to date the
onset of problems to a foreign holiday when on her return she had begun to have thoughts
about food, bones or pieces of glass becoming stuck in her throat. Obsessions also
involved fears of contamination and thoughts of harm coming to others. Compulsions
were checking and cleaning, although these had lessened considerably. She would often
throw food out if she had thoughts of it being contaminated. She frequently asked for
reassurance from her husband, and would often ask him to take baths due to her
contamination fears.
KF was taking anti-depressant medication (fluoxetine). She had received cognitive
behavioural therapy for a 2 year period, but was no longer receiving treatment. She felt
that her compulsive symptoms had improved considerably, but she described the
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obsessional thoughts as still present and they caused distress on a daily basis. Her scores
on the measures are recorded below.
MOCI
R






















Again, the MOCI - R score was relatively low, while depression and particularly anxiety
symptoms were severe. Dysfunctional beliefs about obsessions were not strongly held, as
measured by the IBRO. Sociotropy and autonomy scores were similar to or lower than the
mean scores for the group. This participant suspected that her responses on the measures
would have been considerably more 'dysfunctional' if she had completed them before she
had received cognitive treatment for her problems. She recognised that her thinking style
had changed as a result of therapy. Maternal bonding showed relatively low care
compared to the group mean, but overprotection was not unusually high. Paternal care was
lower than mean scores and overprotection considerably higher.
Participant SR: paternal 'affectionless control'
(participant 1 in Table 2, Results section)
'SR' was a 39 year old woman with a 17 year history of OCD. She had also received a
diagnosis of manic depression at the age of 30, but said that she had had no episodes since
the time the diagnosis was made. This participant's symptoms were described in the
Discussion section, in relation to group heterogeneity and the continuum between
obsessions and delusions.
SR reported one powerful obsession related to thoughts and images of having strangled
somebody. These thoughts had begun 4 years previously. She responded to these thoughts
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by checking and continually seeking reassurance. She described this thought or image as
being present 100% of the time. She recognised that the thought was the product of her
own mind and was irrational, but she continued to doubt whether or not it was true. She
was sometimes able to distract herself from the thought, but was continually distressed by
it. Checking behaviours, which had been present previous to this obsessional thought and
still remained were related to thoughts of harm coming to others, and led to behaviours
such as checking plugs and electrical appliances. SR would also repeat actions and
sometimes compulsively repeat words. The compulsive behaviours took up approximately
half an hour a day, but the main interference in functioning came from the distress due to
the obsessional thoughts.
Medication prescribed was sertraline, lithium and thioridazine. She had had frequent
admissions due to the obsessions and continued to contact psychiatric services for
reassurance about the thoughts. She had received psychotherapy a year previously, but
contact had been brief. Her questionnaire scores are shown below.
MOCI
R






















The MOCI - R score was not particularly high, possibly due to the limited number of
symptoms, rather than intensity. Mild to moderate depression and anxiety can be seen.
The IBRO score was higher than the group mean, which would be expected in an
individual with predominantly obsessional thoughts which were extremely intense.
Sociotropy and autonomy scores are not notable. Neither maternal care or overprotection
were significantly different from group means, but it can be seen that paternal care was
much lower and overprotection higher than mean scores.
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APPENDIX 3
COPIES OF MAIN QUESTIONNAIRES USED IN THE STUDY:
1. The Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory - Revised
2. The Inventory ofBeliefs Related to Obsessions
3. The Personal Style Inventory
4. The Parental Bonding Instrument
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MOCI-R
Please rate each statement by putting a circle around the number that best describes
how much you agree with the statement, or how much it is true of you. Please answer
every item, without spending too much time on any particular item.








1. I find it very difficult to make even trivial decisions. 0 1 2 3 4
2. Touching the bottom of my shoes makes me very
anxious.
0 1 2 3 4
3. For me, thinking about making an obscene gesture feels
as bad as actually doing it.
0 1 2 3 4
4. I feel compelled to check letters over and over before
mailing them.
0 1 2 3 4
5. I am often upset by unwanted urges to harm myself. 0 1 2 3 4
6. I feel compelled to follow a very strict routine when doing
ordinary things.
0 1 2 3 4
7. If I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this
increases the risk that he/she will actually have a car
accident.
0 1 2 3 4
8. My living space is unacceptably full of clutter because I
have great trouble throwing things away.
0 1 2 3 4
9. I feel extremely contaminated if I touch an animal. 0 1 2 3 4
10. I worry far too much that I might upset other people. 0 1 2 3 4
11. I repeatedly experience the same unwanted thought or
image about an accident.
0 1 2 3 4
12. One of my major problems is that I collect excessive
amounts of useless things.
0 1 2 3 4
13. I repeatedly expenence upsetting and unacceptable
thoughts of a religious nature.
0 1 2 3 4
14. I tend to get behind in my work because I repeat things
over and over again.
0 1 2 3 4
15. I excessively check and recheck things like taps and
switches after turning them off.
0 1 2 3 4
16. I spend far too much time washing my hands. 0 1 2 3 4








17. I try to put off making decisions because I'm so frightened
of making a mistake.
0 1 2 3 4
18. I am often upset by my unwanted thoughts of using a
sharp weapon.
0 1 2 3 4
19. I almost always count when doing a routine task. 0 1 2 3 4
20. If I think of a relative/friend falling ill this increases the risk
that he/she will actually fall ill.
0 1 2 3 4
21. I am afraid to use even well-kept public toilets. 0 1 2 3 4
22. I repeatedly experience the same upsetting thought or
image about death.
0 1 2 3 4
23. I feel upset if my furniture, ornaments, or other objects
are not always in exactly the same position.
0 1 2 3 4
24. Having violent thoughts feels as unacceptable to me as
violent acts.
0 1 2 3 4
25. I find that almost every day I am upset by unpleasant
thoughts that come into my mind against my will.
0 1 2 3 4
26. I take an excessively long time to dress in the morning. 0 1 2 3 4
27. I am often upset by unwanted thoughts or images of
sexual acts.
0 1 2 3 4
28. I often have trouble getting things done because I try to
do everything exactly nght.
0 1 2 3 4
29. I am frightened of having any contact with bodily
secretions (blood, unne, sweat, etc.).
0 1 2 3 4
30. I often experience upsetting and unwanted thoughts
about illness.
0 1 2 3 4
31. I feel strongly compelled to keep things like lots of empty
boxes and newspapers just in case I need them later on.
0 1 2 3 4
32. I often feel compelled to memorize trivial things (e.g.,
licence plate numbers, instructions on labels).
0 1 2 3 4
33. My mean thoughts wishing a person harm can increase
the chance that something harmful will actually happen to
him or her.
0 1 2 3 4








34. I often feel strong unwanted urges to drive or run into
oncoming traffic.
0 1 2 3 4
35. I repeatedly check that my stove is turned off, even
though I resist the urge to do so.
0 1 2 3 4
36. Having a blasphemous thought feels as sinful to me as a
sacrilegious act.
0 1 2 3 4
37. 1 feel very dirty after touching money. 0 1 2 3 4
38. After 1 have decided something, 1 usually worry about my
decision for a long time.
0 1 2 3 4
39. 1 often experience upsetting and unwanted thoughts
about losing control.
0 1 2 3 4
40. 1 am often very late because 1 can't get through ordinary
tasks on time.
0 1 2 3 4
41. 1 find it very difficult to touch garbage or garbage bins. 0 1 2 3 4
42. 1 spend a lot of time every day checking things over and
over again.
0 1 2 3 4
43. 1 avoid using public telephones because of possible
contamination.
0 1 2 3 4
44. 1 feel compelled to be absolutely perfect. 0 1 2 3 4
45. Having bad thoughts makes me feel like a ternble person. 0 1 2 3 4
46. One of my ma|or problems is repeated checking. 0 1 2 3 4
47. 1 repeatedly experience upsetting and unwanted immoral
thoughts.
0 1 2 3 4
48. 1 find it almost impossible to decide what to keep and
what to throw away.
0 1 2 3 4
49. 1 am excessively concerned about germs and disease. 0 1 2 3 4
50. 1 am strongly compelled to count things. 0 1 2 3 4
51 1 become very anxious when 1 have to make even a minor
decision.
0 1 2 3 4






52. For me, thinking bad things feels as bad as actually
doing bad things.
0 1 2 3 4
53. 1 frequently have to check things (e.g., gas or water taps,
doors, etc.) several times.
0 1 2 3 4
54. One of my major problems is that 1 am excessively
concerned about cleanliness.
0 1 2 3 4
55. 1 am often very upset by my unwanted impulses to harm
other people.
0 1 2 3 4
56. 1 spend far too long getting ready to leave home each
day.
0 1 2 3 4
57. 1 repeatedly check that my doors or windows are locked,
even though 1 resist the urge to do so.
0 1 2 3 4
58. If 1 have a thought or image of a bad thing happening to
people 1 care about, it makes me feel that 1 have put them
at risk.
0 1 2 3 4
59. One of my major problems is that 1 pay far too much
attention to detail.
0 1 2 3 4
60. For me, thinking unkindly about a friend feels as disloyal
as doing an unkind act.
0 1 2 3 4
61. I am often upset by unwanted thoughts or images of
blurting out obscenities or insults in public.
0 1 2 3 4
62. Touching the floor frightens me. 0 1 2 3 4
Rachman, Thordarson, Radomsky, 5c Shafran, June 1996
- BELIEF INVENTORY (Freeston et al 1993)
\
The statements below describe the attitudes people may have toward their own thoughts Please mark the space next to each
statement according to how strongly you believe that it is true or false for you. Please mark every one
6: 1 believe strongly that this statement is true
5: I believe that this statement is true.
4: I believe that this statement is probably true, at least more true than false.
3; I believe that this statement is probably false, at least more false than true.
2: I believe that this statement is false.
1: I believe strongly that this statement is false.
— 1 Thoughts are in themselves harmless
— 2.Uncertainty should not disturb.
— 3 .It is unforgivable to be responsible for an error that makes oneself look bad.
— 4 Guilt is an appropriate response to unacceptable thoughts.
— 5.Danger is always a terrible thing
— 6. If one believes that there is even the slightest possibility of having caused harm, then one must act so as not to be
blamed.
— 7 One should avoid at any price any activity that runs the possibility ofbeing held personally responsible for a loss
— 8 Loss is always a terrible thing
— 9 One should feel guilty if thoughts are ot controlled.
— 10 Not being able to control thoughts will harm no one.
— 11 Enduring unpleasant thoughts without doing anything is dangerous for the person who has them
— 12 Generally speaking, it is preferable to carry responsibility alone
— 13 . Punishing oneself for errors that may have been made will enable future errors to be avoided
— 14 Eduring unpleasant thoughts without doing anything can lead to their disappearance.
— 15.A responsible person does not let unpleasant thought occur without trying to control them
— 16.The loss of someone dear is always unbearable
— 17.One is to blame is something happens that one has thought about
— 18.To be uncertain about haaving caused possible harm is unbearable even if the possibility is very unlikely
— 19 Uncertainty is a source for concern
— 20.One should feel very guilty if there is the slightest possibility that one is responsible for an unfortunate event
Personal Style Inventory
Here are a number of statements about personal characteristics Please read each carefully, and indicate
whether you agree or disagree, and to what extent, by circling a number
Strongly Slightly Slightly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
I I often put other people's 1
needs before my own.
2. I tend to keep other 1
people at a distance.
3 I find it difficult to be 1
separated from people I love
4 I am easily bothered by other 1
people making demands ofme
5 I am very sensitive to the 1
effects I have on the feelings
of other people
6 I don't like relying on 1
others for help
7. I am very sensitive to 1
criticism by others
8 It bothers me when I feel 1
that I am only average and
ordinary
9 I worry a lot about hurting 1
or offending other people
10 When I'm feeling blue, I don't 1
like to be offered sympathy
II It is hard for me to break I
off a relationship even if
it is making me unhappy
12 In relationships, people 1
are often too demanding of
one another
13 I am easily persuaded by 1
others
14 I usually view my performance
as either a complete success
or a complete failure
15 I try to please other people
too much.
16 I don't like people to invade
my privacy.
17. I find it difficult if I
have to be alone all day.
18 It is hard for me to take
instructions from people who
have authority over me
19. I often feel responsible for
solving other people's
problems.
20. I often handle big decisions
without telling anyone else
about them
21 It is very hard for me to
get over the feeling of loss
when a relationship has ended
22 It is hard for me to have
someone dependent on me
23 It is very important to me
to be liked or admired by
others
24 I feel badly about myself
when I am not actively
accomplishing things
25 I feel I have to be nice
to other people
26 It is hard for me to express
admiration or affection
27 I like to be certain that
there is somebody close I
can contact in case something
unpleasant happens to me
Strongly Slightly Slightly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
12 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6
12 3 6 5 6
Strongly
Disagree
28. It is difficult for me to 1
make a long-term commitment
to a relationship
29 I am too apologetic to 1
other people.
30. It is hard for me to open 1
up and talk about my feelings
and other personal things.
31 I am very concerned with 1
how people react to me
32. I have a hard time forgiving 1
myselfwhen I feel I haven't
worked up to my potential
33. I get very uncomfortable I
when I'm not sure whether
or not someone likes me
34 When making a big decision, I 1
usually feel that advice from
others is intrusive
35 It is hard for me to say 1
"no" to other people's
requests.
36 I resent it when people try 1
to direct my behavior or
activities
37. I become upset when something 1
happens to me and there's
nobody around to talk to
38 Personal questions from others 1
usually feei like an invasion
of my privacy
39 I am most comfortable when 1
I know my behavior is what
others expect of me
40. I am very upset when other 1
people or circumstances
interfere with my plans
Slightly Slightly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 6 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
2 3 4 5 6
Strongly Slightly Slightly Strong!;
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
41. I often let people take
advantage ofme.
42. I rarely trust the advice
of others when making a
big decision.
43 I become very upset when a
friend breaks a date or
forgets to call me as
planned
44. I become upset more than most
people I know when limits
are placed on my personal
independence and freedom
45. I judge myself based on how
I think others feel about me.
46 I become upset when others
try to influence my thinking
on a problem
47 It is hard for me to let
people know when I am
angry with them.
48 I feel controlled when others
have a say in my plans
Thank you for completing this questionnaire
THE PARENTAL BONDING INSTRUMENT
This questionnaire lists various attitudes and behaviours of parents. As you remember your MOTHER in









1 Spoke to me with a warm and friendly voice ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )2. Did not help me as much as I needed ( ) ( ) ( )
3 Let me do those things I liked doing ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
4 Seemed emotionally cold to me ( ) ( ) ( )
5 Appeared to understand my problems and worries ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
6. Was affectionate to me ( ) ( ) ( )
7. Liked me to make my own decisions ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
8 Did not want me to grow up ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
9 Tried to control everything 1 did ( ) ( ) ( 1
1 i
10 Invaded mv privacy 1 )
1 1 Enjoyed talking things over with me ( 1
12 Frequently smiled at me ( 1
13 Tended to babv me ( 1
14 Did not seem to understand \vhut 1 needed in wanted ( )
1 5 Let me decide things tor myselt' t 1
16 Made me feel 1 wasn t wanted ( >
17 Could make me feel better when I was upset I I
18 Did not talk with me very much ( )
Id Tried to make me dependent on her ( >
20 Felt 1 could not look after myself unless she was around ( )
21 Gave me as much freedom as 1 w anted ( )
22 Let me go out as often as 1 wanted < )
27 Was overprotective of me i )
24 Did not praise me < 1



















THE PARENTAL BONDING INSTRUMENT
This questionnaire lists various attitudes and behaviours of parents As you remember your FATHER in
your first 16 years would you place a tick in the most appropriate brackets next to each question
very moderately moderately very
like like unlike unlike
1 Spoke to me with a warm and friendly voice ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 Did not help me as much as I needed ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
3 Let me do those things I liked doing ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
4 Seemed emotionally cold to me ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
5 Appeared to understand my problems and worries ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
6 Was affectionate to me ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
7 Liked me to make my own decisions ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
8 Did not want me to grow up <1 ( ) ( ) ( )
9 Tried to control everything 1 did < ) 1 ) ( ) l 1
10 Invaded mv privacy I ) < ) ( ) I 1
1 1 Enjoyed talking things over with me (I ( ) ( ) ( l
1 2 Frequently smiled at me ( ) ( ) ( ) I )
1 3 Tended to babv me ( l li ( I . i
14 Did not seem to understand what 1 needed or wanted I ) (' I < i (. 1
15 Let me decide things for myself ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
16 Made me feel I wasn't wanted ( I (1 ( ) ( )
1 7 Could make me feel better when 1 was upset 1 ) I ) ( ) I 1
18 Did not talk with me very much ( ) < ) ( ) ( )
19 Tried to make me dependent on him l ) ( ) ( ) I 1
20 Felt I could not look after myself unless he was around 1 ) ( > ( ) ( )
21 Gave me as much freedom as 1 wanted it (1 ( ) 1 1
22 Let me go out as often as I wanted ( ) () ( ) I )
23 Was overprotective of me i ) i ) ( ) ( i
24 Did not praise me i ) i i i 1 1 1
2> Lei me dress in anv wav 1 pleased ii li I ) 1 I
